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Abstract
The thesis analyses the Coventry car component industry and
investigates its significance to the British motor industry
between 1895-1939. Traditionally, historians have
compartmentalized their analyses of the motor industry by
focusing on the car assembling sector at the expense of the car
component makers. Consequently, although Coventry played a
leading role in the motor industry between 1895-1939, its
component sector has remained neglected by economic and
social historians.
Nevertheless, Chandler and Lewchu k have suggested that
British motor manufacturers were inefficient due to an absence
of backward integration in the industry during the interwar
period. However, in common with previous investigations, their
assumptions were not based on an archival analysis of the car
component industry. By overlooking why the component sector
was heavily utilised in Britain, historians have assumed that
British car manufacturers rejected integrated production
structures due to either managerial failure or labour resistance
to Fordism.
This thesis sheds new light on the organisation of the motor
industry between 1895-1939, by drawing from primary sources
which hitherto have been overlooked or inaccessible to
historians. Moreover, the study offers a new perspective by
arguing that the production practices of the car assemblers can
only be assessed when they are analysed in conjunction with the
car component sector.
Unlike previous studies, the thesis argues the car assemblers
use of the component sector was the optimum production
strategy. Whereas mass car consumerism in the US allowed
American based firms to integrate production, the shallow social
depth of the British car market required manufacturers to
implement annual model changes. This process could only be
achieved through the extensive use of the component sector
which proved the most flexible method of manufacture. On a
more general level, the thesis challenges Chandler's suggestion
that industrial structure followed business strategy. Thus the
dis-integrated structure of the motor industry reflected Britain's
domestic car market rather than deficiencies in strategy at a
managerial level.
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Introduction
The thesis is primarily concerned with examining the structure
of the Coventry car component industry and analysing its
significance and relationship with British car assemblers
between 1895-1939. In order that the industry is placed in an
appropriate analytical framework, it is important to clarify the
term structure. In analysing and defining the structure of the
industry, the study will pursue six major areas and objectives:
(i) Create a data base of the number and size of firms (ii)
Examine the circumstances surrounding the entry and departure
of firms in the industry (iii) Analyse the sources of finance
open to firms (iv) Investigate the ownership and management of
firms (v) Determine the degree of rationalization in terms of
product standardization and production techniques (vi)
Investigate the relationship between car manufactures and
suppliers.' One of the main problems when evaluating the
structure of the component industry is its vast diversity, both in
terms of the range of components produced and the geographical
dispersion of firms. Thus, in order to keep the project within
manageable proportions the research will be conducted along
certain parameters. First, the geographical area under study is
the Coventry region. Coventry played a key role in the
development of both car and component manufacturers, due to
the city's distinct contribution to the origins of the British car
1 Works cited throughout the thesis are published in London unless
otherwise stated. For a similar definition of 'structure' in an industrial
context see J.S. Dunnett, (1980), The Decline of the British Motor
Industry, p. 18.
2industry and its central role in the subsequent instability and
decline of the industry. 2 However, the thesis will avoid treating
the component sector in isolation since an emphasis will be
placed on the connection between the Coventry component
sector and British car manufacturers as a whole. Moreover, this
analysis will be set against the structural changes that occurred
in the British motor industry between 1895-1939. Second, the
research will focus on five major branches of the component
trade, the manufacture of engines, stampings and castings,
electrical equipment, bodies, and tyres and wheels. These
distinct five branches were selected for analysis since the
contemporary component manufacturers organised their industry
in this fashion through the formation of trade associations and
trade agreements. Finally, as a prime objective of the study is
to analyse the interaction between car assemblers and component
makers, analysis will not include firms which produced
accessories for the general public.
The initial problem when embarking on a study of this nature
is that firms involved in the component industry were generally
small family concerns possessing a low profile. Consequently,
to some extent, the surviving source material placed limitations
on the research conducted. Unlike car manufacturers such as
Daimler, Rolls Royce and Jaguar, component manufacturers were
rarely in themselves the subject of media attention or
contemporary literature commemorating the industry's progress.
Many of the small privately owner-managed concerns saw little
2 D. Thorns and T. Donnelly, (1985), The Motor Car Industry in Coventry
Since the 1890s, Preface.
3value in keeping minute books detailing business decisions since
they were largely answerable only to themselves. The analysis
of the financial structure of these firms also proved difficult as
only a handful of firms retained a consistent run of balance
sheets. Moreover, firms were not required to produce
standardized balance sheets until 1929, which meant that an
extensive comparative fiscal analysis of firms would have been
an undependable exercise. Consequently, the fiscal analysis of
Coventry car component firms was restricted to the financial
sources of firms where there existed a wealth of consistent
primary sources.
However, although these limitations had the affect of
restricting research in certain areas, there was a rich collection
of source material which, hitherto, had remained neglected.
Since previous studies have largely drawn evidence from the
major car assemblers, such as Daimler, Rover and Standard
Motor Company, the research will offer a new perspective on the
s.tructure of the British motor industry by analysing primary_
sources from the component sector of the industry.
In order to utilise fully the existing primary source Material
the study's methodology has drawn from both qualitative and
non-qualitative research techniques. The non-qualitative sources
have primarily been used to analyse the changing size, product
variation, ownership and output of Coventry component firms.
A most valuable source in this respect was the City of Coventry
Trade Directories and Official Guides which provided
information, to varying degrees of detail, on the firms engaged
in car and component manufacture in Coventry. The directories
often listed the proprietors and directors of firms, the products
4made, customers and the date of company formation. However,
certain drawbacks did emerge with an over reliance on the
information contained in trade directories. In some instances
trade directories accidentally omitted firms that were still
trading, and failed to register changes in ownership after take-
overs or mergers. Clearly, when compiling a data base on the
number of Coventry firms it was necessary to consult other
sources. Perhaps the most useful sources from which to cross
reference the data gleaned from directories, were the trade
journals. For example, publications such as The Motor and
Autocar listed annually the Coventry component firms that
displayed products at the yearly motor shows. Also the years
chosen to create a data base of component firms were, to some
extent, dictated by the availability of surviving directories. For
example, although the data collected for years 1902, 1912, 1920,
1926, 1936, provide an effective framework from which to
demonstrate the changing pattern of the component industry,
these precise years also offered the most accurate and
comprehensive information on the Coventry component industry.
The non-qualitative nature of the component industry was also
ascertained by the information supplied by the Society of Motor
Manufacturers and Traders which published various reports
throughout the period on the size, number of workers, output
and product variation of the industry. Similar information on
the state of the motor industry was also available from various
editions of the Times newspaper and in the Political and
Economic Planning Report of 1950.
The non-qualitative methodology proved effective in
measuring the changing structure of the Coventry Car
5Component industry. However, in order that the structure was
fully explained it was necessary to consult qualitative evidence.
Source material of this kind was numerous but surprisingly had
often been neglected by previous historians. For example,
despite heavy bombing of Coventry's engineering firms during
the Second World War, the City Record Office and the Modern
Records Centre at the University of Warwick hold over thirty
company archives of Coventry firms engaged in car and
component manufacture since the 1890s. Indeed, for over
twenty years both groups have pursued a policy of collecting and
preserving business records. The vast majority of these firms,
such as Van Raden, Cornercroft and Coventry Motor Fittings
provided fresh areas of research since, prior to this study, they
had never received academic attention. These sources often
comprised minute books, cash books, balance sheets, production
sheets, customer correspondence and company histories. Not
only did these sources reveal information on the personalities
who owned the firm, but they also offered an invaluable insight
into a company's financial position, product strategy, and
customer relations. However, in some cases analysis of this
data alone was not sufficient to ascertain a company's position,
especially in financial matters which were sometimes destroyed,
omitted, or 'massaged' in official company literature. The
under-utilised bank archives proved an invaluable source in
providing an accurate account of a company's financial position.
These archives revealed the sources of finance open to firms,
the extent firms relied on bank loans and the fiscal relationship
between car manufacturers and their suppliers.	 The daily
journals of the Coventry branches of Lloyds, Midland and
6Barclays presented a vivid picture of the Coventry business
community. Indeed, the information contained in the journals
was not confined to financial matters since products, output,
customers and business strategy were also discussed. The bank
archives also offered detailed information on component firms
whose records no longer exist. Likewise, the Board of Trade
files at the Public Record Office were the only surviving source
material available for some small firms. These files contained
details on the owners, shareholders and the type of product the
firm made. Birth certificates and will probates deposited at
Somerset House were also useful in tracing individuals, family
business interests and the social back grounds of entrepreneurs
involved in the Coventry car component industry. Finally,
insights into the origins and organisation of firms which had left
behind little or no documentary evidence were gained through
oral history interview with former employees and owners.
Moreover, extensive use was made of the oral history archives
housed in the Coventry Record Office and Coventry University.
The source material is examined thematically, avoiding a
narrative account of the industry which a chronological
framework may have induced. Therefore, the major themes
which in some way influenced the structure of the component
industry are the subject of individual chapters. The criteria for
the selection of themes were based on two main principles.
First, the themes should not extensively overlap, and second
they should relate to one another in order to identify effectively
7the structure of the industry and to avoid artificially
compartmentalizing the component trade.3
Chapter one, is divided into two sections, comprising an
historiography of the motor industry and an analysis of recent
economic and social models relevant to a study that focuses on
industrial history. Chapter two analyses the nature of the motor
industry in Britain between 1896-1939. The objective of this
chapter is to provide the reader with a background to the major
car manufacturing centres in Britain and to place the case study
of Coventry into an historical context. Chapter three initiates
the analysis of the primary source material relating to the
Coventry car component industry. This chapter provides the
foundations for the following chapters since it identifies and
analyses the entry and exit of firms and the nature of the
competitiveness in the component industry between 1895-1939.
Chapter four builds on this research by investigating the sources
of finance open to firms, assessing the size of firms (in terms of
capital) in the industry and the degree to which the industry was
supported by financial institutions. Chapter five analyses the
ownership and management of firms. Here, the social
composition of owners, the significance of family firms and the
extent to which professional management were employed are
investigated. Chapter six examines the claim that the
component industry was inherently inefficient due to a
reluctance to embrace new technology and mass production
techniques. Consequently, this chapter focuses on the output of
firms and the nature of demands made by car assemblers.
3 For the thesis' definition of the term industrial 'structure' see p. 1.
8Chapter seven pursues this theme by analysing the relationship
between the car component makers and the car assemblers. This
section examines why, unlike the American car firms, British car
assemblers were reluctant to engage in backward integration.
The chapter investigates the rationale behind this production
strategy by examining the significance of the British car market
in the 1920s and 1930s. Thus although the thesis is grounded in
original research, the study will place its conclusions against
other appropriate theoretical perspectives.
Finally the conclusion will illustrate how these themes had a
bearing on the component industry and how Coventry's car
component industry professed a wider relevance to the structure
of the motor industry as a whole. Thus, by combining both
qualitative and non-qualitative research methods and analysing
the sources thematically, it was possible to construct a detailed
analysis of the Coventry component industry and its relationship
with the wider motor industry.
Chapter One
A Literature Review: A Historiography of the
British Motor Industry and Themes in Business
History
This chapter will review secondary source literature relating
to the British motor industry between 1895-1939 and examine
current themes and discussions within business history.
Consequently, the chapter is divided into two distinct sections.
The first section will consist of a historiography of the motor
industry which will analyse the various methodologies and
conclusions that have been offered by historians over the past
fifty years. A major objective will be to identify gaps in the
existing knowledge of the motor industry where an original
contribution to our understanding of the car component trade
can be offered. The second section will investigate current
themes in business history which will set the examination of the
car component industry into an appropriate analytical structure.
The objective of this section will be to select concepts, models
and themes which will most effectively analyse the structure of
the industry and its interaction with the car assemblers.
The British Motor Industry: A Historiography
During the last twenty years, the growth and development of
the British motor industry has been the subject of a number of
academic studies. Prior to this period, histories of the industry
had emerged largely from in-house company projects or from
veteran car enthusiasts. However, even during this period, there
10
were a handful of historians who became interested in the motor
industry, and their methodology has been important in
influencing subsequent historians who have entered this research
field. The pioneering research of Maxcy and Silberton, which
was published in 1959, was the first major study which
attempted to analyse the structure and development of the
British motor industry between 1895-1956. It's main aim was to
analyse the costs of production in the motor industry. The
analysis was placed in a geographical context with frequent
comparative references to developing motor industries in other
countries. However, despite attempting to examine production
costs, the authors, when defining their research parameters,
interpreted the motor industry as mainly comprising of motor
vehicle manufacturers.' Thus, although Maxcy and Silberton
acknowledged that car manufacturers purchased almost two
thirds of their components from external suppliers, there was an
absence of analysis of archival research relating to the
component industry. However, the deficiency of such analysis
did not prevent the authors from passing judgement on the
developing car component industry between 1895-1959. Thus, in
explaining the comparatively slow growth of Britain's motor
industry, the authors asserted that:
almost certainly, however, the achievement of the British
industry was less than it would otherwise have been
because of the lack of an efficient components industry,
William Morris, who pursued a deliberate policy of buying
a high proportion of his components from outside
suppliers, had to turn to the United States in 1914 when he
could find no British firm which could provide large
1	 G. Maxcy and A. Silberton, The Motor Industry, (1959), preface.
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enough quantities of standardized parts to fulfil his
growing requirements.2
However, despite such assertive statements, analysis of the
component industry was restricted to references to the
development of large component firms. Indeed, there was no
attempt to investigate the small firms which numerically
dominated the component industry and consequently, the reasons
why component firms were unable to meet Morris' demands in
1914. Evidence for their hypothesis was drawn almost
exclusively from material relating to car assemblers, and
therefore it is perhaps no surprise that the blame for slow
growth was shifted from the car assemblers to the component
sector.
Certainly, Maxcy and Silberton did not have access to the
source material available today. However, their influence was
considerable since subsequent historians have adopted a similar
research methodology by compartmentalizing the motor industry
in terms of car assemblers and car component makers. By
adopting this research approach, the car assemblers have been
the focus of attention whilst the component sector, which was
recognised as having played an integral role in the industry, was
examined only in a superficial manner. Thus, although the
influential article by Saul questioned some of Maxcy and
Silberton's assumptions concerning the development of the
component industry, the vast majority of his research was
devoted to the growth of the car assemblers to 1914. Whilst
Saul's article, which was published in 1962, did not examine
archival records relating to the component industry, he noted
2 Ibid, p. 13.
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that 'it was the attitude of the car manufacturers themselves -
their addiction to the more traditional engineering methods -
which held up the growth of component production'.3
Nevertheless, this tentative line of inquiry was never pursued
and once again the motor assemblers became the focus of
attention and the component suppliers became the focus for
blame. In 1964, Turner in his study, The Car Makers, claimed
that:
it was the lack of an efficient component industry which
was to handicap Morris (and other British producers) in
the years before and after the First World War. So
uneconomic were some of the British component makers
that Morris went to America and came back with an engine
bought for £25 - an engine which White and Poppe
admitted they could not supply for less than £50.4
Further evidence to support this damning indictment of the
British component industry does not emerge in Turner's study.
In the chapter which analysed the structure and organisation of
the motor industry between 1895-1939, only two brief
paragraphs were devoted to the car component industry. In
common with Maxcy and Silberton, Turner made no attempt to
investigate the industry in any depth and consequently analysis
was restricted to the development of the large component firms
such as Lucas and Dunlop.5
Over the past twenty years, there has been a number of
academic studies devoted to the motor industry. 6 Although these
more recent research projects have added to our knowledge of
3 S.B. Saul, 'The Motor Industry in Britain to 1914', Business History, 5,
(1962), p. 37.
4 G. Turner, The Car Makers, (1964), p. 19.
5 Ibid, p. 20.
6 For a recent review of research concerning the motor industry see, T.C.
Barker, 'Slow Progress. Forty Years of Motoring Research', Journal of
Transport History, 14, (1993), p. 161.
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the car assemblers, they have not furthered our understanding of
the component industry to any large degree. Two important
contributions were Overy's William Morris, Viscount Nuffield
(1976), and Church's Herbert Austin. The British Motor Car
Industry to 1941 (1979). Both authors attempted to analyse the
motor industry through the experiences of two leading motor
manufacturers, William Morris and Herbert Austin. Overy's
study focuses rather narrowly on Morris at the expense of an
adequate analysis of the structure of the industry. However,
there was a great potential in this study to explore the
component sector's key role in the motor industry since Morris
was the pioneer of assembling cars from bought-out components
in Britain. In examining Morris' relationship with suppliers,
Overy implies that the component sector could not cope with
Morris' demands due to their inability to imitate Morris'
organisational efficiency. Thus, much is made of Morris' take-
over of the engine makers Hotchkiss in the 1920s where
production was increased from 300 to 600 engines per week.7
However, a central weakness in the study, was Overy's reliance
on secondary source material and public statements and speeches
made by Morris. The limited extant primary sources relating to
Morris, and Overy's apparent reluctance to investigate the
surviving sources of component firms which conducted business
with Morris, ensured that no fresh light was cast on the
relationship between car assemblers and their suppliers.
Although Church's study was more successful in integrating a
biography of Austin's life with an analysis of the motor industry,
there was a tendency to exaggerate Austin's achievements and
7 R.J. Overy, William Morris, Viscount Overy, (1976), p. 27.
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distort his overall influence on the development of the motor
industry. For example, Austin placed very little emphasis on
purchasing components from outside suppliers and, thus in
Church's analysis of the motor industry, the integral importance
of the component sector to the motor industry was given very
little coverage.
However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, some historians
began to follow a line of inquiry which was to become firmly
established by the 1990s. These historians moved away from
using biographies as an insight into the motor industry and
instead focused attention on the changing structural features of
the industry. Such a method of analysis would inevitably
involve some reference to the component sector. For example,
although the prime objective of the research of Richardson
(1977) and more recently Adeney (1988) was to identify and
explain trends within the car assembling industry, they both
devote a brief section to the component industry. However, the
authors did not break with tradition, and instead continued to
confine analysis of the car component industry to a handful of
large firms which emerged prior to the Second World War. For
example, while Adeney implied that small component firms
experienced difficulties during the 1930s, he drew no evidence
from this section, and instead concentrated on the multi-national
firms such as Dunlop and Triplex. 8 Clearly, the investigation of
the component industry through the analysis of one or two major
companies raises two fundamental problems. First, although
large companies such as Dunlop and Lucas had emerged during
8 K. Richardson, The British Motor Industry 1895-1939, (1977), pp. 90-
94. M. Adeney, The Motor Makers. The Turbulent History of Britain's
Car Industry, (1988), pp. 142-158.
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the 1920s, it is clear that the structure of the component
industry was, on the whole, derived from small locally based
component firms who still played an important role in supplying
car manufacturers until the early 1960s. 9
 Second, the analysis
of. large component firms sheds little light on the business
practices and company interaction in the Coventry motor
industry since, between 1895-1960, the vast majority of
component concerns in Coventry were small units of production.
A study which examined the British motor industry within a
regional context was The Motor Industry in Coventry Since the
1890s (1985) by Thorns and Donnelly. The book analysed the
changing structure of the motor industry both in a local and
wider economic context. Consequently, research was not
restricted to investigating the development of the car
assemblers, but attention was also given to other sectors of the
regional economy such as component, machine tool and aircraft
firms. 10 This approach was a significant departure from the
more compartmentalized studies on the motor industry which_
often failed to investigate the relationship between car
assemblers and car component makers. To a certain extent
Thorns and Donnelly redressed this imbalance by highlighting
the credit arrangements that car manufacturers secured from
component makers during the development of the motor industry
in Coventry. Their research uncovered traces of a 'pyramid of
debt', at the top of which was the car manufacturer. However,
since the component industry was on the periphery of their
research parameters, the investigation was not a comprehensive
9 Turner, The Motor Makers, p. 52.
10 Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry in Coventry Since the
1890s, (1985), preface.
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analysis of the affect of car manufacturers' business policy on
their suppliers and the consequences for the structure of the
Coventry car component industry. 11
A significant contribution to the analysis of the structure of
the motor industry has been made by Lewchu k. In a series of
articles and in his book American Technology and the British
Vehicle Industry (1987), Lewchu , k argued that the structure of
the motor industry could only be understood through the analysis
of production methods utilised in car firms between 1895-1939.
Lewchu k asserted that British firms failed to realise their
potential due to the failure of managers to adopt the direct
labour control required for the moving assembly line and
implement American technology. 12 Lewchu k utilised Chandler's
comparative model which suggested that the British economy
declined during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
due to a failure of British management to emulate their
American counterparts in creating a professional managerial
class. 13 Thus, while the 'new managerial class' imposed strict
supervision over workers and fixed wages according to time and
motion studies, the 'British system of mass production' relied on
the piece work system which gave workers the responsibility of
setting their own production targets. Lewchu k presented a
production-centred model to explain the structure of the motor
industry between 1895-1939, and here lies the major weakness
of the study. Lewchu k did not investigate how the nature of
demand may have affected the structure of the industry. Indeed,
11 Ibid, preface and chapters 2,4.
12 W. Lewchurk, American Technology and the British Vehicle Industry,
(Cambridge, 1987), p. 185.
13 See the following section of this chapter for an analysis of Chandler's
model.
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there was no consideration of how the different product markets
in Britain and America shaped the organisation of the motor
industry. 14 Moreover, since Lewchu k's analysis of the motor
industry was largely confined to the production practices within
car assembly plants, scant attention was directed to the car
component industry. Where Lewchu k referred to the component
industry, his argument was weak. In explaining why, in contrast
to America, few British firms purchased components from
suppliers during the early years of the motor industry, Lewchu k
cites two 'critical factors':
The first was the greater experience of British workers on
metal working machines. This made the British worker
more versatile and better suited to manufacturing
operations in which they might be called upon to do a
large number of diverse, if unskilled, tasks. Second,
British firms found it easier to raise capital than did US
firms. Ford, for instance, had to use outside suppliers for
the majority of manufacturing operations because he was
unable to raise sufficient capital to buy his own
machines. 15
However, these factors, which were not supported by any
evidence drawn from the component industry, does not explain
why even the smallest car maker, with very limited financial
resources, attempted to produce the whole car during the early
twentieth century. Furthermore, Lewchu k's analysis does not
shed light on why a growing number of both large and small car
manufacturers began to utilise the car component sector between
1908 to 1914.	 A more fruitful perspective from which to
14 For two recent critiques of Lewchu k's model see: S. Tolliday,
'Management and Labour in Britain 1896-1939', in S. Tolliday and J.
Zeitlin (eds), The Automobile Industry and its Workers, (1986), p. 32. K.
Williams et al 'The Myth of the Line: Ford's Production of the Model T at
Highland Park, 1909-16', Business History, 35, (1993), p. 69.
15 W. Lewchu k, 'The Motor Industry', in B. Elbaum and W. Lazonick
(eds), The Decline of the British Economy, (Oxford, 1986), p. 138.
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analyse the relationship between suppliers and car assemblers is
to incorporate the concept of product demand. British car
assemblers' preference to attempt to produce the whole car itself
during the early years of the motor industry was more due to the
customers' demand that the car be individualistic, and in some
cases cars were made to order. Even after 1908, when firms
began to produce larger batches of cars, the individualistic
element in car manufacture was retained by ensuring that there
were frequent changes in design. Thus unlike the US, Britain
required more flexible production techniques, a process
achieved by extensively utilising the component suppliers.
Lewchu k's attempt to explain the structure of the motor
industry in Britain, then, was somewhat flawed by the absence
of any detailed analysis of the product market and the role of
the component industry.
The few studies which have focused attention on an aspect of
the car component industry have also failed to examine the
interaction between suppliers and car assemblers. Moreover,
where historians have made an attempt to analyse the component
industry, the research is usually limited to a case study of one
firm. One of the first studies to investigate the origins and
development of a component firm was Lucas, the First 100 Years
by Knockolds (1976). 16 Although the book provided a useful
insight into a firm's diversification from cycle to car
components, the study was placed firmly in the narrative
tradition of business history. There was no attempt to set out an
analytical framework within which the growth of the company
could be examined. Consequently, it is difficult to gain a sense
16 H. Knockolds, Lucas, the First 100 Years, vol. 1, (1976).
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of how the component industry developed in Britain since the
1890s. A more penetrating study of Lucas was conducted by
Church in 1978 in his article 'Innovation, Monopoly and Supply
of Vehicle Components, 1880-1939: the Growth of Joseph Lucas
Ltd'. However, although Church provides a useful insight into
the business strategy of what was to become the largest
component supplier in Britain, his research did not reveal the
structure of the component industry and the business practice of
small firms which predominated the sector in Coventry and in
Britain generally. 17 Finally, Church's . analysis of Lucas
generally took place in isolation from the rest of the car
industry. Thus, important issues such as the pressure car
manufacturers' exerted on component firms' financial position
and production policy were only briefly investigated. 18 The only
other component firm to be subject to a detailed academic
analysis was Dunlop. However, the objectives of Geoffrey
Jones' study (1984) were to examine the growth and performance
of a British multinational rather than investigate the firm's
involvement in the car component industry. Consequently,
although the article provides some useful material on Dunlop's
origins, for the historian interested in analysing the structure of
the car component industry in Britain, it is of only limited use.19
Although an analysis of the car component industry is integral
for an understanding organisation and growth of the motor
industry in Britain, a review of the secondary source literature
17 R. Church, 'Innovation, Monopoly, and the Supply of Vehicle
Components in Britain, 1880-1930; The growth of Joseph Lucas',(1978),
Business History Review, 52.
18 Ibid, pp. 240,244,246.
19 G. Jones, The Growth and Performance of British Multinational Firms
before 1939: The Case of Dunlop, Economic History Review, 37, (1984).
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has revealed that few historians have investigated the subject
beyond examining one or two large component firms. However,
this has not prevented historians from formulating sweeping
conclusions which have implied that the 'inefficient component
industry retarded the growth of the British motor industry.
Nevertheless, there has been little or no archival research
which analyses the growth and development of the British car
component industry between 1895-1939. Furthermore, the
component industry's integral role in the organisation of the
motor industry during this period has also been consistently
neglected. Clearly, there exists a vacuum in our knowledge of
the supply side of the British motor industry. In order that the
industry's development and structure can be analysed
effectively, the following section will identify important themes
within business history which, in the proceeding five chapters,
will be applied to the Coventry car component industry between
1895-1939.
An Analysis of Current Themes in Business History.
The analysis of a previously under-researched industry presents
certain problems for the historian. Since the Coventry car
component sector has remained neglected by historians, it is
imperative that the chosen research methodology analyses
effectively the structure and development of the industry."
Consequently, in order to achieve this objective, and to keep the
study within manageable proportions, the examination of the
20 For definition of 'structure' and an outline of the research parameters
see the introduction of the thesis.
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structure and development of the industry will take place
through the analysis of certain key themes. The key themes
selected, will not only possess a pertinence to the car component
industry, but will also hold a wider relevance to debates
surrounding economic and business history generally.
The first step in defining the structure of the industry is to
quantify the size of the industry and the nature of the car
component market in Coventry. Key issues here include an
analysis of the number of firms entering and departing from the
industry in order to assess the competitiveness in the product
market in the five branches of the component trade. A useful
model which sheds light upon the circumstances surrounding a
firm's entry and departure from an industry is Hirschman's
'Exit, Voice and Loyalty' concept (1970). 21 Hirschman argued
that economists had tended to concentrate on the 'exit'
adjustment process, whereby firms did not provide customer
satisfaction and the subsequent fall in profits forced the firm
Qut of the industry. The alternative mechanism which he
claimed had been consistently overlooked was the 'voice' and
'loyalty' options. Here, although customers were dissatisfied
with the products purchased, they did not replace their supplier,
but instead, expressed their dissatisfaction with the management
of the firm. Once their demands had been met, the buyer would
then 'loyally' continue to purchase from the supply firm.
However, a key factor which determined whether a customer
adopted the exit or voice option was the nature of the product
market. If the structure of the industry was highly competitive,
21 Hirschman, Exit Voice and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations and States, (Harvard, 1970).
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then customers would tend to adopt the exit mechanism. On the
other hand, the exit option was unavailable when a market had
reached a pure monopoly status.22
More recently, the model had been applied to an aspect of the
motor industry by Foreman-Peck (1980). 23
 Through his analysis
of the Rover Car Company, Foreman-Peck noted that the voice
option was utilised by Rover's suppliers and clearing bank as
they were not prepared to let an important customer experience
bankruptcy. However, Foreman-Peck concluded that the
suppliers' and the bank's reluctance to adopt the exit mechanism
ensured that Rover continued with 'an inappropriate industrial
structure'. 24
Since the 'exit, voice and loyalty' concepts focus on the
interaction between buyer and vendor, it is an ideal model to
apply to a supply industry such as the component trade.
Moreover, this model is important as it will also reveal the
nature of competition within a particular industry. A high
number of component firms entering and leaving the industry
would indicate that most car assemblers adopted the exit option
and that the competition was fierce in the supply sector.
Conversely, widespread use of the voice mechanism would
suggest that competition was limited and car assemblers were
willing to negotiate with their suppliers as oppose to
consistently switching loyalties.
Another important structural feature which will be analysed is
the sources of finances that were available to Coventry
22 Ibid, p. 33.
23 J. Foreman-Peck, 'Exit Voice and Loyalty as Responses to Decline: The
Rover Company in the Inter-war Years', Business History, 23, 1981.
24 Foreman-Peck, 'Exit Voice and Loyalty as Responses to Decline, p.
204.
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component firms. This theme opens the debate surrounding the
relationship between financial institutions and manufacturing
industry between 1895-1939. For some time, historians have
considered that the British monetary institutions failed industry.
Elbaum and Lazonick, for example, claimed that the banking
system was one of many institutional rigidities which retarded
Britain's economy. They have suggested that the financial
institutions concentrated on short term credit creation, having
consistently avoided developing a long term strategy with
British industry. Moreover, the two historians accused the
banks and capital markets of investing in more profitable
overseas ventures rather than domestic industry. 25 To some
extent, this stance was supported by Harrison, who discovered
that firms involved in the British cycle industry found it
extremely difficult to generate funds from the capital markets.
Indeed, Harrison's research concluded that there was a general
reluctance on behalf of the Stock Exchange to deal with smaller
firms. 26
Recently, however, Ross defended the banks' role in financing
industry by showing that the banks did supply large sums of
money to British industry between 1918-1939. Although Ross
acknowledged that the banks did not actively promote new
investment opportunities in British industry, he claimed that
they did accommodate all credit-worthy firms with short term
loans. This, he argued, constitutes a re-evaluation of the banks'
attitude to industry since they 'were considerably more involved
25 B. Elbaum and W. Lazonick, 'An Institutional Perspective on British
Decline', in B. Elbaum and W. Lazonick (eds), The Decline of the British
Economy, (Oxford, 1986), pp. 1-17.
26 A.E. Harrison, 'Joint Stock Company Flotation in the Cycle, Motor-
Vehicle and Related Industries 1882-1914', Business History, 23, (1981).
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in supporting their industrial customer than they were hitherto
been given credit for'. 27 Thus, in exploring the sources of
finance open to car component makers, the study will not only
identify certain trends, such as the capital size of firms and the
ease with which firms attracted capital, but it will also
investigate the general debate concerning the banks and industry
between 1895-1939.
In examining the structure of the Coventry car component
industry, it is imperative that attention is focused on the
ownership and management of the firms. Over recent years, the
analysis of the development of managerial structures in British
industry has increased considerably. The catalyst for this
growth in literature was the influential work of Chandler. In his
book, Strategy and Structure (1962) 28 and in subsequent articles
published during the 1970s to 1990s, Chandler outlined his
model which sought to explain the differences in the
development and organisation of firms between Britain and
America during the late nineteenth century to 1939. Chandler
argued that a central causal factor which, explained the
differences in the size and structure between British and
American businesses, was the role of the owners and managers
of firms. Thus Chandler asserted that in Britain:
the family wanted to retain and manage its birthright. In
the United States mergers brought administrative and
centralization and industrial rationalization.	 In Britain
they remained	 federations	 of autonomous	 family
enterprises. Until the 1930s, British mergers rarely
27 D.M. Ross, 'The Clearing Banks and Industry - New Perspectives on the
Inter-War Years', in J.J. Van Helton and Y. Cassis (eds), Capital in a
Mature Economy. Financial Institutions, Capital Exports and British
Industry 1870-1939, (Aldershot, 1990), p. 65.
28 A. Chandler, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of
Industrial Capitalism, (Cambridge, 1962).
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brought economies of scale or other advantages of
administrative co-ordination.29
Chandler also attributed the apparent failure of Britain to
participate fully in the 'new industries' and meet the competition
from the United States and Europe to 'managerial failure':
that is, the continuing existence of the family firm helped
deprive Britain of a class of trained managers and sets of
technological and managerial skills that became
increasingly essential, not only to technically advanced
managerial skills but also to the operation of modern
urban, industrial economies.30
Thus, Chandler claimed that family firms possessed a number of
features which ensured that they were at a Constant disadvantage
to professionally run organisations. He maintained that family
firms were reluctant to float the concern for fear of losing
control; that they pursued short-term financial gain by drawing
high dividends; and that they appointed into senior management
positions family or personal friends. At the heart of
Chandler's thesis was the assumption that structure (the design
of the organization) follows strategy (the firm's long term
policy). In essence then, Chandler's model was an internal
analysis of a firm's development and does not place business
within an economic or social context. Thus in Scale and Scope,
Chandler acknowledges that 'this study is an internal history of
the central institutions in managerial capitalism, rather than an
analysis of the broader impact of that institution on the polity or
society in which it appeared'. 31 This statement implies that the
analysis of a firm can be isolated from the institutions that
29 A. Chandler, 'The Growth of the Transnational Industrial Firm in the
United States and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis',
Economic History Review, 33, (1980), p. 402.
30 Ibid, p. 410.
31 Chandler, Scale and Scope, p. 13.
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shaped it. 32
 For example, this research methodology would
stress the importance of a car component firm's internal business
policy since this would override factors such as the sources of
finance available, the branch of the component industry it traded
in, and its relationship with the car assemblers.
Clearly, such an internal model which did not consider
important external variables that may have been instrumental in
shaping British firms between the 1870s to 1939 stimulated
much debate on the role of the family and industrial managerial
organisation. Payne's study into the emergence of large scale
companies broadly agreed with Chandler's assumption that
family firms had a negative impact on the organisation and
development of British business (1967). However, unlike
Chandler, Payne did not adopt an internally based analysis
which suggested that structure followed strategy but, instead,
emphasised the importance of the social and economic context
of the firm. Thus, Payne cited the absence of any legal
framework to enable firms to become larger public companies as
an important limitation on the growth and ultimate size of the
business in Britain. However, even after the final piece of
legislation which enabled firms to attain joint-stock and limited
liability status, the response of firms was slow. 33 Consequently,
Payne then added a cultural dimension to his analysis by
suggesting that Britain was inflicted by an entrepreneurial
weakness.	 He suggested that many traditional British
entrepreneurs were 'especially reluctant to raise new capital
32 For a useful critique on Chandler's model see B. Supple, 'Scale and
Scope: Alfred Chandler and the Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism',
Economic History Review, 64, (1991).
33 P.L. Payne, 'The Emergence of the Large-Scale Company in Great
Britain, 1870-1914', Economic History Review, 20, (1967), p. 520.
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through procedures that might have weakened their control over
their family firms'. 34 According to Payne, these weaknesses were
derived from 'sociological factors' peculiar to Britain. While
nepotism among professional entrepreneurs was frowned upon in
America, this tradition, which had emerged from the family
firm, continued unabated in Britain. Payne concluded that
the structure of many British companies inhibited the
ascent of the brilliant salaried official. Leadership by
inheritance applied in a great range of industrial
activities.. all too frequently the channels of advancement
were blocked by family control. And even in those cases in
which the controlling family group threw up men of
supreme business skill there was.. .a constant haemorrhage
of ability from industry and trade into land ownership and
politics.35
Recently, however, a number of historians have questioned the
central assumption that family firms were instrumental in
retarding British business. Church has suggested the assumption
that family firms were governed by short-term financial gain
does not stand up to a detailed analysis of the evidence. He
pointed out, that while many family firms ploughed substantial
proportions of the profits back into the concern, a large number
of public companies were under pressure from shareholders to
sanction high dividends. 36
 Moreover, Church also attempted to
dispel the assumption that professional management was
innately better than family appointments. Church highlighted
evidence that criticized the professional manager's narrow,
specialist professional training as engineers, lawyers and
accountants who were 'not necessarily effective administrators
34 [bid, p. 526.
35 Ibid, pp. 538-9.
36 R. Church, 'The Family Firm in Industrial Capitalism: International
Perspectives on Hypotheses and History', Business History, 35, (1993),
p. 22.
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or competent in human relations'. 37
 Church concluded his
critique of the 'family firm failure model' by asserting that there
was very little evidence to suggest that family firms formulated
business policies that were 'less rational than policies pursued
by professional management'. Both organisations adopted the
'optimal' policies for their business. Thus in comparing the
differences in industrial development between Britain and
Japan, Church asserted that:
families in different cultures adopted different priorities
for reasons which did not stem, almost deterministically,
from the structure of their businesses. Business strategies
owed more to the contrasting cultural environments which
prompted divergent assumptions, aspirations, and the
adoption of criteria by owners and managers nurtured
within different societies.38
In arguing this case, Church revised the role of the family firm
by presenting a model which analysed the external issues which
may have shaped the development and organisation of a firm.
The final theme which the thesis will investigate is the debate
concerning the production practices of British firms between
1895-1939. The debate surrounding production practices in
British industry has been dominated by the model of industrial
decline offered by Elbaum and Lazonick. Both historians
identified four characteristics of British industrial organisation
which rendered it incapable of competing with foreign
competition. First, firms were highly competitive and lacked
market power. Second, British firms were relatively small
compared to their foreign counterparts. Third, there was very
little vertical integration and consequently British industry
37 Ibid. p. 33.
38 Ibid, p. 36.
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retained its atomistic structure.	 Fourth, this structure had a
negative affect on attempts within British industry to initiate
mass production and standardization practices. Although
America possessed similar characteristics during the nineteenth
century, it had by the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, transformed into a corporate economy that met the
needs of mass production. In contrast, Britain was unable to
emulate the American experience due to rigidities which existed
in its economic and social institutions. 	 Thus Lazonick and
Elbaum have asserted that:
Britain's distinctiveness derived less from the
conservatism of its cultural values per se than from a
matrix of rigid institutional structures that re-inforced
these values and obstructed individualistic as well as
collective efforts at economic renovation.
They maintain that entrenched institutional structures in
enterprise and market organization, education, finance,
international trade and state-enterprise relations 'constrained the
transformation of Britain's productive system'.39
Although Elbaum and Lazonick used the traditional British
industries of cotton and steel to demonstrate how institutional
rigidities of the nineteenth century retarded economic
advancement in the twentieth century, Lewchuck suggests that
the 'new industries' were equally affected. Lewchuck's study
contrasts the more 'efficient' integrated productive process of
the American motor industry, with the more dis-integrated
'atomonic' units of production which characterised the British
car industry. Certainly British car makers utilised the car
component sector to a far larger extent than their American
39 Elbaum and Lazonick, 'An Institutional Perspective', p. 2.
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counterparts. Indeed, the assemblers' preference to perpetuate a
dis-integrated productive process has been interpreted as an
institutional rigidity that retarded the motor industry during the
interwar period. 40 Lewchu k's dissatisfaction with the
organisation of Britain's motor industry stemmed from the belief
that had British manufacturers adopted an integrated system
incorporating mass production techniques, then a market large
enough to enable producers to achieve economies of scale would
have been created. According to Lewchu k, supply factors were
paramount.
Despite the model's persuasive account of Britain's industrial
decline, a number of historians have questioned some of its
underlying assumptions. Most recently, Kirby has suggested that
the model offers only deterministic explanations of economic
decline. Thus, once the economy is locked by historical
circumstances into a particular industrial structure, decline
becomes inevitable. With these pre-conceptions at the heart of
Lazonick and Elbaum's analysis, Kirby has suggested that the
authors over-look significant technical and productive progress:
The First World War stimulated rapid technical progress in
existing industries-in shipbuilding, general engineering,
and steel production - and was responsible for the
extensive manufacture in Britain for the first time of a
number of advanced products such as motor vehicles,
aircraft, light machine tools, chemicals, magnetos and ball
bearings.
Kirby also maintained that the war initiated changes in
production techniques which placed more emphasis on repetitive
40 For a useful critique of such interpretations see M.W. Kirby,
'Institutional Rigidities and Economic Decline: Reflections on the British
Experience', Economic History Review, 65, (1992).
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standardized production processes. 4 ' Finally, Kirby challenged
the assumption that twentieth century industry inherited
nineteenth century market structures. He argued that, far from
continuing in the free market tradition, many industries entered
into collusive agreements, to the detriment of their productive
efficiency. Kirby cited the increased cartelization , especially
in the context of tariffs and imperial preference during the
1930s, as evidence of this process.42
Another study which challenged some of the fundamental
concepts contained in the Elbaum and Lazonick model is that of
Langlois and Robertson. They analysed the process of backward
integration within the American motor car industry and
concluded that an integrated productive process (a central
feature in Elbaum and Lazonick's modern industrial economy)
cannot be regarded as an inherently efficient policy. In contrast
to Lazonick and Elbaum, they analysed the car industry's
relation to market demand and suggested that during the 1920s
and 1930s, the US used car market opened competition that car
makers had not previously faced. The car makers' response was
to implement annual model changes, a policy which was difficult
to implement with a fully integrated production process.
Consequently, whilst Ford experienced great difficulties in
changing from the model T to the model A in the 1920s it was:
the small, less integrated firms, who were best able
initially to succeed in the era of replacement demand...for
example.. .Chrysler's strategy of design flexibility and
shallow vertical integration proved very successful in the
41 Kirby, Institutional Rigidities', p. 650.
42 Ibid, p. 655.
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pre-war period when the rate of technological change in
the product was rapid.43
Therefore, Langlois and Robertson cast doubt upon the validity
of one of the central concepts present in the institutional
rigidity model, that backward integration was necessary for a
modern and efficient productive process.
The need to safeguard more flexible production techniques
was even more pronounced in Britain where the domestic market
lacked social depth. Indeed, in a recent survey of the motor
industry, Church has asserted that British firms adopted the
optimum production techniques (1994). Church attributes Ford's
failure in Britain during the 1920s and 1930s to the inflexibility
of its productive process due to its inability to accommodate
'British customer's preferences regarding performance, road
holding, running costs, appearance and a basic degree of
comfort'. 44 He argued that assemblers were able to accommodate
British tastes by neither investing in automatic machinery or
producing a standardized output. In order to accommodate
frequent model changes, Church asserted that:
Both Morris and, to a lesser extent, Austin opted for the
flexibility offered by a low level of integration,
purchasing a high proportion of parts and components from
outside suppliers for assembly at Cowley and Longbridge.45
Church, then, has been instrumental in questioning whether the
model of industrial decline, (which draws heavily from the
American experience), presented by Lazonick, Elbaum and
43 R.N. Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration:
Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic
History, 49, (1989), p. 370.
44 R. Church, The Rise and Decline of the British Motor Industry, (1994),
p. 34.
45 Ibid, p. 35.
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Lewchuck, is relevant to the economic and social structure of
Britain between 1895-1939.46
Conclusion
Through the analysis of the secondary source material, it is
clear that an investigation into the Coventry car component
industry would make a significant contribution to the history of
the motor industry and business history generally. First,
previous historians of the motor industry have neglected not
only the car component industry but the implications that a low
integrated industrial structure had upon motor car manufacture.
Evidently, an analysis of the structure and development of the
component industry will provide an insight into how a new light
industry emerged in Britain between 1895-1939 and the extent to
which the organisation of the component industry affected the
production strategies pursued by car assemblers. Second, the
literature review of current themes in business history has _
revealed important issues which the thesis will address. Thus
although the thesis is based on archival evidence, the study will
not be archive driven. By implementing a thematic approach
and placing the evidence within appropriate analytical
frameworks, issues such as the circumstances surrounding an
industry's inception, the ownership and finance of firms, and the
organisation of British firms will be examined. 	 Thus the
following seven chapters will address significant themes in
46 Likewise, Supple (1991) challenged the assumption that the American
model of backward integration should be used as a standard against which
to assess the structural characteristics of business systems in other
countries. See Supple, 'Scale and Scope', p. 513.
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business history in order that conclusions can be drawn from
both the car component industry and on the nature of the car
industry in Britain between 1895-1939.
Chapter 2
The British Motor Industry 1896-1939: A National
Perspective
This chapter will analyse the origins and growth of the British
motor industry between 1870-1939. The objective is to provide
a background to the structural development of the industry by
examining the significance of the industries which preceded the
motor firms, the geographical location of the industry, and the
level of output attained by firms throughout the period under
study. The chapter also places in context the role played by
Coventry in the birth and subsequent growth of the industry.
Thus the number and size of car and component firms in the city
is contrasted with the concentration of firms in other
engineering districts of Britain.
The Origins of the British Motor Industry 1870-1914
Only after experiments with cars had taken place in Germany
in 1886 and France in 1895 did a motor industry emerge in
Britain during the mid to late 1890s. 1 One explanation for
Britain's delayed entry into motor vehicle production was the
success of its light engineering sector during the late nineteenth
century. The experimental nature of the motor industry created
an uncertainty and consequently established engineering firms
were reluctant to diversify from a successful engineering sector.
The basis of Britain's light engineering success lay initially in
the machine tool trade. Indeed, during the late nineteenth
century there was a rapid development in machine tool
manufacture which had a significant affect on the rest of the
1 T. Barker, The Economic and Social Effects of Motor Vehicles, (1987),
P . 1.
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engineering industry.
In the late nineteenth century machine tool manufacturers
spread in areas associated with locomotive production, textile
machinery manufacture and cycle making. A report on the
Vienna Exhibition in 1873 commented that 'the workshops of
certain leading firms in England are being filled with tools of a
certain kind, possessing great originality with regard to fitness
for a purpose in the manufacture of general machinery,
agricultural engines, small arms etc.' However, the production
of these items required a high degree of specialization and
consequently tools were manufactured in small batches for a
specialized purpose. 2 The geographical location for the vast
majority of these firms was the West Midlands where there
existed, in Birmingham, a long-established iron and metal
working sector and, in Coventry, a textile and cycle making
base. Although the region's isolation from the sea barred the
development of an extensive heavy engineering industry, the
access to coal and iron, the extensive reserve of skilled labour
and the continuance of the small scale metal industries invited
the expansion of light engineering. 3 One of the pioneering
machine tool firms in the area was the Coventry firm, Willdig
and Hatton which was established in 1859 to make drilling
machines for textile machinery. Early entrants into the industry
included Webster and Bennett, founded in 1887, and E.S. Brett
which was established in 1892. 4 Despite the specialised nature
2 S.B. Saul, 'The Market and Development of the Mechanical Engineering
Industries in Britain 1860-1914', Economic History Review, (1967), p.
125.
3 C.H. Lee, Regional Economic Growth in the United Kingdom Since the
1880s, (1971), p. 85.
4 Victoria County History: Warwickshire, (Birmingham, 1962) p. 187.
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of machine tool manufacture, large businesses did emerge. For
example, by 1914 the Coventry firm Alfred Herbert, which was
established in 1888, was almost three times the size of any other
machine tool manufacturer in the country employing over 2,000
workers. 5
 The growth of machine tool manufacture in the West
Midlands encouraged not only an expansion of the cycle industry
but also provided an attractive site for the advent and
development of the motor industry.
The origins of the cycle industry can be traced to the Coventry
Sewing Machine Company which extended its production to
cycles in 1868. The firm had originally been sited in Coventry
as a replacement for the declining ribbon trade and also to
utilise the host of machine tool firms which had serviced the
textile machinery. Although Coventry remained at the heart of
the industry, the cycle trade rapidly spread to Birmingham,
Wolverhampton and Nottingham. Table 2.1 shows the rapid
growth of the industry and significance of Coventry and of the
West Midlands for the years 1881 and 1891.
Table 2.1
The Number of Cycle Firms in the West Midlands 1881 and 1891
Town 1881
No of Firms
% of Firms
National
Industry
1891
No of Firms
% of Firms
National
Industry
49.4Coventry 400 57 4,100
Bir'ham - - 2,600 31.3
Wolv'ton 300 43 600 7.2
Source: P. McLeay, 'The Wolverhampton Motor Car Industry 1896-1937',
West Midland Studies, (1969), p. 100.
Thus by 1891, almost 90% of the cycles produced in Britain
emanated from the West Midlands. Furthermore, a cycle boom
occurred in the mid-1890s when an upsurge in demand led to
manufacturers producing large volumes of cycles by assembling
5 Lee, Regional Economic Growth, p. 85.
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bought-out components. This development added to the growth
of the industry by encouraging a large number of firms to enter
the cycle component industry especially in Coventry and
Birmingham. A large proportion of these cycle component firms
had diversified into the industry from old-established trades. In
1896, Middlemores of Coventry, made the natural transition
from making saddles and leather goods to cycle saddles and
other cycle accessories. 6 Indeed, the cycle and motor industries
shared similar technical objectives in relating the transmission
of power to the process of movement. 7 In 1906, The Motor noted
that 'so closely has the balance-geared axle of the tricycle maker
been copied by the motor engineer that he has in many cases
taken it bodily in the form used by the cycle maker'. 8 However,
some firms entered the cycle industry without any previous
technical connection with cycles. In these cases links did exist,
even though they were not immediately obvious. For example,
Thomas Warwick, umbrella maker, became a manufacturer of
cycle and wheel rims, E. Payne and Company of Coventry, a cork
manufacturer, entered the cycle component industry through the
production of handle grips and Bluemel and Bros which made
umbrellas and walking sticks, became mud guard and gear case
producers. Indeed, Bluemel was a good example of how firms
were able to transfer technology from their original and
unrelated trade and apply it to the cycle industry. Bluemel,
which had been attracted to Coventry from London during the
late 1890s due to the boom in the cycle trade, used its
6 D. Thorns and T. Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry in Coventry Since
the 1890s, (1985), p. 20.
7 The Motor, 30 January 1906, p. 734.
8 The Motor, 27 February 1906, p. 94.
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experience of producing celluloid handles for walking sticks to
manufacture the first celluloid cycle components in Britain.9
Related to the growth of the machine tool and cycle trades
was the development of motor car production. Consequently,
the geographical location of the industry was largely based in
the West Midlands. Indeed, S.B. Saul noted that:
the car industry concentrated in the Midlands, largely
because either the firms themselves or their progenitors
grew up in those trades which created the new industrial
area in the second half of the nineteenth century. The
environment was on more naturally suited the manufacture
of cars and above all their component parts than that of
the heavy engineering trades of the North. 10
The first motor company to be established in Britain was the
British Motor Syndicate which was publicly floated by Harry
Lawson in 1896. The highly publicised floatation of the
Coventry based firm ensured that the city attracted a number of
important car assemblers and component makers during the
formative years of the motor industry. Lawson's attraction to
Coventry was twofold. First, he had strong connections with the
city's business community after promoting a number of cycle
firms during the early 1890s. Second, Lawson exploited 'another
legacy from Coventry's industrial past by utilising a disused
textile factory to house the British Motor Syndicate. 11 Although
the advent of the motor industry in Britain can be traced to the
establishment of the British Motor Syndicate, the growth of the
industry did not become fully established until after the mid-
9 A.E. Harrison, 'The Origins and the Growth of the UK Cycle Industry to
1900', Journal of Transport History, 6, (1985) p. 52. Coventry Standard,
7 March 1952, p. 7.
S.B. Saul, 'The Motor Industry in Britain to 1914', Business History, 5,
(1962), p. 30.
11 Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, pp. 36-39.
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1890s cycle boom. The collapse of the cycle trade during the
late 1890s forced many cycle firms to search for new product
outlets. Firms which were to become established marques in the
motor industry such as Rover, Riley, Singer, and Humber all had
origins in the Coventry cycle industry, whilst William Morris
began his business interests by establishing a cycle shop in
Oxford. Although Coventry harboured the first few firms at the
advent of the motor industry, there were a number of other areas
where the motor industry began to concentrate. The Wolseley
sheep sheering machinery business in Birmingham transferred
over to car production, whilst Calthorpe Motors was established
in the city at the turn of the century. After the West Midlands,
the main concentration of car makers was the south east. C.H.
Lee has suggested that the reasons for growth of the motor
industry in this area were due to 'the prior existence of a highly
diverse engineering industry, as in the case of the West
Midlands, plus the fact that, geographically, London was the
location most open to the influence of French and organizational
advancement in the industry at the time'. 12
 Between 1903-1905,
Vauxhall's marine engineers made vehicles in Lambeth before
moving to Luton, while a host of small car firms were founded
in Lambeth, Pimlico, and Fulham. By 1911, London and
Middlesex contained 25 per cent of motor car and mechanics in
England and Wales. During these formative years of the motor
industry there was also a concentration of car makers in the
North. A number of important car manufacturers were cited in
Manchester during the early 1900s such as Crossley Motors and
Bellsize Motors.	 The early success of these firms almost
12 Lee, Regional Economic Growth, p. 102.
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certainly encouraged Ford to site its first factory in Britain at
Trafford Park Manchester in 1911) 3 Further north in Scotland,
some 51 firms began producing vehicles between 1900-1925.
However, three firms dominated the Scottish industry during this
period, Albion, Arrol Johnston and Argyll, which was one of the
largest manufacturers in Europe. In 1907, Scotland was
producing 11 per cent of the UK's vehicle output, but by 1913,
the figure had dropped to 7 per cent. This decline continued
through the interwar period since, by 1930, only one firm of any
significance had survived)4
The output of cars to 1914 was often small and subject to
yearly variation. In 1913, out of the 29 firms which recorded
output totals, only eleven produced over 1,000 cars. Moreover,
only three firms, Ford (6,139), Humber (2,500) and Wolseley
(3,000), surpassed the 2,000 mark." Significantly, the two
largest producers, Ford and Wolseley were not based in
Coventry, although it has been estimated that over 9,000 cars
were built in the city in 1913, compared to 5,000 in Birmingham
and 3,000 in Wolverhampton. Thus it was that by 1914, the
motor industry was one of comparatively small units of
production, a characteristic which was to continue in Coventry
throughout the interwar period." Only Singer, which had
marketed its first car in 1905, was a firm of any great size since
it was considered the third largest car producer in Britain until
the late 1920s) 7 However, during this early period, the focal
13 A.D. George, 'The Manchester Motor Industry 1900-1938', Manchester
Polytechnic (Occasional Paper no. 3, September 1981).
14 S. McKinstry, 'Financial Management in the Early Scottish Motor
Industry', Accounting, Business and Financial History, 3, (1993), p. 277.
15 Saul, 'The Motor Industry', p. 24.
16 Victoria County History, p. 181.
17 K. Richardson, The British Motor Industry 1896-1939. A Social and
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point of the industry was undoubtedly Coventry since, during the
late 1890s, all of the firms working on continental patents were
located in the city. By 1911, Coventry possessed 6,838 workers
engaged in motor car production, which represented nearly one-
third of the personnel employed in the West Midlands and 14 per
cent of those employed in Britain. This compared to 5,400
workers in Birmingham, 1,300 in Wolverhampton, and some
2,800	 scattered	 in	 Worcestershire,	 Staffordshire,	 and
Warwickshire. 18
Chart 2.2
Coventry's leading position in the motor industry between 1896-
1914, was confirmed by the large number of component firms
which had been established in the city. Figure 2.2 shows that by
Economic History, (1977), p. 110.
18 Victoria County History, p. 180.
43
1912, Coventry possessed approximately 25 per cent, of the total
number of car component makers in Britain, a figure which
placed it in front of Birmingham which had 21 per cent and
behind the south east with 49 per cent of firms. Significantly,
very few component suppliers were established in the North of
England and Scotland since these areas were mostly concerned
with heavy industry and producing raw materials for the
industry. 19 Moreover, the North's largest car producer, Ford of
Manchester, imported kits of cars from the US, thereby making
minimal use of local component suppliers. 29. However, the West
Midlands' strong links with the cycle industry provided fertile
ground for the growth of the component industry. Many of the
cycle component makers, after the collapse of their trade in the
late 1890s, diversified into car component production. For
example, Al1day and Onions and Joseph Sankey, both of
Birmingham had entered the component industry by the turn of
the century. Likewise, Birmingham based Joseph Lucas, which
was to become the largest component supplier in Britain by
1939, diversified from producing cycle to car components with
minimal difficulty. By the 1910 Olympia Motor Show, Lucas
was already exhibiting a complete electric lighting system for
motor vehicles. 21 Although the south east did not possess links
with the cycle industry, a number of significant component
suppliers emerged at this time. In the electrical branch of the
trade, Smith and Sons, Simms and Company, and the Chloride
Company became important suppliers of gauges, accumulators
D.R. Littlewood, 'The Location of the British Car Industry 1888-1940'
(unpublished MA thesis, University of Leicester, 1962), p. 27.
20 R. Church, The Rise and Decline of the British Motor Industry, (1994),
5
21 Richardson, The British Motor Industry, p. 91.
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and batteries for the motor industry. Whilst Simms established
his business with the objective of supplying the motor industry,
Smith's and Chloride existed before the car had been invented.
Smith's had been founded in 1851 as clockmakers at Newington
Causeway in London. In 1904 the business diversified into car
components by opening a department to make 'motor watches'.
After taking over Goldenlyte, a car head-lamp firm, in 1908, and
the car starting business of Trier and Martin in 1913, Smith's
were able to produce a whole range of motor vehicle electrical
equipment. 22 The Chloride Company was established in Britain
in 1891 to produce batteries for Britain and the Empire using
American patents. At this stage, the batteries were designed for
static use in industrial and domestic lighting, but they were soon
converted to act as a power source for marine vehicles and cars.
By 1914 Chloride was the principal supplier of motor batteries,
a position which was strengthened after the war by taking over
numerous smaller competitors and winning key contracts with
Ford and Vauxhall.
The British Motor Industry 1914-1939.
Although the manufacture of cars and components continued
to be concentrated in the West Midlands and the south east, the
motor industry under went radical structural change between
1914-1939. Since the First World War limited the resources
available for the construction of private cars, the British motor
industry transferred its productive capabilities to military
products.	 For example, Daimler manufactured tractors,
22 M. Adeney, The Motor Makers. The Turbulent History of Britain's Car
Industry, (1988), p. 156.
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ambulances, lorries and buses, whilst Standard and Riley
devoted their resources to the manufacture of aircraft.23
However, although the war checked the expansion of the
domestic car industry, the repetitive production techniques
employed, increased the potential capacity to manufacture
vehicles. Nevertheless the most significant war time event was
the imposition in 1915 of the McKenna duty which placed a
33 1 /3 per cent tax in the landed cost of imported components and
cars. Apart from a brief interruption in 1924-1925, the duties
were retained for almost 50 years, a factor which ensured that
the domestic car market was dominated by British based
manufacturers.24
In the years that directly followed the First World War, the
British motor industry expanded due to an increase in new firms
and the enlargement of existing car firms. The high demand for
cars after the war created boom conditions within the industry,
and at least twelve new car firms were founded in Coventry
alone between 1919-1926. Chart 2.3 shows that the trends in
Coventry were mirrored nationally, with a large rise in car firms
recorded between 1918-1921.
23 Victoria County History, p. 182.
24 R. Church, The Rise and Decline of the British Motor Industry, (1994)
p. 12.
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handful of firms began to produce cars in volume. In 1929, it
was estimated that three British manufacturers shared some 75
per cent of the British production of cars. Oxford based Morris
accounted for 35 per cent of the market (63,000), Austin of
Birmingham took 30 per cent (46,000), whilst Singers of
Coventry possessed 15 per cent of the market (28,000).
Significantly, Ford slipped from its pre-war dominance to fourth
position with a market share of only 4 per cent. (7,000)26.
Further structural change occurred during the 1930s when there
was an increase in firms entering the volume production market.
By 1939, 90 per cent of car production was in the hands of the
'Big Six', Morris, Austin, Vauxhall, Rootes, Ford, and Standard.
Another 8 per cent of output emanated from Rover, Singer,
Jaguar and BSA. Thus, the period 1929 to 1939 witnessed a
change in the relative importance of different firms. In 1932,
Ford re-located to a new purpose built plant in Dagenham to
take advantage of the facilities offered for shipping raw
materials into the factory and completed cars out to the export
markets. Although Ford did improve its sales position, the new
facilities proved more beneficial to its export markets. 27 A more
substantial improvement in output was experienced by Vauxhall.
In 1928, the small ailing producer of quality cars was taken over
by the American firm General Motors. Through the financial
backing of General Motors, which was able to build up their
subsidiary's capital equipment, re-organise the production lines,
introduce intensive marketing techniques and inject technical
expertise and design innovations, Vauxhall made the leap from
26 G. Maxcy, 'The Motor Industry', in P.L. Cook, The Effects of Mergers,
(1958), p. 367.
27 D.G. Rhys, The Motor Industry. An Economic Survey, (1972), p. 13.
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small scale to volume producer. Thus from possessing only 0.75
per cent of British car output in 1929, Vauxhall had increased
the figure to 9.4 per cent by 1939. 28 Standard and Rootes also
joined the volume producers during this period, Standard
through the re-organisation of the production process under the
management of Captain Black, and Rootes which entered the
market through the purchase of Humber and Hillman in 1932.29
In 1931, Standard's assembly shop at Canley had been re-
organized and mechanized to facilitate volume production. By
October 1932, sales had increased by 80 per cent on the previous
year, trebling profits for the firm. Indeed, Standard's success in
entering the volume production market is demonstrated by the
increase in output that had been achieved by the outbreak of the
Second World War. Thus in an eight year span, production
increased from 8,000 vehicles in 1931 to 55,000 in 1939.30
Although, Rootes initially entered the mass market through
merger, they too re-organised the productive process. By
integrating their existing firms with Humber and Hillman,
Rootes were able to achieve a degree of standardizarion and
interchangeability, a factor which helped increase production by
nearly sixfold.31
Another important development of the motor industry during
the 1930s was the nature of competition between firms.
Although competition by variety had always been a feature of
the British motor industry prior to the 1930s, the practice of
28 L. Holden, 'A History of Vauxhall Motors to 1956: Industry,
Development and Local Impact on the Luton Economy', (unpublished
MPhil Thesis, Open University, 1984), pp.50-51
29 J. Bullock, The Rootes Brothers. Story of a Motoring Empire, (1993),
p. 40
39 Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, pp. 97-98.
31 Maxcy, 'The Motor Industry', p. 374.
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increasing the number of models available was accentuated
during this period. In 1933, The Economist noted that:
The number of models in production of the ten largest
manufacturing groups, controlling over 90 per cent of the
market, increased from 46 in 1929-30 to 55 in 1931-2, 60
in 1932-3, and 64 in 1933-4. The old game continues-
everybody to catch the public's fancy with at least one of
their range of models.32
This trend continued after 1933 and consequently, by the 1939,
the variety of models produced had further increased. Indeed,
the most successful car assemblers during this period were the
firms that adopted a flexible production system that could meet
the persistent British consumer demand for quality and
differentiation. 33 Thus, a low integrated productive system,
which had characterised Britain's car industry between 1912-
1929, continued to be the optimum production strategy through
into the 1930s.
It was during the interwar period that Coventry's position as
the focal point of the motor industry altered. With both volume
producers, Morris 34 and Austin, located outside of Coventry, the
city became associated with relatively small firms producing
medium priced or luxury cars. Coventry firms such as Rover,
Alvis, Lea Francis, SS Cars (later Jaguar) and Riley had all
established themselves in the medium to luxury market by 1935.
Although volume production was carried out at Coventry's
largest firms, Standard and Rootes, these two firms only
represented approximately 10 per cent of the total car
32 Quoted in G. Maxcy and A. Silberton, The British Motor Industry,
(1959) p. 15.
33 Church, 'The Rise and Fall' ,p 37.
34 R.C. Whiting, The View from Cowley. The Impact of Industrialisation
Upon Oxford 1918-1938, (Oxford, 1983).
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production for 1939. 35 Although at one time Singer appeared to
be establishing itself as a major volume producer, by the 1930s
it had diversified into the quality market. Despite a fresh
capital injection in 1936 after being on the verge of bankruptcy,
Singer failed to regain its place in the 'Big Six' car
manufacturers. 36 Coventry's failure to realise its pre-war
potential due to the preponderance of small scale firms was
reflected in the employment statistics for the period. In 1921,
18,692 Coventry workers were engaged in the manufacture of
cycles and motor vehicles which represented approximately 9
per cent of the total employed in the country. Thus the number
employed in Coventry in relation to the total employed in the
motor industry had fallen by 5 per cent from the 1911 figure. In
contrast, Birmingham increased its national average by 5 per
cent and accommodated 28,863 workers (14 per cent.) whilst
Wolverhampton possessed 6,252 working in the motor and
related industries (3 per cent). Although these figures did not
alter dramatically over the next ten years, they indicated that
Birmingham and Oxford, largely through the firms such as
Austin and Morris, had become the focal points for volume
production in the car industry by 1930.37
The trend of locating volume production factories outside of
Coventry was also reflected in the changing structure of the
component industry. Figure 2.4 shows that due to an increasing
tendency for component firms to locate outside the traditional
supply areas, Birmingham, Coventry and the south east, all
experienced a fall in their percentage of the national share.
35 Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Industry, p. 85.
36 Ibid, pp. 90-91.
37 Victoria County History, p. 184.
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Figure 2.4
The Location of the British Car Component Industry 1939
Source: D.R. Littlewood, 'The Location of the British Car Industry 1888-
1940', (unpublished MA Thesis, 1962), Victoria County History,
Warwickshire, (1968), p. 188, Appendix 1 (List of Coventry Car
Component Makers 1902-1936).
By 1939, approximately 10 per cent of British car component
firms were located in Coventry, a figure which represented a 15
per cent drop from its 1914 position. This compared to
Birmingham which housed 15 per cent of component firms and
the south east which possessed 33 per cent. Moreover, not only
did Coventry slip behind Birmingham in the ranking of leading
component suppliers but also, as in car assembly, Coventry
continued to be associated with the small to medium sized
component firm. 38 In a similar manner to that of the car
assemblers, a number of volume producing firms began to
dominate the component industry. In 1935, The Economist noted
that:
38 See Littlewood, 'The Location of the British Car Industry', p. 60 and
Appendix I.
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The motor accessory trade like the motor industry itself,
appears to be attaining its commercial majority. ..The boom
of the late 'twenties had multiplied the accessory
manufacturers... highly competitive conditions resulted, in
which the ranks of the accessory makers were noticeably
thinned.
The Economist concluded that the main beneficiaries of these
conditions were the large component suppliers since the high-
turn over of small firms suggested that they were unable to
withstand the fluctuations in demand that occurred during the
late 1920s and 1930s. 39 Of the large component firms which
emerged during this period such as Dunlop, Lucas, Triplex
Glass, Pressed Steel, Briggs Motor Bodies, Smith and Sons and
Chloride, not one possessed their head office in Coventry.
Indeed, Dunlop was the only firm to possess a subsidiary
(Dunlop Rim and Wheel) in the city. However, Coventry still
retained a significant position in the component industry as the
city still housed a high number of firms which supplied the
medium and luxury car makers or acted as secondary suppliers to
the volume producers. Moreover, the Coventry firm represented
the typical British component firm, since although a handful of
large firms held a pivotal position in the trade, the industry as a
whole was derived from hundreds of independent small scale
units of production. Indeed, the survival and importance of the
small component firm was to continue into the post Second
World War period. In 1962, a British Motor Corporation
executive commenting on the important role of the small
component firm noted that 'when their efforts are added
together, the small firms contribute a great deal more. Many are
39 The Economist, 26 October, 1935, p. 814.
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companies which the public have never heard of-and yet without
them empires like our own could be in serious difficulty'. 40
Conclusion
This chapter has identified and analysed the origins and
subsequent growth of the British motor industry between 1870-
1939. The structures of the car and component industries
closely mirrored one another, since both recorded a high level of
turn-over of firms. Moreover, although the entry and exit
barriers remained fairly low throughout the period under study,
both sectors had experienced a concentration of large dominant
firms by the 1930s. Significantly, the concentration of powerful
car assemblers and component makers occurred largely outside
of Coventry. Thus from becoming the focal point in the
formation of the British car and component industries, Coventry
began to play a more specialised, yet still significant, role in
the development of the motor industry. Indeed, after the First
World War the city became associated with a myriad of small
car and component firms that operated to small scale scales of
production. However, although the component industry was
dominated by a handful of powerful firms, Coventry reflected a
key characteristic of the British component industry since it was
derived from hundreds of small scale firms. Since historians
have had a tendency to analyse the large and prominent firms,
the small to medium component firm has received scant
attention.	 The following chapters will analyse the archival
evidence relating to the Coventry car component industry to
40 G. Turner, The Motor Makers, (1962), p. 52.
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establish the structure, development of the industry and the key
role it played in the British motor industry between 1895-1939.
Chapter 3
Coventry Component Firms:
Exit and Entry and the Competitive Structure of the
Industry
This chapter analyses the circumstances surrounding the entry
and departure of firms in the Coventry car component industry
between 1895-1939. Whilst entry to the industry will be defined
as occurring when a firm embarks on the production of car
components for assemblers, the circumstances surrounding a
firm's exit is a little more complex. In analysing the exit of
firms, this chapter will only include concerns which ceased
making components through either business failure or a firm's
diversification from car components to other products.
Consequently, the take-over of component firms by either larger
competitors or assemblers, unless it led to product
diversification or the direct closure of the supplier, will not
constitute an exit from the industry.
By using this criterion to analyse the pattern of entries and
exits in the component industry, the chapter will explore the
competitiveness of the industry through Hirschman's 'Exit, Voice
and Loyalty' model.' The model offers an alternative to the
simple exit of firms from an industry by analysing the 'voice'
option, whereby a firm's customers, or financial backer 'loyally'
intervene to ensure that the firm staves off liquidation.
Foreman-Peck has applied this concept to the car industry and
concluded that banks and large suppliers 'played a significant
part in the shaping of industrial structure at least in the motor
1 For further information on the mechanics of this model see chapter one.
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industry, though not a beneficial one in the long run'. 2 However,
Foreman-Peck's evidence does not shed light on the extent to
which the voice option was utilised in the component industry
since intrinsically linked to the exit or voice options was the
nature of the market in which these decisions were made. Thus
an assembler was more likely to show loyalty to a supplier and
save it from liquidation if there was a deficiency in competitive
component makers on the market. Conversely, an assembler that
used suppliers from a highly competitive market would, if one of
their component suppliers was experiencing financial difficulty,
transfer their orders to a competitor. However, each branch of
the component trade was influenced by a number of different
variables which shaped their particular market. Therefore,
where possible, this chapter will examine the added pressures
exerted on component firms by the competition they faced
within their own sector, factors which may have influenced a
firm's entry into or exit from the motor industry.
The Structure of the Coventry Car Component Industry
1895-1939
Table 3.1 provides an useful insight into the number of
Coventry car component firms between 1902-1936. However,
since the table was constructed through the use of trade
directories, it is little more than a 'snap shot' of the car
component firms operating for the years shown. Also the years
chosen to create a data base of component firms were, to some
2 J. Foreman-Peck, 'Exit Voice and Loyalty as Responses to Decline: The
Rover Company in the Interwar Years', Business History, 23, (1981), p.
191, 205.
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extent, dictated by the availability of surviving directories. For
example, although the data collected for the years 1902, 1908,
Table 3.1
The Number of firms in the Coventry Car Component Industry
or selected y ears between 1902-1936.
Date 1902 1908 1912 1919 1926 1936
No of
Firms
28 38 61 78 80 62
Sources: Kelly's Directory of Warwickshire 1902-1936, Ryland s Directory
of Iron, Steel and Allied Trades 1902-1936, Spennell's Directory for the
City of Coventry 1919, Directory for the City of Coventry 1936. Motor
Manufactures of Coventry (Museum of British Road Transport).
1912, 1919, 1926, 1936, provide an effective framework from
which to demonstrate the changing pattern of the component
industry, these particular years also offered the most accurate
and comprehensive information on the Coventry component
industry. While trade directories are a useful guide to the size
of the industry, they also present a number of problems.
Although it is clear that some firms were producing car
components prior to 1902, the trade directories do not recognise
these firms as manufacturing within an identifiable industry.
Consequently, early car component firms were listed under-
Coventry's traditional industries such as the cycle, watch and
coach trades.
However, as table 3.1 shows, by 1902 an identifiable car
component sector had emerged. The industry grew steadily until
the years 1908-1912, when it almost doubled in size, the largest
increase of firms the component trade ever experienced.3
Between 1912-1926, the industry gradually increased in size,
until 1936 when the number of car component firms began to
3 During this period Coventry component firms accounted for
approximately 25 per cent of the total component firms in Britain. See
chapter 2, chart 2.2.
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decline. Significantly by 1939, Coventry had lost its position as
a leading car component supplies centre. 4 Indeed, the table
implies that after 1919 the industry progressed to a period of
relative stability or even stagnation. However, although the
table may provide a useful insight into the fluctuation of firms,
the information can not be regarded as a useful guide to the size
and importance of firms or the stability of the component
industry. Only through the analysis of the entry and exit of
firms and the markets in which various branches of the
component trade were operating, will the industry's changing
structure be examined effectively.
The Emergence of the Coventry Car Component Trade:
The Formative Years 1895-1912
Table 3.2 shows that between 1902-1912, the component
industry possessed particular growth areas. For example, of the
thirty-six firms which entered the industry, almost two thirds
began manufacturing bodies and engines. The third largest group
was the electrical sector which attracted five firms during this
period. In contrast, castings, stampings, radiators, tyres and
wheels, all recorded low levels of entrants. Perhaps the most
striking feature between 1902-1912 was the relatively small
number of firms leaving the industry. Unlike the motor car
industry, in which this period witnessed high levels of entries
and exits, the component industry appears to have experienced
very few business failures at this stage. Indeed, the departure
of Allard from the coach building branch was
4 See chapter 2, chart 2.4.
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Table 3.2
The Entry, Exit and Origin of Coventry Car Component Firms
1902-1912.
Product Entry Origin Exit Origin
1902-1912 1902-1912
Bodies 10 Old Est: 7 1 Old Est: 1
New: 3 New: 0
Electrical 5 Old Est: 1 0 Old Est: 0
New: 4 New: 0
Casting 1 Old Est: 0 0 Old Est: 0
Stamping New: 1 New: 0
Engines 10 Old Est: 8 0 Old Est: 0
New: 2 New: 0
Radiators 2 Old Est: 0 0 Old Est: 0
New: 2 New: 0
Tyres	 and 2 Old Est: 0 1 Old Est: 1
Wheels New: 2 New: 0
Other 0 0 1 Old Est: 1
New: 0
Unspec 6 Old Est: 2 0 Old Est: 0
New: 4 New: 0
Total 36 Old	 Est: 3 Old Est: 3
18 New: 0
New: 16
Sources: Kelly's Directory of Warwickshire 1902-1912, Ryland's Directory
of Iron, Steel and Allied Trades 1902-1912, Motor Manufactures of
Coventry (Museum of British Road Transport), Autocar, The Motor,
Lloyds Bank Archive, Midland Bank Archive.
due to a desire to produce whole cars, rather than as a
consequence of any product or financial problems.5
A classic characteristic of an emergent industry is that it
experiences high levels of entries and exits. 6 While the car
industry lends itself to this interpretation, tables 3.1 and 3.2
suggests that the same scenario cannot be attributed to the
component trade between 1902-1908. Clearly, there existed
between 1895-1912, some underlying factors common to most
branches of the component trade which effectively created
5 K. Richardson, The British Motor Industry 1896-1939. A Social and
Economic History, 1977, p. 225.
6 M.E. Porter, Competitive Strategy. Techniques for Analyzing Industries
and Competitors, (New York, 1980), p. 218.
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barriers to entry. Only in two branches, bodies and engines,
sectors not connected with the city's cycle industry, was there
any substantial growth. In order to uncover the circumstances
surrounding the relatively low number of entrants, the following
section will examine the economic context of Coventry during
the late nineteenth century to 1914 and the configuration of the
early motor industry itself.
With the much publicised formation of the British Motor
Syndicate in 1896, many contemporaries, expected a rapid
growth of component firms. The close relationship that
contemporaries predicted would exist between the cycle and
prospective motor industries was demonstrated in a speech by
Harry Lawson on the structure of the prospective British Motor
Syndicate. Lawson believed that the organisation of the new
motor industry would be almost identical to the cycle trade. He
asserted that the production practices of the cycle trade, which
involved many small firms buying components from suppliers,
would be an integral cornerstone in the structure of the motor
industry.
Nineteen years since I went to Coventry with the present
cycle.. .to establish an industry that has now some ninety
subsidiary but important trades dependent on it. Yesterday
I went to Coventry with the motor car, and I venture to say
that in a very short time there will be more subsidiary
trades depending on the car industry than dependent on the
cycle industry.7
Thus, Lawson envisaged a large component sector would
establish itself soon after the advent of the car industry.
Certainly, the belief that the component sector would
immediately generate work in allied trades was shared by the
7 Autocar, 25 April 1896, p.57
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Coventry business community. The manager of the Midland
Brick and Lime Works in Coventry wrote to a colleague insisting
that the output of bricks should be increased to at least eighty-
thousand a week to cope with prospective orders from companies
associated with autocar manufacture. He predicted that over
'10,000 more people will be working in Coventry in the course
of a year [and ] they cannot get houses to live in, it is far worse
than when the boom was on before...' s With the establishment of
the British Motor Syndicate and the success of the cycle
industry in 1896, business men entered the car manufacturing
industry with great optimism. The Coventry Graphic described
1896 as the 'signal for the starting of feverish activities in the
motor business. There was no time to wait for works to be built.
Everyone was anxious to "start constructing".9
However, as we have seen, a clearly identifiable car
component sector did not establish itself in Coventry until some
years later. The lack of a supply sector was recognised as a
problem by contemporaries such as Frederick Lanchester, one of
the pioneering engineers of the late nineteenth century motor
industry. Recalling his early experience of the motor trade,
Lanchester noted that:
the difficulties of management were very great partly
owing to the fact that no ancillary trades had been
developed, and we had to do everything ourselves, chassis,
magneto, wheels, body work, etc., everything except the
tyres. 10
8 Coventry Record Office (hereafter CRO), Acc 279/44/6253 Letter from
Midland Brick and Lime Works, 1896.
9 Coventry Graphic, 28 November 1913, p. 3
Littlewood, 'The Location of the British Car Industry 1888-1940', 14.
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There are perhaps two factors which underpin the slow
development of the car component sector during the formative
years of the motor industry. First, the design of motor cars in
Britain had not reached a standardized pattern. Manufacturers
were mostly at the experimental stage with very little output. In
1913, the Coventry Graphic recalled the test runs of the very
early cars:
One remembers the curious little machines that Mr
Pennington used to pack as full of boys as it would hold as
his test load for climbing the hit!.. .The 'live load' enjoyed
very much this method of testing the new locomotion. 11
Such was the early variation in the design of cars that
manufacturers experimented with engines under seats, single
chain drives, tube ignition, short wheel bases and 'many other
eccentricities'. 12 Indeed, Henry Sturmey, 13
 the editor of Autocar,
commented that 'it will be many a long day before cars are
standardized and all built on the same design principle like
bicycles'." Thus, with very small production runs and frequent
changes to design, there was virtually no market for specialist
producers in the motor trade. However, the absence of a car
component industry did not impose a great financial burden on
car manufacturers as long as output remained small since large
outlays on fixed plant and machinery were not necessary.15
The second factor which deterred companies from entering the
component trade was the success of the cycle trade in the mid-
11 Coventry Graphic, 28 November 1913, p. 3.
12 Victoria County History of Warwickshire, II, (1908), 198.
13 For a brief account of Sturmey's activities in the motor industry see
Richardson, The British Motor Industry, p. 13,28,192,192.
14 University of London, Simms Papers, List A, 9/67, H. Sturmey, 'The
Motor Car Industry. Why British Manufacturers have failed to make
Headway', 1902c
15 Littlewood, 'The Location of the Motor Industry', 14.
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1890s. While car manufacturers attracted some new concerns,
the component sector was largely derived from traditional
industries. Table 3.3 demonstrates that from the sixty one
component firms in 1912, at least thirty one had diversified
from a trade outside of the motor industry. Consequently, it took
a depression in the cycle and watch trades to encourage
companies to diversify.
Table 3.3
Origins of the Car Component Firms 1912.
Cycles 17
Coach Building 8
Est as	 Component Firm 15
Other 6
Unknown 15
Total 61
Sources: Ryland's Directory of Coventry, Kelly's Directory of
Warwickshire, The Motor, Autocar (Motor Show Editions), Lloyds Bank
Archive, Midland Bank Archive, for the year 1912.
Between 1898 and 1899 the full ill effects of the boom were
felt in the cycle trade. Over capitalization and a stagnant
market had pushed down cycle prices resulting in the bankruptcy
of many small cycle firms, while the larger concerns sustained
heavy losses. In 1897, practically all of the cycle producers
paid dividends, yet by 1899 many paid no dividend at all. The
number of cycle firms in Coventry dropped from a peak of
seventy-five in 1899 to forty-nine in 1912, only sixteen of which
had survived from the nineteenth century. 16 At Dunlop's annual
general meeting in 1899, it was reported that 'the cycle trade
was in crisis' and, over the last few years, 441 firms engaged in
16 D. Thorns and T. Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry in Coventry since
the 1890s, (1985), p. 28.
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cycle production had collapsed. 17 Significantly, it was the
component sector of the cycle trade that experienced the greater
losses, since they were on the whole small units of production,
and lacked the resources of firms such as Humber (1898),
Progress (1899) and Riley (1898) who had branched out into car
production. During the year 1899, the Coventry Wheel Company
and the Badminton Cycle and Components Company were
voluntarily wound up, the Cycle Components Manufacturing
Company returned only 4 per cent in 1897, while Smith's
Stamping had not paid investors since 1897. The affect on the
small cycle firms was noted by the Coventry Herald who
commented that 'a number of small firms have disappeared and
of several others, more or less prominent at the time of the
boom, little is known', the fact that some firms still survived
furnished 'substantial cause for wonder'. 18 Moreover, the
collapse of the cycle industry had immediate repercussions for
the recently formed motor industry. In 1902, Henry Sturmey,
who was both chairman of Daimler and editor of Autocar,
vividly described how the motor industry had become tainted
with the failure of the cycle trade:
when the slump came in the cycle industry these 'cycle and
motor' companies, having but unsecure foundations in
cycles, and less than none at all in motors, were the first
to collapse, with the immediate result that.. .'motors'
became synonymous with failure... 19
Clearly, the association between failure and the motor industry
that was circulating among the business community at the turn
17 CRO, Acc 606, Daffern and Stephenson Collection, Dunlop accounts
1899
18 Coventry Warwickshire Collection (hereafter CWC), A. Lowe, 'City of
Coventry', (1899-1900), 135-6.
19 University of London, Simms Papers, List A, 9/67, Sturmey, 'The
Motor Car Industry'.
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of the century, did little to encourage either new firms being
founded in the car component industry or old-established firms
to diversify away from their traditional and 'safe' businesses.
However, four years after the formation of the British Motor
Syndicate circumstances within Coventry's economy began to
change. In 1899, the Coventry Herald observed that the motor
industry was:
developing more rapidly than was anticipated three or four
years ago. There is, of course, a great deal yet to be done
before the perfect vehicle is turned out, but... [the trade is]
rapidly passing through its experimental stage and on the
way to fairly rapid production.20
Thus the two factors which had effectively blocked a component
industry from emerging, the experimental stage of car
manufacture and the success of the cycle industry were
beginning to recede. One indication of its emergence was the
establishment of new companies which had the sole intention of
manufacturing car components.
In 1898, Hermanus Van Raden founded the Van Raden
Company in Queen Victoria Road, Coventry and immediately
described the firm as an important 'branch of the automobile
industry'. 21 Van Raden successfully specialised in a wide range
of glass accumulators and consequently moved to larger
premises in Foleshill Road in 1903. By 1908 the company
produced both high tension and low tension magnetos, spark
plugs, electric horns and car lighting sets. 22 Another company
which regarded itself solely as a branch of the motor industry
CWC, A. Lowe, 'City of Coventry', (1899-1900), 137.
21 Anon, Motors and Motoring, (1908), 79, Van Raden Trade Catalogue,
(1906).
n CRO, Acc 1562/29/13 Van Roden Trade Catalogue, (1908).
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was the Coventry Motor Fittings Company. Established in 1902
by two former Daimler employees W.S. Tyler and C.E. Hatfield,
the company produced a variety of components including
radiators, pumps, dash boards, bonnets and wings. 23 Engine
making also attracted a number of newly established firms.
With French firms such as De Dion and Aster dominating the
English market, a number of Coventry firms entered into engine
production at the turn of the century. Cromwell Engineering's
entry into the engine making sector was a direct consequence of
the winding up of Payne and Bates, an early car manufacturing
firm. The partnership had depended on Payne's skill as an
engineer while Bates financed the business. However, after the
premature death of George Bates as a result of a motoring
accident, the Bates family withdrew their capital leaving Payne
to search for some financial support. 24 Support was found in the
shape of Dan Albone who owned a small motor concern in
Bedfordshire. However, the capital was fairly small and,
consequently, Payne could not afford the outlay required to
produce a whole car and had little option but to diversify into
producing engines. 25
 The motivation behind the formation of
Johnston Hurley and Martin seems to have stemmed from a
dispute between the three founders and their former partner
Forman. In 1903, Johnston, Hurley and Martin withdrew their
capital from the business and set up their own firm informing
their bank manager that they 'will do well as Forman was no
23 Anon, Motors and Motoring, (1908), p. 84.
24 C. O'Gallagher, 'Payne and Bates of Coventry: Pioneer Motor
Manufacturers, Warwickshire History, 2, 1975, p. 83.
25 University of London, Pollitt Papers, Book 1, 8/148, Letter to Pollitt
from F.S. Payne, 25 February 1946.
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good at all'. 26 Their assertion proved accurate for in 1912,
whether through lack of capital or poor quality products, the
Forman concern was wound up. 27 While both Forman and
Johnston, Hurley and Martin, were pioneer engine makers, their
fairly low output did little to break French domination.28
However, Simplex engines, founded by Pelham Lee, and White
and Poppe were relatively successful in attracting British car
manufacturers away from French engines. In fact, White and
Poppe were one of the most successful in attracting custom from
the newly established firms. Founded in 1899 by Alfred White,
a watchmaker who financed the concern, and Peter Poppe, a
Norwegian engineer, the firm pioneered the precision machinery
of parts to interchangeable limits. 29 At the 1906 Motor Show
fifteen firms were showing cars with White and Poppe engines,
while in the same year the firm's carburettor was produced,
selling twenty thousand in the following six years. 3° On the
whole, newly established firms were formed to exploit a
technological deficiency within the motor industry. Clearly this
was the case in the engine and electrical sectors of the
industry, since eight of the ten engine firms and four of the five
electrical firms entered the car component industry • as newly
founded concerns. Engine making and electrical equipment were
still in an early stage of
	
technical development and
consequently a number of short-lived firms initially attracted
26 Lloyds Bank Archive (hereafter LBA), B379a/12, 15 April 1903.
27 Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), BT 31 19263/770779, Forman
articles of association and winding up certificate.
28 S.B. Saul, 'The Motor Industry in Britain to 1914', Business History, 5,
(1962), p. 35.
29 Thorns and Donnelly, The Car Motor Industry, p. 23.
30 Saul, 'The Motor Industry in Britain', p. 35.
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the interest of car assemblers by engaging in product
experimentation.3i
Whilst most new component firms were founded by
independent entrepreneurs, in some cases, firms entered the
industry through a car assemblers' desire to guarantee supplies.
For example, H.J. Baker of Daimler and C.V. Pugh of Rudge
Whitworth financed the formation of Sterling Metals which
entered the casting sector prior to the First World War.32
Moreover, a number of Albion Drop Forging's directors, which
was formed in 1900, were also prominent figures in the motor
car industry. Both the Riley motor firm and Daimler helped
Albion's entry and subsequent survival in the supply industry by
purchasing substantial shares in the firm.33
Although the entry of a number of newly formed specialist
firms confirmed that by 1902 Coventry possessed an identifiable
component sector, the component industry itself was largely
derived from the region's traditional industries. For example,
prior the advent of the motor industry, Coventry possessed a
large number of coach builders. Consequently, in terms of
technical expertise and the plant required, the process of
diversification from horse-drawn coaches to motor carriages was
neither complex nor costly. Of the ten new entrants between
1902-1912, seven had previously produced horse-drawn
coaches. 34
 Indeed, by 1906, The Motor had noted that the motor
31 See chapter 7 for further analysis of the relationship between car
component makers and assemblers.
32 LBA, B379a/19, 27 October 1911.
33 LBA, B379a/15, 12 November 1905 and B379a/16, 6 February 1907.
34 For an interesting analysis of the early coach building industry in
Britain to 1939, see D. Lyddon, 'Craft Unionism and Industrial Change: A
Study of the National Union of Vehicle Builders until 1939', (unpublished
PhD, University of Warwick, 1987).
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industry had revitalised the fortunes of Coventry's coach
building sector:
Another old-established business, and one which was in a
very poor way a few years since, has now completely
revived as a result of the advent of the car. We refer to the
coach building trade. Three of four firms of repute that
were in a declining state ten years back are now working
overtime to keep pace with the demand for car bodies.35
Coventry's traditional cycle trade also proved to possess a high
level of technological continuity with the emerging motor
industry. 36 By 1900, the Coventry Chain Company, which had
been established by Alick Hill in 1896 for the purpose of making
cycle chains, found car production more commercially viable.37
Likewise, companies such as Automachinery, which was
established in 1875 to produce steel balls, A.E. Dover which had
manufactured cycle gear cases since 1897 and the cycle
accessories firm Bluemels, 38 had all diversified into car
component production during the formative years of the
twentieth century. In 1906, the Quadrant Cycle Company
transferred its technical expertise to the car component industry
by establishing the Motor Gear Company with a capital of
£45,000. 39 Another influential firm which entered the
component sector in 1907 was the fairly large concern, the
Coventry Ordnance Works. Established by John Brown, Cammel
Laird and Fairfield Shipbuilding in 1905, it was originally
formed to produce ordnance. However, in 1907, the business
35 The Motor, 25 September 1906, p. 207.
36 See an article detailing the technical similarities between the cycle and
motor trades in The Motor, 27 February 1906, pp. 94-5.
37 B. Tripp, Reynold Chains. A History of the Company and the Rise of
the Precision Chain Industry 1878-1955, (1956), p. 58.
38 A.E. Harrison, 'The Origins and Growth of the UK Cycle Industry to
1900', The Journal of Transport History, 6, 1985, pp. 52-3.
39 The Motor, 30 January 1906, p. 734.
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became an important supplier to the car industry through its
ability to accept orders for large sets of components.4°
However, the early success enjoyed by some old-established
firms, especially in the radiator, wheels and tyres branches of
the trade appear to have deterred potential entrants. Indeed,
between 1902-1912 a total of only four new firms entered the
both the radiator and tyres and wheels branches of the trade.
Significantly, these two component markets had already become
dominated by two firms, Coventry Radiator and Dunlop Rim and
Wheel. Both firms became established in Coventry during to the
boom in the cycle trade and had progressed to take a firm
foothold in the car component trade. The Dunlop Pneumatic
Tyre Company established a factory in Coventry in 1893 by
integrating back into the tyre making process and buying one of
its suppliers, the Bryne Bros Company. In 1900 Dunlop entered
the car industry and eventually went on to dominate Coventry's
car tyre and wheel sector. 4 ' Indeed, despite a fairly late entry
to the motor industry, Dunlop had reached a dominant position
in the tyre and wheel sector by 1906. 42 Likewise, it was reported
that as early as 1912 Coventry Radiator was responsible for 20
per cent of the industry's output of radiators. 43 Another notable
sector which attracted only one new entrant between 1902-1912,
was the Stamping and Casting branch of the trade. The lack of
opportunity for firms to enter this sector stemmed from the
40 W. Lewchuck, American Technology and the British Vehicle Industry,
Cambridge, 1987, p. 254.
41 M. French, 'The Growth and Relative decline of North British Rubber
Company 1856-1956', Business History, 30, 1988, pp.397-401.
42 G. Jones, 'The Growth and Performance of British Multinational Firms
before 1939: The Case of Dunlop', Economic History Review, 37, 1984, p.
39.
43 Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, p. 48.
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dominance of established firms which had diversified from the
cycle industry. Firms such as Coventry Malleable, Smith's
Stamping and Coventry Swaging seemed to have, up to 1912,
satisfied the motor assemblers' limited demand for castings and
stampings.
In some cases an old-established firm's entry to the motor
trades appeared to be carefully planned. For example, the
diversification policy of Rotherham and Sons, an old-established
firm which progressed from making watches to components for
cycles and cars, has been described as a 'wholly voluntary
action'. 44 Similarly in 1911, W.A. Oubridge, who owned British
Chuck and Tool Company, dispensed with the machine tool
business and diversified fully into producing piston rings. 45 In
the same year, Oubridge changed the firm's name to the British
Piston Ring, claiming that it was a 'splendid business' and that
his 'piston rings are the best on the market'. In fact, considering
the surge of demand from many of the prominent motor car
manufacturers in Coventry, it is almost certain that they were
the only firm devoted to piston ring manufacture.46
Another interesting entry into the car component industry was
the Clipper Pneumatic Tyre Company. Formed in 1898 to
acquire cycle tyre patents, the company's trading profits
increased from £15,871 in 1899 to £31,017 in 1902. At this
juncture the company decided to enter the motor industry, and
by 1903 production was geared towards manufacturing motor car
tyres. However, Clipper's decision to join the motor trade can
44 CRO, J. Woodward, 'Rotherham: Watchmakers', (unpublished report,
1975).
45 Coventry Standard, 8 November 1963, Supplement section, ' British
Piston Ring. A Story of Achievement 1909-1953'.
46 LBA, B379a/19, 1 June 1911.

73
reliable transmission units from engine and gear box to the axle,
so eliminating belt or chain drives.° The process of
diversification, was for many firms, a difficult transition, and
firms did not immediately reap the benefits of entering an
unstable and immature motor industry. For example, after
making a net loss of over £4,000 in the cycle crisis of 1899,
Brett's Stamping took seven years to record a modest profit of
just over £2,000 after entering the motor industry in 1900.50
Another typical early entrant to the car component sector was
Thomas Smith's Stamping Works. Attracted. to Coventry in 1896
by the cycle boom, Smith found that by 1899, the orders for drop
forged cycle components had dropped alarmingly. With
hundreds of pairs of dies for cycle parts on his hands, Smith
sought alternative products for manufacture. Although Smith's
Stamping experimented with a variety of products including door
handles, boiler fittings and military equipment for the Boer War,
it was not until Smith entered the motor industry that he was
able to reduce the yearly losses from twelve thousand pounds in
1900 to six thousand pounds in 1901. Smith's early success in
the car components trade was largely due to the fact that many
of the new customers were former cycle manufacturers And were
familiar with the company's working arrangements.51
Since many firms entered the car component sector as a direct
response to a slump in Coventry's traditional craft industries,
there was often a reluctance from firms to commit themselves
49 M_ Adeney, The Motor Makers. The Turbulent History of Britain's Car
Industry, (1988), p. 148_
CRO, Ace 606, Daffern and Stephenson, Brett's Stamping Accounts
1899-1906.
51 A. Muir, 75 Years. A Record of Progress. Smiths Stamping Works
Coventry, Clayton Forge Lincoln, (1958), p. 33.
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fully to the motor industry. Moreover, the reluctance for firms
to diversify into the motor industry was compounded by the
economic and social context of Edwardian Britain. Not only did
the early motor trade become retarded by the eccentric design of
cars, and suffer an economic slump in 1908, but the industry was
also at the heart of the debate over the future of the factory
system and of capitalism in Britain. 52 A firm which was perhaps
affected by this technological, economic, and political
uncertainty surrounding the motor industry was the Coventry
Watch Movement Company. Consequently it is worth
investigating, in some detail, the Movement Company's process
of diversification since the problems confronting the watch firm
were common place among prospective car component makers.
The Movement Company was formed in 1889 by several of the
city's leading watch makers in an attempt to break the
Lancashire Watch Movement's monopoly of watch supplies.
However, the Coventry firm suffered from a shortage of capital
and was forced to abandon plans for the mass production of
watch movements, a decision which left it ill equipped to
weather the decline in the watch trade during the late nineteenth
century. 53 It became clear to the directors that some form of
diversification was essential and it arrived in the form of the
Boer War. Although the concern's War Office tender was
rejected, they successfully supplied 1,000 rocking bars, centre
pieces and springs to White and Poppe, who were engaged in
armament production. However, there is little to suggest that
52 W. Lewchuck, 'The Return to Capital in the British Motor Vehicle
Industry 1896-1939', Business History, 27, 1985, P. 21.
53 J.R. Bailey, 'The Struggle for Survival in the Coventry Ribbon and
Watch trades, 1865-1914', Midland History, 7, (1982), p. 148.
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this diversification away from watch movements was considered
by the Movement Company as a long term strategy. Edwin
Bolton, the chief engineer, informed the board that the tender
for White and Poppe work was offered because it did not require
any technical reorganisation, as it was discovered that 'the
company's tools would be largely suitable for the production
required.' 54. Significantly, despite the fall in Coventry watch
manufacturers from 115 in 1890 to 78 in 1901, the Movement
Company still persisted in concentrating on producing
movements after the Boer War. 55
 Consequently, while a board
meeting reported in 1902 that 'sales in watch movements were
much less than for many years', the company calculated that
stock had increased from five thousand pounds to seven
thousand pounds in just one year.56
Between 1902-1903, the Movement Company was forced to
enter three new manufacturing areas in order to save the
company from 'serious losses'. By 1903, the firm produced
relatively small runs of cycle, electrical and motor components._
The seriousness of the fall in net profits, from over six hundred
pounds in 1900 to just seven pounds in 1904 did not allow the
directors to formulate a well planned diversification strategy.
In order to tender for contract outside of the movement trade,
the company employed an agent, Mr Kalker, who had good
connections in the cycle and motor trades. However, the
contract drawn up between the two parties suggests that the
Movement Company considered that cycle, motor and electrical
component production would not form the staple business of the
54 CRO, Acc 542 CWMC. Minute Book 1889-1912, 8 June 1901.
55 Bailey, 'The Struggle for Survival', p. 136.
CRO, Acc 542, CWMC. MB 1889-1912, 10 February 1902.
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company since Kalker was awarded 50 per cent commission.
This miscalculation became a serious drain on profits, for while
the sale of watch movements continued to slide, orders for cycle
gears, spark plugs, motor brushes and rollers, radiator tubes,
and electrical motor switches gradually became the source of the
company's business. 57
 Figure 3.4 demonstrates the growing
importance of the motor industry by analysing the income
received by the firm's four departments between 1908-1914.
Although, business in the cycle department remained fairly low
throughout the period, the largest decline in income was
experienced by the watch section which fell from an average
monthly income of almost £2,000 in 1908 to under £200 in 1914.
The largest increase in average monthly incomes was in the
motor department which increased its earnings rapidly from just
over £2,000 in 1910 to almost £7,000 by 1914.
57 Ibid. 20 November 1905.
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Figure 3.4
Yearly Income of Each Department of the Coventry Movement
Company, 1908-1914. 
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By 1908, a nut and bolt department had been established, while
Bolton designed and patented a variety of grease cups and motor
lubricators which were 'well received in the [motor] trade'.
However, despite receiving large orders from Daimler, Rover
and Maudslay, the firm still harboured hopes of resurrecting
their movement trade. In fact it took the external pressures of
the First World War effectively to close the movement shop and
terminate any lingering hopes of reviving the movement trade.58
Thus far, the chapter has argued that the component industry
did not immediately conform to the classic model of an emergent
industry, whereby an industry experiences a high number of
entries and exits of firms. While a substantial number of firms
58 Ibid, 11 October 1909 and MB 1913-1932, 26 October 1914. Coventry
University, Lanchester Oral History Collection, Interview with Mr Bird,
former watch maker, 26 October 1972.
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entered the industry, particularly during the period 1908-1912,
the number of exits was relatively small. Placed against
Hirschman's model, this evidence indicates that assemblers
favoured the voice rather than the exit option when dealing with
their suppliers. However, alongside this assumption, three
important issues should be considered. The slow growth of the
component industry was related to the eccentric design of motor
cars, a strong cycle industry, and a reluctance to diversify from
an old-established trade during a period of economic and social
uncertainty. However, the sudden influx of firms prior to the
First World War created an intensely competitive market
structure, a development which was to have a profound effect on
future structures of the component industry. The following
section will analyse the impact this had on the entry and exit of
firms during the years 1912-1919, the second half of the
emergent period for the car component industry.
The Emergence of the Coventry Car Component Trade:
The Years of Rapid Expansion and Failure 1912-1919
Table 3.5 shows that between 1912-1919 high levels of entry to
the Coventry car component industry were confined to particular
sectors of the trade. Moreover, there were striking similarities
with the period 1902-1912, as the body, electrical equipment,
and engine sectors continued to attract a number of concerns.
Significantly, between 1912-1919, the firms' circumstances on
entry to the industry differed to the period 1902-1912. Unlike
the earlier years, many of the firms entering the industry were
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Table 3.5
The Entry, Exit and Origin of Coventry Car Component Firms
1912-1919.
Product Entry
1912-1919
Origin Exit
1912-1919
Origin
Bodies 5 Old Est: 0
New: 5
7 Old Est: 4
New: 3
Electrical 3 Old Est: 1
New: 2
2 Old Est: 0
New: 2
Casting
Stamping
10 Old Est: 6
New: 4
0 Old Est: 0
New: 0
Engines 5 Old Est: 1
New: 4
2 Old Est: 2
New: 0
Radiators 2 Old Est 0
New: 2
1 Old Est 0
New: 1
Tyres	 and
Wheels
0 Old Est: 0
New: 0
0 Old Est: 0
New: 0
Other 0 Old Est: 0
New: 0
0 Old Est: 0
New: 0
Unspec 8 Old Est: 0
New 8
4 Old Est: 1
New 3
Total 33 Old Est: 8
New: 25
16 Old Est: 7
New: 9
Sources: Kelly's Directory of Warwickshire 1912-1919, Ryland's Directory
of Iron, Steel and Allied Trades 1912-1919, Spennell's Directory of the
City of Coventry 1919, Motor Manufactures of Coventry (Museum of
British Road Transport), .Autocar, The Motor, Lloyds Bank Archive,
Midland Bank Archive.
not derived from Coventry's traditional trades but were founded
as component firms. A measure of this change is illustrated by
the coach making sector, which attracted five new entrants, all
of which were founded with the sole purpose of producing motor
carriages. Moreover, all five of the new engine firms and two of
the three new electrical concerns were established to supply the
motor industry. Another contrast with the earlier period, was
the rapid increase in the number of firms involved in the casting
and stamping branch of the industry. Whilst between 1902-
1919, only one new entry was recorded, ten firms began
supplying the motor industry between 1912-1919. The fact that
many of the firms entering the industry were founded with the
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purpose of supplying components, rather than diversifying from
an ailing traditional trade, suggests that a number of 'pull'
factors existed. Indeed, this period marked a turning point for
car manufacturers since they began to make more use of
component suppliers. Car assemblers, such as Singer, Standard,
Calcott Bros and Humber, began producing new popular light
cars designed for the more affluent middle class. These cars,
which were produced in larger batches than previous designs,
were miniature versions of the larger prototypes but with an
engine capacity limited to 1500 c.c. 59 Another 'pull' factor for
prospective component firms was the First World War which
rapidly increased Coventry's entire engineering sector.
However, the war also played a role in the increase in firms
departing from the component industry. With the combination
of an increased competitive market and a switch from civilian
products to war-time demand, the number of exits rose from
three, between 1902-1919, to sixteen between 1912-1919.
Whilst table 3.5 effectively outlines the changing pattern of
exits and entries in particular branches of the component
industry, it is necessary to gain an overarching perspective on
the circumstances surrounding exit and entry of firths in the
industry as a whole between 1912-1919.
The First World War encouraged both an entry and exit of
firms from the Coventry car component industry between 1914-
1918. Coventry's emerging engineering infrastructure, not only
encouraged new firms to settle in the area, but also prompted a
rapid building programme by existing firms eager to
59 B. Beaven, 'The Growth and Significance of the Coventry Car
Component Industry 1895-1914', Midland History, 18, (1993), p 113.
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accommodate the growth of military production. Such was the
intensity of the building activity that an American visitor
observed that:
The people in Coventry walk quicker than other
Englishmen. Everyone seems prosperous. There is a
briskness in the very air of the place. Your factories are
growing as fast as the factories in Detroit - and I cannot
say more than that. Everyone is busy...
Indeed, The Times agreed and noted that 'new factories were
springing up' in Coventry 'at a speed which even Detroit could
^
not exceed'. 60 This rapid building programme clearly impressed
contemporary commentators who often highlighted Coventry as a
role model for war-time industrial re-organisation. In 1915, The
Times commented that 'British industries are being turned upside
down and mobilised for war', and yet they 'lacked knowledge and
experience, for all but a few, most of the work they are called
upon to undertake is new'.61
The supply problems, which had stemmed from the outbreak of
war, encouraged many firms to enter branches of the component
trade which had been largely in the hands of foreign
competitors. The sector of the component industry which had
been particularly affected by foreign competition was the
electrical sector. The German electrical firm Bosch's technical
and commercial domination in Europe had been so great that the
magneto industry in Britain was virtually non-existent. 62 The
pressure for firms to enter this branch of the component trade
was recognised by contemporaries. A.P. Young, who was a chief
The Times, 17 January 1916, p. 7.
61 The Times, 18 September 1915, p. 11.
62 Parliament (Commons), Monopolies Commission on the Supply of
Electrical Equipment for Mechanically Propelled Land Vehicles, 18
December 1963, p. 14.
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engineer at British Thompson Houston in Coventry, recalled
that:
the production of a High Tension, magneto in Britain was
now a key problem because war with Germany meant most
decisively that supplies of Bosch Magnetos from Stuttgart
upon which the motor car and aircraft industries (still in
their infancy) had depended, would instantly cease.63
Until 1914, Bosch had been supplying high quality 4 cylinder
magnetos under a free trade system for under £5. However, A.P.
Young and the firm's supervisor for purchases • W.J. Terry,
quickly reached the conclusion that 'this grave national problem
presented to the BTH company in Coventry a glorious
opportunity'. Support for BTH's entry into magneto production
grew until the firm's Rugby based chief executive, H.N.S.
Sporborg, gave the go ahead for the whole of the Coventry works
to be converted into magneto manufacture in 1914. 64 Since
magneto production was still at an experimental stage, BTH
appealed to the government for some financial support in a bid
to ease their research costs. However, the War Office's response
was not at all accommodating as Lord Kitchener simply asserted
that 'it should not be difficult to make a little thing like a
magneto. All you have to do is place an order for your
requirements on a firm like Rolls Royce'. Young found this
reply 'quite staggering' and he came to realise that a successful
entry into such an immature industry was an immense task:
Even the great Rolls Royce would have been the first to
admit that the desperate problem facing Britain in 1914
could not be disposed of so easily.. .The simple fact was
63 University of Warwick Modern Record Centre (hereafter MRC), MSS
242/BI0/8, A.P. Young Collection, 'An Industry is Born', (unpublished
autobiography), p. 2.
64 Ibid, p. 3, H.A. Price-Hughes, BTH Reminiscences. Sixty Years of
Progress, 1946, pp. 34-43.
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that a new industry had to be created and time was not on
our side. 65 [His italics]
BTH's entry to the magneto industry was assisted by the
purchase of F.R. Simms' magneto assets after his firm was
wound up in 1913. Simms, had lost over 00,000 in his bid to
produce a reliable magneto, a loss which helped demonstrate to
Young the difficult task he had taken on. 66 Indeed, according to
Young, it was only through joint research with a number of new
electrical firms, that a magneto industry began to emerge in
Britain. Given that technical expertise in this field was limited,
the BTH Company contacted ML Magneto and Thomson-Bennett,
two recently formed firms which were also attempting to
produce magnetos. While, the Birmingham based Thomson-
Bennett had experimented with magneto production prior to the
First World War by copying Bosch designs, ML Magneto had
entered the component industry in a small way in Coventry as
early as 1908. However, until the outbreak of war, the firm
consistently made losses incurred by insufficient sales due to
the experimental nature of their product. 67 Both firms lacked
the financial resources of BTH and so were more than willing to
co-operate with their large American owned competitor. In
1914, the three firms established the British Ignition Apparatus
Association with the intention of providing 'co-operation and
mutual help to improve the service given to the magneto
industry'. 68 The extent of this early co-operation by firms eager
to gain and maintain entry to the electrical branch of the
65 MRC, MSS 242/180/8, Young, 'An Industry is Born', pp. 4-5.
66 Ibid. p. 2, B. Morgan, The Simms Story from 1891 to 1964, (1965), p.
12.
67 LBA, B379a/17, 31 July, 29 October 1908.
68 MRC, MSS 242, Young, 'An Industry is Born', p. 29.
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component industry was recalled by BTH's chief engineer,
Young:
In those early days, frequent meetings of Peter Bennett [T-
B], E.A. Watson [ML] and myself were held in the BTH
works.. The spirit of co-operation thus emerged bore good
fruit in the year ahead.. .There was a free exchange of all
information and a technical and design committee met
regularly promoting new ideas.. 69
Thus, of significant importance for a firm wishing to gain entry
to the magneto industry was geographical location. With the
exchange of technical information imperative for such a new and
under-developed industry, a midlands based factory was
essential. Accordingly, Young later asserted that the 'creation
of the high tension magneto industry was centred in Coventry
and Birmingham'. Indeed, by the end of the First World War the
British Ignition Apparatus Association possessed approximately
a dozen members, almost all of whom were based in the west
midlands district. 70 Moreover, although the initial manufacture
of magnetos at the outbreak war was fairly slow and subject to
yearly variation, production had dramatically increased by
Armistice. For example, Thomson-Bennett's the monthly output
of magnetos increased from 100 in 1914, to over 18,000 in 1918.
By the close of the war, the concern's total magneto output
stood at over 130,000, 71
 while BTH's Coventry factory had
produced over 36,000 over the same period.72
The First World War also stimulated demand for more
developed branches of the component industry, such as engines
Ibid, p. 28-29.
Ibid, p. 28,29.
Autocar, 12 July 1919, p. 53.
72 CRO, R.G. Ho11, 'Lucas Areo Space Ltd. A Review of the Years up to
1990 of the Coventry Site', (unpublished Report, April 1990), p. 7.
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and engine components. While engine components were by no
means standardized, they did not suffer from the high levels of
technical unreliability which had afflicted the electrical branch
of the component trade. Although technical difficulties in
producing items such as pistons and valves were minimal, there
were few firms in the industry devoted to this branch of the
industry. The large increase in demand that Pistons Ltd
experienced during the first few years of the war, was clearly
the motivation behind Frank Bullock's decision to leave the firm
which he had helped found and establish Valves Ltd in 1916.73
Although founded on modest capital, both firms were fairly
successful since they exploited previously neglected areas of the
component industry. Indeed, throughout the interwar period,
Bullock maintained his works were always busy since there was
'little competition'.74
Another significant addition to Coventry's engine making
sector was the arrival of the French machine gun makers,
Hotchkiss and Cie. The company moved to Britain when their
parent works in France were threatened with German invasion
and set up premises in Gosford Street. The factory, which was
regarded as a major centre for munitions work, employed over
2,000 people. 75 The concern's entry into the car component
industry occurred just after the war when they received a large
contract from Morris to build 100 engines and gear boxes a
week. 76 Apparently Hotchkiss experienced few difficulties in re-
organising production since, between 1919-1922, the firm had
73 Midland Bank Archive (hereafter MBA), 358/7, 17 January 1916.
74 MBA, 358/12, 5 September 1933.
75 F.W. Carr, 'Engineering Workers and the Rise of Labour 1914-1939',
(unpub PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 1978), p. 57.
76 MBA, 358/6, 29 November 1920.
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produced over 20,000 engines. 77 Another new entrant into the
engine sector was Nero Engines which was formed by Victor
Riley in 1915. This firm took full advantage of the war since as
well as obtaining a contract valued at £15,000 from Riley cars,
the firm also secured contracts to make shells and fuse heads
from Vickers and the government worth over £17,000. However,
Nero Engines was plagued by a shortage of capital which
prevented an expansion of production, a situation which was to
continue until Rover took over the firm after the war.78
A more short-lived entry into the engine components sector
was encountered by the Holley Brothers firm. This American
owned firm had entered the industry by producing carburettors
for the War Office. However, since the firm had been founded
as a direct consequence of the war and had devoted the whole of
its works to Government contracts, it had not built up a working
relationship with car assemblers prior to 1914. Subsequently,
the firm experienced extreme difficulties in procuring custom
after 1918 and, in the following year, it was purchased by T.G.
John. 79 John, - who was formerly a chief engineer at Deasy,
removed the concern from the component industry by
diversifying into a car manufacturer by establishing . Alvis in
1919. 80 Another firm which left the car component industry due
to their wartime activities was the Coventry Ordnance Works.
Although COW was originally established in 1905 to
manufacture armaments, it began producing large orders for car
77 Anon, A Souvenir of a Visit to the Hotchkiss Works, Coventry, (1922),
preface.
78 LBA, B375a/21, 13 January 1915, 21 May 1915.
79 MBA, 358/6, 23 October 1917.
K. Richardson, Twentieth Century Coventry, Coventry, (1972), pp. 46-
47.
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components in 1907. 81 The most visible indication of the war's
affect on the factory was its change in size. The factory nearly
doubled in size to over 50,000 sq feet at a cost of £360,000.
The cost of the extensions was met by the government under the
condition that the firm remained government property after the
war. However, the transition from producing car components to
shells, fuses and guns was surprisingly difficult considering the
company's history of producing armaments. Such was the
company's pre-war commitment to producing car components
that at the outbreak of war, no orders for armaments had been
placed with the firm for over five years and therefore only a
small staff were conversant with the manufacture of field guns.82
However, after a painful two year re-conversion period, at the
end of the war, the work's output had included 710 aircraft, 111
tanks, 92 anti-aircraft guns, nearly 4,000,000 cartridge cases
and millions of fuses and detonators. 83 Furthermore, the success
of the fuse department during the war had a significant affect on
the future of the firm in the car component sector. In 1918
Messrs Dick, Kerr and Company purchased COW for £1,400,000,
and exploited the achievements of the electrical department by
leaving the motor industry and diversifying into producing
'heavy electrical plant'.84
A more significant exit from the Coventry car component after
the war was the engine makers White and Poppe. Once again,
the affect of the war played a leading part in encouraging the
firm to diversify from its original product range.	 In 1914,
81 W. Lewchu-k, American Technology, p. 254.
82 PRO, MUN 5/373/1200/5, 'History of the Supply of Guns from COW',
October 1914-July 1917,
83 Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, pp, 71-72,
" The Times 15 November 1918, p, 4,
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despite being one of the largest engineering works in Coventry,
the company was facing intense financial pressure after they
were left holding £15,000 worth of engines which had been
commissioned by Morris. The firm's financial situation
worsened when, in the same year, the supply of Bosch magnetos,
which had been obtained on three months credit, ceased and had
to be replaced by the American equivalent purchased on cash
terms. The war did enable White and Poppe to enter the aero
engine business, and in 1915, the firm won a contract with
Armstrong Whitworth for 80,000 fuses a week. 85 However, it
was White and Poppe's large contracts with Dennis, the
commercial vehicle manufacturers of Guildford, which was to
prove the most significant customer. After the war, White and
Poppe switched entirely to the production of Dennis commercial
vehicle engines, and in 1920, the firm was eventually purchased
by the Guildford concern. 86 White and Poppe's decision to leave
the car component trade may have been influenced by
uncertainty in the private car market. Demand and vehicle_
fashion in the commercial sector was more consistent than the
private car sector, and there was less of a possibility of
accumulating large sets of unwanted stock that had so threatened
White and Poppe's business at the outbreak of war.87
The First World War was the catalyst for a number of
departures from the car component industry. However, unlike
COW and White and Poppe, it was the inability of the
component firm to adjust to war-time demand which was at the
85 Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, p. 72-73.
86 Surrey County Record Office, 1463/2/3, Dennis Director's Minute
Books 1913-1920, pp. 252-254, 258-259.
87 MBA, 357a/21, 17 October 1914, 4 November 1915.
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root of their business failure. For example, in 1910, Priory
Accessories was formed by two brothers, T.H. and J.F. Spencer,
with a capital of just £100. The onset of the First World War
created immense problems for the firm, since it was left with a
large and unwanted stock of components for civilian cars.
Moreover, the Spencer brothers were unable to raise sufficient
capital to re-organise production to meet war-time demand. By
1915, the firm was wound up with debts of between £3,000 to
£4,000. 88 The struggle to ascertain war office contracts was a
particular problem for small firms in a component sector
dominated by one or two leading firms. With the out break of
war, unlike the new entrants in the electrical sector which
specialised in magneto production, electrical firms such as
United Motor Industries and Coventry Headlights Ltd, were
unable to hold their position in the car lamp set market as they
were in direct competition with Lucas. 89 The war particularly
hit the body building sector, since with the almost complete halt
in production of civilian cars, the demand for high-class
carriage work fell dramatically. The body builders which left
the industry, such as Albert Mason, Hewer Bodies and Hobely
Bodies were old-established firms which had diversified into the
motor industry from manufacturing horse-drawn carriages.
These concerns lacked the financial resources required and were
less adaptable than the new firms, such as Midland Light Bodies
and Midland Motor Bodies which were both financially backed
by car assemblers.90
88 MBA, 358/6, 5 March 1910, 15 January 1915.
89 PRO, BT31/18752/101921 Coventry Headlights Ltd, BT31/66000 United
Motor Industries.
9° See Exit and Entry Table 1912-1919.
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The period 1912-1919, in many respects, cemented the
foundations laid during the early years of the car component
industry. The highly competitive market which emerged
between 1908-1912, was stimulated by the First World War .
which demanded that firms diversify to military items, embrace
rapid production techniques and engage in experimentation.
Thus the voice option became less of an attractive strategy for
car assemblers due to the highly competitive market. Moreover,
the increased use of the exit option exacerbated the instability
within the Coventry car component industry, further ensuring
that there was a high turn over of component firms throughout
the interwar period.
The Interwar Years: The Emergence of Monopolies and
the Continuance of Fierce Competition 1919-1939.
Table 3.6 show that the years 1919-1939 were a turning point
in the growth and development of the component industry. The
industry was subjected to major re-structuring and, for the first
time, the number of firms departing from the industry was
greater than those entering. This suggests that the emergent
period, in which an industry experiences a high level of entries
by short-lived embryonic firms, was over by 1939. Indeed, the
origins of the firms entering and leaving the industry would
support this notion. Many of the firms founded as component
firms between 1919-1936, appear to have short life spans since
forty-one of the forty-six new entrants and fifty-four of the
sixty-three firms leaving the industry were founded as car
component firms. Moreover, there was also a relatively low
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branches of the trade. The period 1895-1919, left the legacy of
an increasingly competitive market which greatly affected the
structure of the Coventry component industry between 1919-
1939. Although, some large firms had emerged during this
period, due to the fairly slow growth of the industry and the
interruption of the First World War, no one firm possessed a
monopoly interest in its respective sector by 1919. Coupled
with the great optimism which overwhelmed the motor industry
after the war, a surge of newly established firms entered both
the motor car and car component industries.91
Although the post war boom in the British motor industry
attracted many new firms, a large proportion of firms were short
lived due to subsequent recessions and fierce price cutting.
Moreover, according to contemporaries, some promoters entered
the motor industry in the full knowledge that the firm was
simply a pretence to generate money. 92 In 1920, the Economist
commented that:
If one wishes to moralise on the credulity of human nature,
a fit subject might be that of motor-car manufacturing
companies. Since armistice large numbers of engineering
plants which owed their existence to the war have come
into the market, and promoters have reaped a rich harvest
from introducing them to the public as a motor car
manufacturing undertaking.. .in some cases the company
has never produced a motor...93
There can be little doubt that the unscrupulous promoter and
inexperienced engineer were behind the failure of some motor
concerns.	 Indeed, the number of car assemblers in Britain
91 For a useful analysis of the highly competitive structure of the motor
industry see W. Lewchu k, 'The Motor Industry', in B. Elbaum and W.
Lazonick (eds), The Decline of the British Economy, Oxford, (1986),
92 For an analysis of the company promoter's role in creating motor firms
for the purposes of generating money see the chapter 3.
3 The Economist, 7 February 1920.
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declined from 96 in 1922 to 33 in 1939. The influx of firms into
Coventry's car assembly resembled the national trends, with one
important difference. Whilst there was a large turnover of car
firms in Coventry, forty had entered and left between 1918-
1931, of the eleven that remained in Coventry none could
compete with Morris and Austin, the two largest car
manufacturers in Britain. 94
 Likewise, the Coventry car
component industry experienced a high turnover of firms with
similar results. Of the twenty-nine firms which entered the
component industry between 1919-1926, sixteen had left by
1936. Moreover, only Coventry's Dunlop Rim and Wheel was
among the select group of component firms such as Pressed
Steel, Triplex, and Lucas, which began to dominate the industry
during the late 1920s and 1930s.95
The short-lived nature of many of the firms which were
inhibited by a shortage of resources and engineering experience
during the 1920s, was perhaps to be expected. However, the
increasingly competitive market environment also hastened the
exit of firms with a greater pedigree in component production.
An experienced firm which was unable to withstand this
increased competition was ML Magneto which left the industry
in 1930. Although ML Magneto had been instrumental in
creating the British magneto industry, the concern was
constantly short of financial resources. Despite a financial re-
construction in 1915, the firm's capital was insufficient and
consequently Smiths of Cricklewood made a successful bid for
the firm in 1919. At this point Smiths, which already had began
94 Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, pp. 84-85.
95 Ibid. p. 85.
94
to dominate the motor clocks and gauges market, was eager to
compete with Lucas, and believed that the acquisition of ML
would provide an ideal entry into the ignition side of the
industry. 96
 With an increased capital of £10,000, ML Magneto
extended its range of products by beginning manufacture
combined lighting and ignition sets in 1920. 97 However, unlike
the early days when the magneto industry was effectively in the
hands of a few firms, the war and the subsequent boom in the
motor industry, encouraged a number of new entrants. By 1923,
ML's directors reported a 'severe competition in prices', and by
the following year, the concern was forced into selling magnetos
below cost price. 98 In 1925, the firm decided to cut all
overheads 'by stopping all development, research, improvements,
etc., in fact anything which involved immediate outlay for
deferred results'." This action demonstrates the serious
problems facing ML, since this reduction in research came
during a period in which more financially secure concerns were
experimenting with new forms of ignition. 1°° As table 3.7 shows,_
despite these cut backs, ML were unable to reduce their rising
debts. Indeed, if it was not for Smiths' backing it would have
been unlikely that Lloyds bank would have granted such a small
firm the limits it did.
96 Parliament, (Commons), Monopolies Report on the Supply of Electrical
Equipment, p. 88.
97 CRO, Acc 1107/1, ML Magneto Minute Book, 1915-1930, 28 May 1920.
98 Ibid, 16 August 1923, 16 August 1924.
99 The reduction of expenditure in research and development was a
characteristic of a highly competitive industry see S. Helper, 'Strategy and
Irreversibility in Supplier Relations: The Case of the Automobile
Industry', Business History Review, 65, 4, 1991, p. 809.
100 Parliament, (Commons), Monopolies Report on the Supply of
Electrical Equipment, p.16
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Chart 3.7
ML Magneto Overdraft Debt and Limit 1919-1930
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Moreover, there was a reluctance among ML's customers to use
their 'voice' and improve the firm's financial difficulties. During
the late 1920s, Austin placed a large contract with ML for
magnetos for the Austin Seven. However, Austin's motive for
placing the order with ML did not arise out of any loyalty to the
magneto firm, rather that ML offered the cheapest prices on the
market. Indeed, once it became evident that ML was unable to
hold down its prices, Austin switched to a cheaper rival, a move
which compounded the Coventry firm's financial difficulties.m
In 1930, the firm was sold by Smiths to Lucas, after the two
firms had agreed a demarcation policy in which Smiths would
concentrate on the clocks and gauges, while Lucas continued
101 Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, p. 87.
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with producing lighting and ignition equipment. 102
 However,
Lucas would not tolerate ML's financial instability, and in 1930,
the research staff and workers were moved to Birmingham and
ML Magneto was wound up.
It was during the 1920s and 1930s that the electrical
equipment branch of the component industry began to resemble a
structure which was to continue into the post war period. The
success of the volume producers, Morris and Austin, proved
decisive in affording the opportunity for Lucas and Smiths to
establish strong positions in the motor industry. As we have
seen, smaller firms, such as ML were unable to compete in terms
of research and pricing, and consequently they were unable to
gain a foothold in the growing diversity of electrical goods,
such as electric horns and windscreen wipers, which car
assemblers were now demanding. 103
 Indeed, between 1919-1936,
eight Coventry firms left the industry, with only one firm
entering between 1926-1936. The smaller firms had little option
but to concentrate on products, such as magnetos, which Lucas
and Smiths were losing interest in. For example, Coventry
Magneto and Midland Components were able to continue making
magnetos in a small way into the 1930s since it was later stated
by Lucas that it had always been the firm's policy to 'confine
competitors to the part of the business which we did not desire
to hold'. 104 However, the small firms in Coventry which were
forced to concentrate on products such as magnetos had a
limited life span.
	 While, in 1926 over 80 per cent of cars
102 Parliament, (Commons), Monopolies Report on the Supply of
Electrical Equipment, p.89.
103 Ibid, p. 16.
104 Ibid, p. 54.
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exhibited at the Motor Show used magneto ignition, this figure
had dropped to 50 per cent in 1929. By 1931, the new coil
ignition out numbered magnetos by three to one, and by the
outbreak of the Second World War only ten per. cent of cars
contained a magneto. 105 Even larger firms, which were not short
of financial resources believed that Lucas' and Smiths' emerging
Duelopoly and the decline of the magneto signalled the end of
their interest in the car component industry. For example,
BTH's attempt to enter the car lighting set market when it
produced lighting equipment for Armstrong Siddeley, Austin,
Clyno and Singer cars during the mid-1920s, failed due to Lucas'
competitive pricing. An equally unsuccessful venture followed
after BTH, attempting to dislodge Smiths dominant position in
the motor trade, displayed a range of car speedometers at the
1933 Motor Show. The final straw for BTH was the decline of
the magneto industry. Although the firm had commanded a
strong position in the magneto market through out the 1920s, the
emergence of coil ignition signalled the end of BTH's interest in
the motor industry, and by 1936, it had diversified into
producing aircraft components.m6
Similarly, during the 1920s and 1930s the tyre and wheel
sector of the component trade became dominated by a few select
firms. Indeed, by the mid-1920s, small, medium and large car
firms in Coventry were purchasing wheels and tyres from two
main suppliers, Dunlop and Goodyear. Yet unlike the electrical
industry, there were no demarcation agreements between the
large firms relating to tyres and wheels. Prior to 1926, wheels
105 Morgan, The Simms Story, p. 17.
1°6 MRC, MSS 242/BT/9/11, 'History of the BTH Coventry Works', by L
Griffiths, (unpublished report, 4 January 1961), pp. 8-12.
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and tyres were not covered by the Mckenna duties, and
consequently, Dunlop was often undercut by cheaper American
imports. 107 However, even after 1926, competition within this
sector remained fierce for a number of foreign competitors side
stepped the duty tax by establishing firms in Britain. For
example, in 1929, Rover decided to switch suppliers of tyres
and wheels from Dunlop to Goodyear which reportedly saved the
car assembler £18,000. 108
 Thus while table 3.8 shows a rapid
growth in motor tyre production during the 1920s, this increase
was not due to the establishment of a number of new British
firms.
Table 3.8
The Units of Motor T res Produced in Britain 1924-1929
Year Units of
Tyres
Year Units of
Tyres
1924 1,972,000 1927 3,480,000
1925 2,900,000 1928 4,805,000
1926 3,000,000 1929 5,720,000
Source: The Economist 19 July 1930.
Indeed, commenting on the evidence presented in table 3.8, the
Economist, remarked that:
The increase has been rapid, particularly in the last two
years. A note worthy expansion in the output of the
largest British concern, the Dunlop Rubber Company is
reflected in these figures, but a large share of the recent
increase is attributable to the coming into production of
large plants established by foreign (particularly American)
manufacturers in this country including Firestone and the
Indian Rubber Company.m9
107 MRC, MSS 226/ST/1/2/1 Standard Minute Book 1908-1912, 23
November 1909, M. Adeney, The Motor Makers, p. 146.
log MRC, MSS 226/R0/1/1/5 Rover Minute Book 1926-1936, 3 September
1929.
109 The Economist, 19 July 1930, p. 120.
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With such fierce competition, there was little opportunity for
small Coventry based firms to enter the industry. While a few
firms had unsuccessfully diversified from cycle to motor wheels
and tyres at the turn of the century, only one Coventry firm
Warland Rim entered between 1919-1939. However, while
Warland Rim did well to withstand the slump in tyre production
in 1921, in which Dunlop lost over £8 million, the concern was
unable to compete with the mass producers which offered car
assemblers large set of cheap components and subsequently the
firm had been wound up by 1936.110
In contrast with the tyre and wheel sector of the Coventry
component industry, the body building branch of the trade
experienced a fairly high turnover of firms during the interwar
period. Moreover, the exit and entry of firms in the body
building sector differed from the other branches of the
component industry for two critical reasons. In conjunction
with having to operate in an intensely competitive environment,
body firms also had to contend with changes in both technology
and assemblers' demand. Between 1919-1926, twelve body firms
entered, attracted to the industry by the immediate post war
boom and the fact that no one body supplier had succeeded in
dominating the industry. However, four of the twelve firms,
Bryant, Hannock and Warman, W.E. Ward and Coventry Motor
Wings did not survive beyond past 1926. Nevertheless, a further
nine firms began producing bodies in Coventry between 1926-
1936. The high number of firms entering the sector supports the
notion that body building provided the fewest barriers to
110 Adeney, The Motor Makers, p. 146.
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successful entry to the component industry during the interwar
period.
The attraction of firms to body building during the interwar
period was the relatively low levels of capital required initially
to enter the industry. For example, Motor Panels was founded in
1920 on capital of just £994. This is not to suggest that the
firm was free from financial problems. The owners, Turner and
King, were heavily reliant on a Midland Bank loan of £1,800,
which enabled the firm to purchase larger premises worth £2,500
in 1924. The loan proved critical since the Midland Bank
manager reported that prior to the move 'they have been
compelled to refuse orders as they have not the space to take on
the work'."
The entry and survival of coach firms possessing only small
amounts of capital were jeopardised during the late 1920s and
1930s when new productive techniques were introduced into the
industry. Until the late 1920s, coach building revolved around
'composite' production methods. Composite production would_
either consist of pushing metal panels into, or building panels
upon, a timber framework. 112 The initial financial outlay for this
productive process, which was between £1,000-£2,000 in 1931,
placed low barriers of entry to this type body building."3
However, in 1926 Pressed Steel was established in Oxford with
the claim that they were the first firm to manufacture all steel
bodies. The firm, which was manufacturing under licence of G.
Budd an American body producer, initially suffered a number of
111 MBA, 358/7, Coventry Motor Panels balance sheets 1923-1928, 24
November 1924.
112 T.P. Newcomb and R.T. Spur, A Technical History of the Motor Car,
Bristol, (1989), p. 400.
113 Automobile Engineer, January 1934, p. 273.
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set backs in the quality of its early bodies. During this period,
all metal bodies were perceived as a lower quality product and
were some times described as 'tinny, noisy contraptions'. 114
Moreover, a further negative aspect of all metal bodies was the
high cost of entry into this particular market. In 1934, a
prospective body builder wishing to produce all metal bodies
required over £40,000 for the necessary jig and presses and
would need to produce over 10,000 bodies to recoup the original
outlay. 115 This change in technology ensured that there were two
forms of entry to body building, with a question mark over
which would product would prove most successful. As late as
1934, even the technical journal Automobile Engineer could not
decide which branch of the body industry had the most secure
future.
The two main systems of construction, namely pressed
steel and composite methods, employed in the manufacture
of quality produced body work continues to be the subject
of much discussion. It is difficult to estimate which of the
two systems is more popular or decide whether one will
eventually replace the other. 116
With this uncertainty hanging over the construction of carriages,
it is perhaps no surprise that there was instability in Coventry's
body building sector. Between 1926-1936, only one firm, Fisher
and Ludlow entered into pressed body production. Fisher and
Ludlow was a large Birmingham based firm which diversified
from making household metal appliances into body building in
1929. Between 1929-1932, the concern rapidly increased
production and, in 1936, a purchased purposed built factory next
114 Newcomb and Spur, A Technical History of the Motor Car, p. 403
115 Automobile Engineer, January 1934, p. 273.
116 Ibid.
102
to its chief customer, Standard Motor Company in Tile Hill
Coventry. 117 Indeed, it was only through an agreement with
Standard for the car company to order large sets of bodies
which allowed Fisher and Ludlow to scale the high entry barriers
and open a factory in Coventry. In relation to the initial outlay
for the new Coventry factory, the Fisher and Ludlow board of
directors announced that 'to install the great range of presses,
interchangeable dies and the other equipment is so costly an
undertaking that can only be justified by a very large
turnover'. 118 Without vast amounts of capital and long term
volume production agreements with car assemblers, the
remaining body builders in Coventry entered the composite side
of the trade, an old but far from extinct form of production.
Many car assemblers continued to require composite bodies, a
demand which lasted until the late 1940s. The popularity of
composite bodies among the car assemblers stemmed from the
fact that production did not entail the purchase of large and
expensive presses. Therefore, it was practical for body makers
to alter designs without great expenditure or loss of time.
Indeed, the preparation time for new designs using pressed steel
production techniques was between six to twelve months, while
composite body firms could start construction after only eight
weeks. 10 These were important considerations for both the
small body firm and the car assembler. Whilst the small
supplier could not afford long periods of preparation without
income, the car assembler was operating within a market which
117 MRC, MSS 226/ST/1/3/1/ Standard Board Minutes 1923-1970, 10
November 1937.
118 CRO, Ace 606, Daffern and Stephenson Collection, Fisher and Ludlow
balance sheet 1932.
119 Automobile Engineer, January 1934, p. 273.
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demanded constant changes in the appearance of cars. 120 Such
was the vast variety of body styles available that Austin, for
example, listed 52 different bodies in its 1934 eatalogue.121
Indeed, in the same year Herbert Austin announced to
distributors that 'no sooner are we in full swing with current
models than we have to turn our thoughts and energies to
redesigning the body or chassis in an endeavour to meet - or
anticipate - the public's ever changing moods'. 122
Consequently it was within Coventry's composite body sector
which most change occurred. Firms which adopted this form of
production around the needs of volume production were the most
successful entrants during the 1920s and 1930s.	 By the
extensive use of jigs, composite bodies could be built relatively
cheaply and in some volume, with the minimum amount of
skilled labour. For example, Cross and Ellis, a firm established
just after the First World War, adapted new production
techniques to traditional composite construction. In 1927, it
was noted that 'a very well equipped saw mill is a contributory
cause for such a large output from so few men. In fact, very
little hand work is done to the production type of body, other
than assembling. /123 In contrast to Cross and Ellis, the old-
established firms, such as Thomas Pass and Baker continued to
use a large number of skilled workers, which pushed up costs
and kept production totals to a minimum. 124 The problems which
120 See Chapter 7.
121 Newcomb and Spur, A Technical History of the Motor Car, p. 403
122 R, Church, Herbert Austin. The British Motor Car Industry to 1941,
(1979), p. 116.
123 The City of Coventry Official Handbook 1927, (Cheltenham, 1927),
p 19
124 CRO, City of Coventry Enrolment of Indentures 1895-1930. At two
year intervals between 1895-1930, a list was compiled of apprentices
enrolled at car component firms. The branch of the component industry
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held for the future, were recognised by J.H. Butlin, whose
dissatisfaction with Thomas Pass' methods appeared to be the
motivation behind his entry into the trade. In 1933, Butlin's
entry into the industry was recorded by the Midland Bank
manager. The manager, while noting the small scale of the firm
commented that:
JHB, who was until six months ago manager of
Charlesworth Bodies, has started on his own. He has a
good reputation, and is so busy he had to refuse orders. He
has offered £1,500 for a factory in Leicester Causeway.I25
Unlike many of Butlin's contemporaries who. entered the industry
at this time, the firm survived the Second World War and
continued to trade until the mid 1950s.
However, while the continued use of outdated techniques
account for many of the eleven exits that occurred between
1919-1936, some body firms left the industry through a lack of
capital or mis-management. For example, Swift Bodies, which
had experienced severe financial problems during the late 1920s
required the good will of their creditors in 1929 to stay in
business. However, this proved only to be a stay of execution as
the concern, which was owned by the Du Cros family, was
finally wound up in 1931. 126 The failure of Holbrook Bodies,
which was established in 1920, stemmed from the lack of
positive leadership and a constructive approach to forward
planning. The continued use of highly skilled labour and
traditional productive methods ensured that the concern faced
which was most represented was the coach sector. Within in this sector,
the traditional coach firms which had diversified from horse-carriage
work, such as Charlesworth and Thomas Pass, possessed the most entries.
125 MBA, 358/13 7 December 1933. For the period when it appears that
T. Pass is wound up the business see MBA, 358/11, 29 May 1928.
126 CRO, Ace 1246/23/1-7, Coventry Movement Company, Ace 985/1//,
AIvis Minute Book, 20 January 1932.
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severe financial problems by the late 1920s. A belated attempt
to rationalize production was made when the firm moved into a
modern factory in 1929. However, these plans disrupted the
concern at a critical time since the Board announced that the
firm had lost over £12,000. The chairman blamed this loss on
the 'cost of removal and the consequent loss of output from the
latter coupled with the difficulties of re-organisation'.
Consequently the Chairman, W.A. Oubridge, resigned from the
firm on the grounds of 'ill health', though he continued to chair
the successful British Piston Ring until his death in 1942. In
the following year, after a substantial loss of nearly £4,000,
F.H. Stonebanks resigned from his position as Holbrook Bodies
General Manager, and by 1931, the concern was wound up. 127
The uncertainty surrounding coach making was in stark
contrast to Coventry's engine making sector which experienced a
decline in the number of independently owned firms during the
interwar period. Between 1926-1936 the only new entrant was
formed by Johnston, Hurley and Martin who simply
reconstructed their old firm and renamed it Alpha Engines. By
1936, there were only two other firms, Riley and Courthouse
Green Engines which were regularly making whole engines, and
they both were owned by car assemblers. Indeed, by the out-
break of the Second World War, Coventry possessed only two
engine making concerns when Riley Engines was wound up after
the family firm was acquired by Morris in 1938. 128 This
underlined the growing trend at the close of the interwar period,
127 CRO, Acc 606, Daffern and Stephenson, Holbrook Bodies balance
sheets 1929-1930.
128 PRO, BT31, 275907/33428 Riley Engine Company, articles of
association and winding up certificate.
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of assemblers producing in-house engines and explains the
decline in Coventry engine firms. I29
 Consequently, as the
figures in table 3.6 suggest, the market for prospective entrants
was extremely limited. Moreover, the re-structuring of the
motor industry during the 1920s, which shook many of the small
car assemblers out from the trade, also had adverse affects on
the engine making sector. Such was the importance of the
engine to the assembler, the car firm often demanded that their
supplier provide a unique and specially designed engine.
However, in the event of the car assembler failing, the engine
supplier was left with large sets of unwanted and non-
standardized engines. These circumstances surrounded the
departure of Coventry Climax from the private car engine sector.
Formed in 1917, by H. Pelham Lee, Climax had never been
committed fully to the production of private car engines. 130
 In
addition to private, commercial and racing engines, the concern
also manufactured generators, and fire pumps. I31
 Nevertheless,
in 1931, Climax faced severe financial problems when, without
warning, the Swift car firm was wound up. It was reported that
'when the factory closed down Coventry Climax found
themselves saddled with quite a lot of completed Cadet Engines
for which there was no market available, as well as all the jigs
and tools for manufacture.'	 However, serious losses were
avoided when Climax temporarily diversified from the motor
129 By the close of the interwar period, car assemblers began to exert
more control over key components such as engines, transmissions and
axles by making these components themselves. For further analysis of the
changing relationship between car assemblers and car component makers
see chapter 6; A similar situation had developed in America see S. Helper
'Strategy and Irreversibility in Supplier Relations' p. 805.
130 Coventry Standard 30 January 1953, p. 4.
131 J. Lane, A Register of Business Records of Coventry and Related
Areas, Coventry Polytechnic, Coventry, 1977. p. 20
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industry by converting Cadet engines into fire-pumps since 'very
little modifications were required'. 02 The instability of the
motor industry during this period was perhaps one of the key
reasons that persuaded Climax to continue to produce fire-
pumps, forklift trucks and specialised racing engines after the
Second World War.
Conclusion
Hirschman's 'Exit, Voice and Loyalty' model, has been useful
in analysing the pattern of entries and exits of firms in relation
to the nature of competition within the car component industry.
The evidence drawn from the Coventry car component industry
differs significantly from Foreman-Peck's research on the car
manufacturers. Whilst Foreman-Peck suggested that car
assemblers were sustained through the adoption of the voice
facility, the evidence for the car component industry showed
that there was a minimal use of the voice option due to the
highly competitive nature of the component industry.
This chapter has argued that the nature of competition in the
component industry was largely determined by Coventry's
changing economic structure during the late nineteenth century,
and the buying policies adopted by car manufacturers between
1908-1939. Moreover, the study has shown that it is imperative
to analyse the early years of the car component in order to
understand how the competitive nature of the market emerged.
Since the majority of the firms that initially entered the
132 CRO, Acc 1296/5 Swift Motor Company, 'Vintage Swift', by J. Price,
(n.d.).
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component industry were derived from the cycle, watch and
coach industries, it took a slump in Coventry's traditional
industries, for firms to commit themselves fully to the motor
industry. Consequently, many of these traditional firms entered
the component industry in a financially weak position, a factor
which was exploited to the full by the car assemblers. However
in most sectors of the component industry entry barriers were
fairly low. Firms which diversified from cycle, watch and
coach making to car component manufacture, discovered that
there was a high degree of technological transfer in terms of the
productive process, factory size, and the machine tools required.
However, after this rather slow start, the large influx of
concerns between 1908-1912, ensured that fierce competition
prevailed in almost all sectors of the industry. This period left
a legacy which was to inflict the car component industry from
the First World War and through the interwar period. The
competitive market structure, which had emerged prior to the
First World War, became ingrained in the foundations of the
motor industry during the interwar years, a phenomenon which
helps explain the high number of entries and exits of firms
during this period. This environment was not conducive for one
or two firms dominating a sector of the industry as the myriad of
small firms were constantly undercutting one another.
Significantly, apart from Dunlop, all of the large and dominant
car component firms grew outside of Coventry, and much like
the car assemblers, the city lost its position as a leading
location for car component manufacture.
Chapter 4.
Sources of Finance: Coventry Car Component
Firms 1895-1939.
This chapter explores the sources of finance open to the car
component firms in Coventry between 1895-1939. Whilst
historians, such as Saul, have argued that the larger motor car
manufacturers received adequate funding from Britain's
financial institutions, little attention has been focused on the
smaller motor firms or the car component industry.' The first
section will investigate whether the British capital markets
satisfactorily met the demands made by the car component
industry or whether firms which required financial support were
forced into alternative forms of capital provision.2
Consequently, alongside an analysis of the capital markets, the
study will investigate the alternative forms of raising capital,
such as the formation of private joint stock companies, the
supply of funds by families and friends and the important role
played by the clearing banks.
The Use of the Capital Markets.
Prior to the 1880s, the Stock Exchange dealt in the shares of
relatively few domestic industrial companies and was mainly
1 S.B. Saul, 'The Motor Industry in Britain to 1914', Business History, 5,
1962, p. 32.
2 See A.E. Harrison, 'Joint Stock Company Flotation in the Cycle, Motor-
Vehicle and Related Industries 1882-1914', Business History, 23, (1981).,
M.H. Best and J. Humphries, 'The City and Industrial Decline', in B.
Elbaum and W. Lazonick (eds), The Decline of the British Economy,
(Oxford, 1986),223-239., D.M. Ross, 'The Clearing Banks and Industry -
New Perspectives on the Inter-war Years', in J.J. Van Helton and Y.
Cassiss (eds), Capital in a Mature Economy. Financial Institutions,
Capital and British Industry 1870-1939, (Aldershot, 1990), pp 53-70, M.
Collins, Banks and Industrial Finance in Britain 1800-1939, (1991).
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concerned with home government stock, home railways and
overseas investment. However, after the 1880s a number of
firms became limited liability companies and went public. One
motivation for the public floatation of shares was to put an
objective value on the shareholdings of family members and to
create an active market in the shares to make the assets more
realizable. 3 However, the main purpose for many businesses to
go public was to raise additional capital, and this was
particularly the case for the 'new industries'. By 1914, a number
of the larger motor car firms had become public limited
companies. Whilst Daimler and Deasy had been established as
public companies in 1896 and 1906 respectively, several car
firms, such as Standard and Rover, went public in order to
expand their manufacturing activities. In 1913, Standard issued
public shares to support investment into greater output, while
Rover secured the necessary funds from the market to purchase
the coach builders Hawkins and Peake in 1907.4
However, although the capital markets were utilised
successfully by some of the large car manufacturers, there were
few Coventry car component firms which chose this option of
acquiring financial support. An analysis of the Economist and
the Investors' Monthly Manual revealed only four Coventry car
component firms which utilised the London Stock Exchange
between 1895-1939. Significantly, two of these firms, Dunlop
and British Thompson and Houston (BTH), were large
3 J. Armstrong, The Rise and Fall of the Company Promoter and the
Financing of British Industry', in J.J. Van Helton and Y. Cassiss (eds),
Capital in a Mature Economy. Financial Institutions, Capital and British
Industry 1870-1939, (Aldershot, 1990), pp. 118-119.
4 D. Thorns and T. Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry in Coventry Since
the 1890s, (1985), p. 54.
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multinational companies. Dunlop, which in 1890 acquired
important and profitable patents, was floated successfully on the
stock exchange in 1896 and, in the same year, the foundation of
BTH was facilitated through the raising £1 million capital
through public share issues. 5 Although the search can not be
regarded as conclusive, it does suggest that Coventry Chain, in
1907, and Cornercroft, in 1936, were the only Coventry based
component firms which were quoted on the London Stock
Exchange during this period. Why then was this form of funding
within the Coventry car component industry such a rare
occurrence?
A significant feature of the Coventry car component industry
was that, throughout the period 1895-1939, firms were founded
and functioned on small sums of capital. A data base was
created of the known capital of 44 Coventry based component
firms that traded in the industry between the period under study
(see appendix 1). 6 In the case of multinationals such as Dunlop
and BTH, the capital of the Coventry subsidiary was noted rather
than the capital of the whole organisation. A firm's capital on
foundation or the earliest reference to a firm's capital was
recorded and the mean figure for the 44 component firms was
determined. The result clearly illustrated the small scale of the
industry since the mean capital for the sample of component
firms was calculated at only £14,506. Moreover, the foundation
5 G. Jones, 'The Growth and Performance of British Firms Before 1939:
The Case of Dunlop', Economic History Review, 37, (1984), p. 36-7, R.
Jones and 0. Marriott, Anatomy of a Merger. A History of GEC, AEI and
English Electric, (1970), p. 65.
6 The search for a firm's capital involved the analysis of various firm
archives, the Lloyds Bank and Midland Bank archives, the Public Record
Office Board of Trade files, Daffern & Stephenson Stockbrokers balance
sheets (Coventry Record Office 606), and The Coventry Stock and Share
List, 1900-1939 (Colindale Newspaper Library).
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of firms on small sums of capital was not confined to the
formative years of the motor industry but was common
throughout the interwar period. As late as the 1930s Coventry
component firms, such as United Accessories, Self Changing
Gears and Modern Headlights, were being founded on capital of
between £1,000 to £10,000. 7
 However, the fact that the vast
majority of the firms sampled were founded on modest sums of
capital does not, in itself, explain why component firms shied
away from utilising the capital markets. Indeed, why did so few
firms not imitate Coventry Chain and Cornercroft by converting
the firm into a public company, thereby vastly increasing its
capital and improving its manufacturing capabilities? An
analysis of these two company floatations will demonstrate why
the firms held a somewhat unique position within the Coventry
car component industry and why, particularly with the
difficulties experienced by Coventry Chain, many firms avoided
securing funds form the capital market.
- A factor which linked both Coventry Chain and Cornercroft,-
and which gave rise to their unique position in the industry, was
that by the time of public issue they had secured a relatively
strong position in the component industry. As chapter three has
demonstrated, all five branches of the component trade, viz.
drop forgings, tyres and wheels, engines, bodies, and the
electrical sector, remained highly competitive throughout the
period under study. However, both Cornercroft and Chain
developed new products outside these competitive branches of
the trade and subsequently captured a large share in their
7 Coventry Stock and Share List, 1 July 1932, p. 1, 2 June 1933, p. 1, 3
August 1937, 13. 1, CRO, ACC 985/87/1, Armstrong-Siddeley Collection,
Articles of Association for Self Changing Gears, 1934,
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During this period, Cornercroft consistently refused requests
from car manufacturers to produce long runs of wheel discs.
Instead, sets were kept to a minimum of 45 per company to
avoid bad debts and to ensure that the firm's limited working
capital was not tied to large accumulations of unwanted stock.1°
However, in order to maintain contracts with the larger car
makers such as Austin, Morris and Humber, it became apparent
that Cornercroft would need to embrace the principles of mass
production. Since neither Rycroft, Corner or Meates possessed
the capital required, the firm was converted into a public
company and the capital was increased from £2,700 to £150,000
by the creation of 499,500 additional shares at 4s and 120,000
preference shares at 1 Os each. The concern was now able to
extend its new premises at Queen Victoria Road and invest in
automatic machinery. The benefits of this new investment were
reflected in the monthly net profits which leapt from £2,420 in
March 1932 (March was the peak period for the motor industry)
to £22,066 in March 1937. 11
 However, this initial success was
at the expense of the firm's two pioneers, Rycroft and Corner,
since due to a shift in the balance of shareholding, control of
the firm was transferred to two new directors based in London,
Captain W.F. Strickland a Coventry MP, and H. Wylie.12
Alick Hill's motivation behind founding Coventry Chain in
1896 with a capital of £300, was to exploit a previously
neglected area of the cycle component market. Norman Hill, the
former Coventry Chain director, recalled that 'my brother Mr
CRO, Acc 1468/1/1, Cornercroft Minute Book 1927-1936, 30 August
1928. Autocar 21 September 1934, p. 527.
11 CRO, Acc 1468/1/1 Cornercroft Monthly balance sheets March 1932,
March 1937.
CRO, Acc 1468/1/1 Cornercroft Minute Book 1927-1936, 22 June 1936.
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Alick Hill, then in America, wrote to say that he was returning,
determined to manufacture the only part of a cycle which was
not made in the home of the industry, viz, the chain'. 13 Although
Chain increased its capital to £8,008 and become a registered
company with a limited liability status in March 1902, the firm
was consistently unable to attain the financial resources
required." Thus, Norman Hill noted that, until the intervention
of Daimler in 1907, Chain had to resort to securing short term
loans from the bank and was forced into using inadequate
machinery and premises.
We purchased power in the shape of steam from a carpet
beating factory at the end of the entry and I well remember
the rushing to and fro when the already ancient steam
engine was being over loaded. Having devoured several
other shops and two private houses, we were still in the
clutches of the old steam engine and the bank when Mr
Percy Martin offered to supply us with £30,000 from some
members of the Daimler Company. 15
In order to facilitate this investment programme, Daimler
persuaded Chain to became a public company in 1907. 16 The
firm's capital was increased to £100,000 which financed the
building of a modern factory on a new seven acre site in Spon
End costing over £6,000. 17 The bulk of Daimler's investment
was derived from two men who were both elected on to Chain's
board of directors. Percy Martin, the Managing Director of
13 Manchester Central Library (hereafter MCL), M105/061.5/CC 932/1,
Extract from Statement in Guard Book, Norman Hill, 1932, B. Tripp,
RenoId Chains. A History of the Company and the Rise of the Precision
Chain Industry 1879-1955, (1956), pp 72-73.
14 Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), BT31/9785/72901, Coventry
Chain List of Share Holders 25 March 1902.
15 MCL, M105/061.5/CC 932/1, Extract from Statement in Guard Book,
Norman Hill.
16 For an analysis of Daimler's involvement in Coventry Chain see chapter
7
17 Midland Bank Archive (hereafter MBA), 368/5, 18 April 1907.
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relate to the public's perception of the 'new industries' and
capital markets during the late Victorian and Edwardian era.
First, the capital markets, on the whole, did not regard firms
involved in the 'new industries' in a very favourable light. Most
of the firms involved in the cycle, motor and component trades
were small firms and considered high-risk ventures. The
generally unreceptive response from the market to cycle firms
issuing public shares served as a warning to the Coventry car
component industry. 22 Indeed, many of the Coventry car
component firms resembled cycle firms in terms of size and
structure since many of the firms had been derived from the
cycle industry. 23 Harrison's study of the cycle industry revealed
that the great majority of companies appealing to the market
failed to obtain full subscription. The research concluded that
'the capital markets, apparently, tended to discriminate against
the small concern, though issues of much larger sizes were not
necessarily certain of a favourable reception'. 24 For example,
well established cycle and component firms such as Rudge Cycle
(1887) Clipper Pneumatic Tyre (1887), Thomas Bayliss, Riley
(1896) and Thomas Smith (1897), all failed to obtain full
subscription. 25 The extent of under-subscription among small
cycle and accessory firms is even more significant when it is
considered that the middle years of the 1890s was the boom
period for the British cycle industry.
22 Under-subscription was a problem throughout the Edwardian period see
The Motor, 17 April 1906, P. 300, 7 May 1907, p. 402.
23 B. Beaven, 'The Growth and Significance of the Coventry Car
Component Industry, 1895-1914', Midland History, 18, 1993, p. 108.
24 Harrison, 'Joint Stock Company Flotation', pp. 178-179.
25 lbid, p. 188,190.
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the company promoter. In effect, the company promoter did not
provide finance for the industry, but acted as the middle-man.28
The lengths that the unscrupulous company promoters would
go to float a business, (in terms of fictional prospectuses, bribes
and sweeteners), ensured that by the early twentieth century
when the car component industry was beginning to grow, 29 many
investors shied away from the motor industry. During the 1890s,
it was the motor industry which became the target for company
promoters, which goes some way in explaining its faltering start.
Indeed, Armstrong asserts that 'bicycles and motor-cars were
puffed and pushed in the 1890s so extravagantly that investors
were wary of any company of this type for some time'. 3° The
dubious dealings and effective advertising campaigns by Henry
Lawson, attracted one million pounds to motor car firms which
had never, and were destined never, to produce marketable
vehicles. 31 The excitement surrounding the 'new high-tech
industries' in 1896 encouraged a rush of small, and often short
lived, motor car firms to issue public shares. Certainly,
contemporaries viewed the activities of Lawson with great
suspicion and laid the blame for the slow start of the motor
industry at the door of the company promoter. During the first
few years of the twentieth century, Henry Sturmey, the editor of
Autocar, explained his reasons for the motor industry's slow
start. He claimed that the unscrupulous company promoter had
invited the floatation of weak companies with no experience in
28 'bid, p. 128.
29 Beaven, 'The Growth and Significance of the Coventry Car Component
Industry', p. 106.
30 Armstrong, 'The Rise and Fall of the Company Promoter', p. 130.
31 S. Morewood, Pioneers and Inheritors: Top Management in the
Coventry Motor Industry 1896-1972, (Coventry, 1990), p. 92. See also
Chapter 2.
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the motor industry 'with the inevitable result that.. ."motors"
became synonymous with failure'. He added that the problems
stemmed from firms appointing commercial men or company
promoters, on to the board of directors since they possessed:
the least knowledge of the requirements of system of an
engineering factory.. .the concerns blundered on, without a
head and without a defined policy, with only the natural
result - the capital was again strengthened in its distrust of
the industry by their failure to secure financial success.32
The investors' suspicion of the floatation of motor car firms was
reciprocated by the motor industry itself. As late as the 1930s,
William Morris viewed the capital markets with great suspicion.
In 1936, Morris considered floating his remaining private
company, Morris Commercial and contacted Barclays Bank for
further advice. In a letter to the Bank, Morris outlined his
scepticism of the company promoters, which almost certainly
was derived from his experiences of the early motor industry.
He explained that he wanted to:
avoid all contact with financiers and finance houses,
whose usual practice seems to be to take a handsome
picking from anything which falls into their hands, before
passing it on to the public in a watered condition. For
instance, I have heard a report that the city made a
considerable profit out of the Pressed Steel floatation.33
This mistrust between the two parties does go some way in
explaining the low number of Coventry car component firms
turning to the market for external finance. Together with the
failure of the cycle and early motor car industries to achieve
full subscriptions and the small size of firms engaged in the
32 University of London, Senate House Library, Simms Paper List A, 9/67,
H. Sturmey, 'The Motor Car Industry. Why British Manufacturers have
failed to make headway', c1902.
33 Barclays Bank Archive, Acc 2244/14, Morris Motors Account, Letter
from William Morris to Barclays Bank, 23 June 1936.
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component industry, many firms turned to alternative forms of
funding. The next section will analyse how firms extracted
external finance by either forming 'private' joint-stock
companies, receiving funding from family or friends and
examining the key role of the clearing banks.
The Formation of Private Joint-Stock Companies
An alternative to capital raised by public floatation was the
formation of 'private' joint-stock companies. Given the absence
of company promoters and prospectus expenses, the conversion
of a firm into a private joint-stock company was a cheaper
option than applying to the capital markets. Here, capital would
be raised privately from investors who were not hitherto directly
connected with the financing and management of the business.
This was an extremely popular method of raising capital in the
cycle industry, especially during the 1890s. Harrison has
calculated that well over 100 'private' joint-stock companies
were formed in the main cycle making centres, Coventry,
Birmingham and Nottingham, between 1870-1914. 34 The issuing
of shares privately, placed a heavy reliance on local family,
personal and business connections, and consequently the number
of shareholders were usually small in total. In fact, seven
shareholders was the statutory minimum for joint-stock
companies and few cycle, or car component firms exceeded this
figure.	 Moreover, the local and small scale nature of this
34 Harrison is one of only a few historians to analyse and define the role
of these 'private' joint-stock companies, see Harrison, 'Joint-Stock
Company Flotation', p. 171.
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method of raising additional funds, ensured that investment
levels were relatively modest, often not more than £10,000.35
The Coventry Stock and Shares List, published by the
Coventry stock brokers T.M. Daffern, reveals that throughout
the period under study, a number of firms sought to raise capital
through the private issue of shares. Since the car component
industry had been closely connected with the cycle industry, the
cycle boom of the late nineteenth century and the subsequent
clamour to raise capital through private-joint stock companies,
ensured that there were a number of Coventry firms which had
derived external funds in this manner. Indeed, prior to the
First World War, most of the 'private' joint-stock companies had
been formed during the 1890s when they had been trading as
cycle component firms. Firms such as Automachinery, Brett's
Stamping and Coventry Watch Movement Company, were all
fairly small concerns (all had capital of less than £20,000) and
had been formerly engaged in the cycle trade. Moreover,
although the small scale of these firms rendered them unsuitable
for floatation on the stock exchange, the owners of the firms
often preferred the 'private' issue of shares since it allowed
families to retain control of the business. For example, by the
early twentieth century William Hillman, provided the vast
majority of capital for his business interests, and only
occasionally issued small allocations of private shares. 36 As
with the public floatation of firms on the stock exchange, 37 the
call for private investors, through the medium of The Coventry
35 Ibid. p. 171.
36 Colindale Newspaper Library, The Coventry Stock and Share List,
1901-1914, Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, p. 56.
37 Harrison, 'Joint-Stock Company Flotation', p. 168.
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Stock and Share List, coincided with boom periods in the motor
industry. The 1920s and the mid 1930s, witnessed an increase in
newly established component firms, requesting additional
capital through private investors. Many of these firms, unlike
the earlier period, had possessed no previous connection with
the cycle industry. However, the striking feature of the new
capital issues advertised in the Stock and Share List was the
modest amounts of capital that firms required. For example, in
1923, J.A. Barnes Accessories issued new capital of only £1,000
and Godiva Engineering requested additional capital of £5,000.
Indeed, the Stock and Share List reveals that most new capital
issues by private car component firms were under £10,000.
Table 4.1 lists the known private Coventry car component firms
which advertised new capital issues between 1932-1939.
Although this list can not be regarded as a comprehensive listing
of all private shares issued, it does indicate the proportion of
capital required by component firms and the extent to which
this facility for raising capital was utilised.
Table 4.1
Private Coventry Component Firms which Issued New Capital to
External Investors Between 1932-1939.
Year Firm New Capital
Issued
1932 Boyce Motor Accessories £1,500
1932 Swallow Coach Building £20,000
1932 Midland Motor Body Company £10,000
1932 United Motor Accessories £200
1932 Safety Bumpers Ltd £10,000
1933 Hobely Brothers £1,000
1934 Coventry Hood and Sidescreen Ltd £1,000
1937 Avon Bodies £3,000
1937 Modern Headlights £10,000
1939 Butlin Coachbuilders £1,000
, Average New Capital Issued £5,770
Source: Colindale Newspaper Library, The Coventry Stock and Share List
1932-1939.
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Table 4.1 shows that whilst there were a number of firms issuing
new capital to external investors between 1932-1933, this
strategy of raising capital for private companies was not widely
adopted within the component industry. Moreover, the sums
involved were also extremely modest since the average figure
for the ten firms reached only £5,770. The small amount of new
capital issued also indicates that most of these firms applying
for external funding were unable to utilise bank finance, or
close family and friends and had to resort to tapping the
Coventry business community for funds. Thus United Motor
Accessories' issue of £200 private shares suggests that the firm
possessed a very modest working capital and were unable to
procure any other financial support. However, firms which
attempted to raise quite substantial sums of new capital, such as
Swallow Coach Bodies and Midland Light Bodies, may have
enjoyed a good standing and extremely good connections within
the local business community. Swallow Coach Bodies, which
was established in Blackpool in 1922, developed a close working-
relationship with Standard after moving to Coventry in 1928.38
Likewise, Midland Light Bodies had become an established firm
by the 1930s and was owned by the Riley family who were
involved in a number of business ventures in Coventry.39
An investigation into the extent to which firms were converted
into joint-stock companies to utilise private capital has revealed
that, although this was an important form of raising capital for
some firms, the practice was not widespread. Thus both the
capital markets and private issues of shares were not commonly
38 Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, pp. 99-100
39 Morewood, Pioneers and Inheritors, pp. 7-8.
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utilised since it seems that entrepreneurs within the Coventry
car component industry were reluctant to acquire finances from
outside sources. The following section will analyse the most
prevalent form of company finance in the Coventry component
industry - family, friends and the business community.
Family, Friends and the business community as a
Source of Finance.
Since the majority of Coventry car component firms were
small units of production, most firms owed their existence to
capital supplied by families, friends and contacts within the
Coventry business community. The pledge of family guarantees
in establishing or expanding existing firms was an important
way of extracting support from financial institutions. 40 This was
perhaps the most common form of entry into the car component
trade, which ensured that wealthy families simply injected the
initial capital or provided the guarantee for bank loans for
younger members of the family to enter into a new line of
business. Alick Hill, for example, the son of a Chapelfields
watch maker, used £300 of his family's wealth to establish
Coventry Chain to manufacture chains for cycles and motor cars
in 1896. Family guarantees, mainly from his father Charles John
Hill, enabled the firm to expand from its small workshop in Dale
Street to larger premises and increase the capital from £300 to
£8,008 in 1902. 41 Similarly, the White family, who had also
40 See the next section of this chapter.
41 PRO, BT31/9785/72901, Coventry Chain, List of Shareholders and
Directors 1902.
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accumulated their wealth through the watch trade, were the
financial source for White and Poppe the engine makers. With
the establishment of White and Poppe in 1899, the Lloyds bank
manager noted that he believed 'old J. White is at the back of
this'. Consequently, in 1900 when his son, Alfred White,
requested a loan for £2,000, the bank manager would only agree
if 'Mr White Senior, who is well off, guaranteed the loan'. Thus
between 1899 to 1907, White and Poppe were able to extend
their overdraft facility to over £10,000 through citing J. White's
financial guarantees.42
It was the funding derived from family sources which enabled
Walter Payne to convert his business from a gas engine firm to a
motor engine and vehicle manufacturing concern. Payne had
established his firm, Godiva Engines, in Castle Street, Coventry
in 1890. However, the firm was under-capitalized, and in 1897,
Payne went into a business partnership with his wife's uncle,
George Bates. Payne's son recalled in 1946, how the firm Payne
and Bates had materialised.
George Bates, my mother's uncle, saw that dad was on a
good thing and offered to put a large sum of money into
the business for dad, his son Henry Bates and himself on
the condition that they had a factory built at Great Heath
Foleshill and the firm be called Payne and Bates.43
However, just as the Bates family had provided the capital to
found the business, the family was also to play a leading role in
its demise. Just five years after the firm's foundation, a
motoring accident led to the death of George Bates, and
42 Lloyds Bank Archive (hereafter LBA), B379a/11, 5 October 1899, 27
June 1900 and B379a/16, 25 November 1907.
43 London University, Senate House Library, Pollit Papers Book 1, 8/108,
Letter to Pollitt from F.S Payne, 25 February 1946.
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consequently, the Bates' family decided to wind up the company
and sell the factory, a process accomplished by 1902.44
Likewise, it is doubtful whether the formation of Pistons Ltd
could have occurred without family backing. The founders of
Pistons, Harry Parsons and Frank Bullock, received the initial
capital of £500, from C.H. Doley, Parsons' father in law, who
owned a brass founding business in Birmingham. Furthermore,
Doley provided the funds when Bullock decided to leave the
business and establish Valves Ltd in 1916. The Midland Bank
manager noted that 'Mr Parsons called with Mr Doley, who banks
at the Birmingham branch and stated that they had paid out Mr
Bullock £500...' Doley acted as the company's guarantor during
the formative years of the company until Pistons received a
substantial order from Ford in the late 1920s. 45
 Morris and
Lister, the founders of ML Magneto were also forced into asking
for some financial assistance from family relations after the
Lloyds bank manager refused an extension to their overdraft. In
1908, the company experienced financial problems since the
concern's sales had not been sufficient to cover the experimental
costs of a magneto patent which they estimated could be worth
up to £5,000. However, this did not impress the bank manager
and subsequently they were compelled to borrow on a regular
basis small sums of money of around £100 from Morris' brother
to pay the wages .46
Along with family backing, entrepreneurs drew financial
support from friends or contacts within the Coventry business
44 C. O'Gallagher, 'Payne and Bates of Coventry: Pioneer Motor
Manufacturers', Warwickshire History, vol 3, 1975, P. 83.
45 MBA, 358/7, 17 January 1916. Taped interview with G. Parsons 16
October 1992.
46 LBA, B379a/17, July 31 1908, 25 January 1909.
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community. For example, William Hillman, the founder of
Automachinery, could not rely on financial assistance from his
family since his father was a shoemaker with limited resources.
Born in Stratford, Essex, in 1848, Hillman trained as an
engineer at John Penn and Company of Greenwich, before
moving to work at the Coventry Sewing Machine Company in
Cheylesmore. The success of Starley's 'safety bicycle' prompted
Hillman to established Automachinery in 1876 to manufacture
nuts, bearings and steel balls. However, since he lacked
sufficient financial resources the company was in fact a
partnership with a close friend, William Henry Herbert.
Herbert, who was the brother of Alfred, the Coventry machine
tool manufacturer, had been given the capital from his father, a
Leicestershire builder and farmer. 47 Although Hillman and
Herbert were the principle shareholders, Automachinery's
remaining investors reflected the component industry's close
links with the regional economy. Thus, of the eight
shareholders listed, six were connected with the cycle industry,
one was a local solicitor and one a silk manufacturer."
It seems unlikely that Van Raden and Company would have
survived if it had not been for the financial backing of Vaughan
Robinson, a Coventry solicitor. The Robinson family derived its
wealth from agriculture since Vaughan's father was a dairy
farmer with an estate worth over £.130,000 in 1913. 49 Although
it is unclear why the Robinson family should want to invest in
Van Raden, it is evident that the venture was entirely the idea of
47 D.G. Rhys, William Hillman', in D. Jeremy (ed), The Directory of
Business Biography, 3, (1985), pp. 245-247.
" PRO, BT31/3813/23928, Automachinery, List of Shareholders and
Directors 29 March 1887.
" LBA, B379a/20, 27 December 1912.
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Vaughan Robinson who effectively took control of the company
in 1903. Both his father and the Lloyds bank manager had grave
reservations concerning the risks in entering an industry in
which there was a rapid change in demand and technology. In
1907 the bank manager noted that J. Robinson (Vaughan's
father) 'thinks Vaughan Robinson will lose a lot of the family's
money in this concern, as there is not sufficient management,
and asked me if I could warn him about this in a fatherly way'.so
Robinson's cash injections and financial guarantees permitted
Van Raden to secure an overdraft limit of £15,000 in 1908. This
loan was to prove central in expanding their range of electrical
car components. The capital was used to pay advance royalties
to a French company, which enabled Van Raden to commence the
manufacture of magnetos. However, during the Robinsons'
association with the Van Raden Company, the bank manager was
constantly advising the family to sell the business since he had
'never seen such losses.. .and if it was not for the old connection
I should at once demand the overdraft'. 51
 It was almost certainly
on the advice of the bank manager that Vaughan Robinson sold
the business in 1919 to Robert Rankin and John Percy Starley,
two former electrical engineers from Pritchard and Gold a
London based company.52
An analysis of the board of trade files, which provides details
of the shareholders of firms, demonstrates that after funds
derived from families, contacts within the Coventry business
community were the most significant form of gaining financial
support. Indeed, within the Coventry business community a
5° LBA, B379a116, 31 October 1907.
51 LBA, B379a116, 12 November 1907, B379a/17, 27 January 1908.
52 Taped interview with Mr Eric Starley, 2 October 1992.
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number of prominent figures emerged who possessed financial
interests in a number of Coventry car component firms. For
example, W.A. Oubridge, who had established British Piston
Rings in 1911 through money supplied from his father, was by
1919, providing finance for the establishment of other
component firms in the city. Valves Ltd, which had been
founded by Frank Bullock in 1916, relied heavily on Oubridge
after the Midland Bank manager urged Bullock to increase the
firm's capital in 1919. Bullock raised the capital from £650 to
£1,010, by persuading Oubridge to supply 85 per cent of the
fresh capita1. 53 Oubridge was also the main financial backer
behind Holbrook Bodies which was established in 1920.
Moreover, Oubridge also played a role in the body firm's demise
when he withdrew his financial support in 1930, after the firm
had experienced a series of heavy losses between 1927-1930.54
Other prominent businessmen who were actively involved in
funding several component firms included Alfred Bednell, W.N.
Lindley and Victor Riley. 55 Alfred Bednell, the leading company_
agent financed a number of different component firms during the
interwar period. For example, Bednell was one of the main
investors in the re-construction of the Holley Brothers Firm, the
American owned carburettor manufacturer. The capital was
raised from £10,000 to £25,000 through securing financial
assistance from three individuals, Alfred Bednell, Harry Smith
of Rover and T.G. John of the Deasy car firm. 56 A year later,
H.J.0 Warren and W.H. Bennett, the owners of the General
53 MBA, 358/12, 15 November 1919.
54 CRO, Acc 606, Daffern and Stephenson Collection, Holbrook Bodies
balance sheets and directors' reports 1929-1930.
55 See also chapter 5 on directorships in the component industry.
56 MBA 358/6, 15 October 1918.
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Accessory Supply Company, successfully convinced Bednell to
invest £1,000 into the business. The firm was founded in 1919
with a capital of only £486, since the two owners were described
as 'practical engineers' with very limited financial resources."
Likewise, W.N. Lindley's investment into the Coventry car
component industry was instrumental in setting up two firms and
re-constructing a third prior to the First World War. Lindley, a
wealthy local solicitor, made substantial financial commitments
in Coventry Climax when it was established in 1904, and the
British Piston Ring Company when it was founded in 1911.
Indeed, Lindley was appointed company secretary at both British
Piston Ring and Coventry Chain, the firm which he invested in
after it was floated in 1907. 58 Another significant financier of
component firms was Victor Riley who between 1900-1939, had
interests in at least four different component firms. During the
early years of the twentieth century, Riley established Riley
Engine Company in 1903, and invested almost ten per cent of the
£2,000 capital of the newly established Albion Drop Forgings.59
After the First World War Victor Riley, along with his brother
Allan, established the Midland Motor Body Company with a
capital of £10,000, and the Nero Engine Company with a share
capital of £5,000 in order to safeguard body and engine supplies
to the Riley car manufacturing firm.60
57 PRO, BT31/24332/152600, General Accessory Supply Company, List of
share holders and directors, 13 January 1919, 19 October 1920.
58 LBA, B379a/14 23 December 1904, B379a/19, 2 August 1911, MCL,
M501/650.0124/CC902/1f, Renold Chain Archive, Coventry Chain Minute
Book 1902-1931, 5 April 1907.
59 S. Morewood, Pioneers and Inheritors, pp. 7-8, LBA, B379s/15, 12
November 1905.
PRO, BT31/264817/33335, Midland Motor Body Company, List of
shareholders and directors, 1932, BT31/22012/133567, Nero Engine
Company Ltd, List of shareholders and directors, 26 January 1914.
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There was also a significant number of firms which succeeded
in attracting capital from individuals who had previously been
unconnected with Coventry's engineering and textile industries.
In 1908, Hewer Car Bodies was established with a capital of
£2,357. Whilst one of the firm's directors, A.A. Wincott a
Coventry builder, possessed the largest single shares of £501,
other large share holders comprised of H.B. Craig, a Gentleman
in Ireland with £500 shares and W.J. Leonard a Gentleman from
London who had invested £300 in the firm. 61 A firm which
successfully acquired capital from outside the Coventry business
community was Thomas Pass Limited. Although, Thomas Pass
was an old-established body building firm, it required additional
capital to expand its motor vehicle body shop. In 1919, the firm
increased its capital from £2,000 to £4,000, courtesy of an
investor external to Coventry. It is quite possible that Thomas
Pass had persuaded one of his suppliers to invest in the firm,
since the shareholder which had increased the capital by £2,000
was named as J.R. Remer an M.P. and timber merchant from
Liverpoo1. 62
 Finally, Charles Forman, who established Forman
Motor Company in 1903 with a capital of £1,425, was financed
almost entirely by London based investors. The largest
shareholder was named as A. Cleverland who possessed £950 of
the share capital and also occupied a position on the board of
directors. 63
61 PRO, BT31/11828/91871, Hewer Car Bodies, List of shareholders and
directors, 14 August 1908. Coventry University, Lanchester Oral History
Archive, Mr A.T. Farrer, 24 August 1982.
62 PRO, BT31/3122138/134614, Thomas Pass Limited, List of
shareholders and directors, 30 June 1914.
63 PRO, BT31/10263/77079, Forman Motor Company, List of shareholders
and directors, 20 April 1903.
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An important form of financing a firm, which did not require
wealthy family, friends or business contacts, was through
debentures. Debentures carried a fixed rate of annual interest as
a means of attracting investors from individuals and were also
favoured by banks as security. Financiers were also attracted to
invest in debentures, since until the 1929 Companies Act,
debenture holders took priority in the distribution of the assets
of a business in liquidation. This was perhaps one of the
reasons why entrepreneurs were not overly keen to have their
businesses financed in this way as an element of control was
passed over to the debenture holders. Indeed, many firms were
to fold through the actions of their debenture holders.64
The vulnerable position of component firms to unscrupulous
debenture holders was demonstrated by the fortunes of Johnston,
Hurley and Martin. In 1903, the three men, whom the Lloyds
bank manager noted 'were all practical men', left the Forman
Manufacturing Company, as they felt 'Forman was no good at all'
and established JHM to manufacture motor engines. 65 However,
evidence suggests that they lacked Forman's financial resources
and so acquired an injection of capital through the debenture
system. In 1910, JHM's largest customer, Calthorpe Motors,
attempted to take-over the firm by underhand methods which the
Lloyds bank manger described as a 'shabby trick'. 66 Mr Hands of
Calthorpe, who was a debenture holder in JHM, let his monthly
interest accumulate and then, during a period in which Calthorpe
had delayed payment of its monthly account, Hands put in a
64 S. Morewood, Pioneers and Inheritors, p. 17.
65 LBA, B 379a/11, 15 April 1903.
66 LBA, B 379a119, 29 September 1910.
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claim for his debenture interest. A furious Hurley reported to
his bank that:
they would have been a good deal better without the
Calthorpe Company and that Hands, the solicitor and the
auditor leagued together, thinking that they could not pay
the debenture, and the concern would be in Hands' power
at his own price.. 67
This failed take-over bid ensured that JHM became extremely
cautious in their dealings with Calthorpe, only supplying the
firm with one engine per week and never allowing more credit
than a £150 a month to accumulate.68
There can be little doubt that, for the vast majority of
Coventry car component firms, family, friends or contacts within
the business community were the prevalent sources of funds for
firms entering or expanding an existing business within the
industry. Indeed, not only were firms able to obtain capital
from these sources, but they frequently called upon family,
friends or business associates to act as guarantors for bank
overdrafts. The important role the banks' played in the car
component industry will be the subject of the following section.
Here, analysis will focus on the criteria adopted by the clearing
banks when dealing with overdraft requests in a bid to determine
the relationship between the component industry and the banks
between 1895-1939.
The Role of the Clearing Banks
The clearing banks played a critical role within the Coventry
car component industry. The small scale nature of the industry
67 Ibid, 11 October 1910.
68 Ibid, 29 May 1911.
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ensured that many firms relied on the support of banks to remain
in business. Such firms were consistently plagued by cash flow
problems since they found it almost impossible to accumulate a
reserve fund. Thus, Midland Bank's refusal to extend Priory
Accessories overdraft beyond its £100 limit was a significant
factor in the firm's failure after it was unable to meet debts of
between L3,000/4,000 in 1915.69
However, in other cases, banks were more flexible with their
customers' requirements. In 1906, E.J. Hardy, after consulting
his accountant, demanded that Lloyds reduce its bank charges_
Despite R.H. Ragg's (the bank manager) comments that he
'thought it was a pity these accountants did not mind their own
business, and had told them so', he relented and reduced the
bank charges on the condition that Hardy 'kept the matter
strictly private'. The business had grown in strength since its
foundation in 1906, and clearly, Ragg feared that Hardy might
transfer his account to Midland Bank unless Lloyds accept his
demands. 7° Consequently, the willingness of a bank to
accommodate their customers rested upon the circumstances
surrounding the firm. To analyse effectively the nature of these
circumstances, the following section will examine the criteria
adopted by banks in offering or declining component firms
financial support.
In order to examine the nature of the banks' policy towards
Coventry car component firms, a search was conducted of
lending policy decisions recorded in the daily journals and the
head office meetings of Lloyds and Midland Banks. Between
69 MBA, 358/7, January 1915.
7° LBA, B379a/15, 13 October 1906.
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them, Lloyds and Midland Banks were the main financial
institutions dealing with Coventry's industrial sector between
1895-1939. 71 Consequently they represent an ideal case from
which to base an analysis of the relationship between the car
component industry and the banks. A table was constructed of
the lending patterns of Lloyds and Midlands Bank by selecting
five significant lending policies and recording the number of
occasions the policies were adopted in their dealings with 26
component firms. 72
 The six chosen overdraft policies were;
renewal a formality, renewal refused, security required,
unsecured overdraft sanctioned, reduction of overdraft demanded
and the banks' intervention into a firms' business practices. The
final policy included circumstances when bank managers would
offer advice or actively intervene in business decisions that
were not directly connected with the issue of overdraft requests.
In such circumstances, bank managers would insist upon regular
interviews with their clients and the submission of periodic
figures.73
71 Information supplied by Dr John Booker, Archivist Lloyds Bank.
72 A similar research methodology was employed in an analysis of the
banks' lending patterns to industry see D. M. Ross see 'The Clearing
Banks and Industry', p. 58.
73 Although this table provides a useful insight into lending patterns,
there are a number of problems associated with research of this nature.
The presence of a policy decision in the sample is a reflection of the
availability of the records. For example, the records for Lloyds' Coventry
branch exist only to 1918, and consequently, for the years 1919 to 1939,
Lloyds' head office minute books, which were less detailed than the branch
documents, were consulted. Also the table analyses the number of
occasions in which particular types of lending policies were made, and
therefore does not take into account the number of times a firm is
represented in the survey.
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Table 4.2
Some Observations on Lloyds and Midland banks' Relationship
with Coventry Car Com p onent Firms, 1895-1939.
Lending Policy Number of Occasions
Renewal a Formality 0
Renewal Refused 8
Security Required 20
Unsecured Overdraft
Sanctioned
5
Reduced Overdraft Demand 2
Intervention	 into
	
Firm's
Business Policy
20
Source: Lloyds and Midland Bank Archives, Daily Journals and Head
Office Minute Book (Lloyds), 1895-1939. From the 26 car component
firms included in the sample, there were 12 firms banking with Lloyds and
14 with Midland.
Despite its limitations, the table does provide insights into the
pattern of overdraft sanctions adopted by Lloyds and Midland
Banks. The fact that not one case of automatic overdraft
renewal was recorded or that there were only five cases of
unsecured loans offered, indicates that the banks viewed the car
component industry with some caution. Clearly, the most
important consideration when a bank manager was dealing with a
request for an overdraft was whether a firm possessed the ability
to provide security. The banks would accept a variety of
securities from firms, including insurance policies on director's
lives, mortgages on premises, personal or combined guarantees
and debentures. The Lloyds and Midland Bank archive revealed
that 36 per cent. of the lending policy decisions requested some
form of security, whilst 16 per cent of firms were refused
renewals. Moreover, the final row on the table demonstrates
that after granting overdrafts, banks would actively shape a
firm's business decisions to safeguard their loan.
	 Moreover,
during the course of research it became apparent that neither
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Lloyds or Midland radically altered their lending policy between
1895-1939.
This analysis of quantitative evidence relating to the banks'
lending patterns is supported by a more qualitative analyses of
the banks' interviews with customers recorded in the daily
journals. The most frequent type of financial support offered by
the banks came in the form of an overdraft facility. Moreover,
for many component firms which were too small to publicly float
or were unable to tap the Coventry business community for
funds, the bank overdraft was their only access to external
capital. Consequently, overdrafts could amount to large sums of
money. In 1911, Coventry Chain secured an overdraft for
£30,000 from Midland Bank whilst, in 1912, White and Poppe
was sanctioned a £16,000 limit by Lloyds to alleviate a
potentially crippling cash flow problem. 74 Although there was
not a formal set of guidelines that firms had to meet to secure
an overdraft, the banks did possess a general criteria in
evaluating a firm's creditworthiness. Bank managers would
investigate three major areas of a firm's business before
deciding to grant an overdraft request; the firm's prospects and
product strength, capital, and the quality of management. 75
 In
exploring these areas, the bank manager would often have
possessed a unique insight into the running of a firm. With
regard to product strength, for example, R.H. Ragg (the Lloyds
manager), consistently refused Van Raden an extension to its
existing overdraft in 1907 after the firm's management admitted
74 MBA, 358/9, 17 November 1911, LBA, B379a120, 3 April 1912.
75 Thorns and Donnelly have identified a similar criteria used by banks
when assessing the credit worthiness of car assemblers during the same
period. See Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, p. 58.
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that they 'hadn't got a magneto.. .only accumulators which were
out of date`. 76
 On the other hand, if a firm was marketing a
strong product the bank manager was more forthcoming in
facilitating an overdraft. In 1911, R.H. Ragg agreed to an
overdraft of £100 to the British Piston Ring Company. Although
it was only in its first year of trading, Ragg noted that 'it was a
splendid business' and that W.A. Oubridge (the owner and
manager), 'works very hard and says that the piston rings are the
best on the market, which the demand seems to prove'.77
However, a strong and marketable product was not in itself
sufficient to persuade a bank manager that a firm was credit
worthy. One of the most common reasons why firms were refused
an overdraft or an extension to their limit was the size of the
capital. As the first section of the chapter demonstrated, it was
common for many firms in the car component industry to possess
small sums of capital. Moreover, it was highly unlikely that
these firms would have had access to substantial guarantees to
cover an overdraft request. A typical firm in this position was
Doherty Motor Accessories which was founded in 1902. Despite
receiving an order worth between £4,000 to £5,000, the bank
manager, while admitting that there 'was a great prospect for
them', declined to offer Doherty an overdraft on a capital of
only £200. Ragg noted in his daily journal that:
no bank would allow £100 to £150 on so small capital, but
would do it on a good guarantee...If they require £10 or
£12 occasionally for wages for a few days, I said they
could have it...
76 LBA, B379a/16, 31 October, 12 November 1907.
77 LBA, B379a/19, 1 June 1911.
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Indeed, after Doherty admitted to Ragg that no guarantee could
be found, the bank manager advised the owners to sell the
business to solve the cash flow problem. 78 Similar capitalization
problems had beset Sterling Metal Ltd in 1911. The firm, which
had secured a large contract to supply engine castings to
Daimler, was refused an overdraft of £6,000 by the Lloyds Bank
manager. Ragg considered that the firm's £10,000 capital was
too small and informed them 'not to go too fast as they must be
aware that the non success of several of the Coventry firms' was
due to receiving orders 'too large for their normal business'.79
Problems were compounded for a firm which possessed a very
small capital and lacked guarantees since the banks would often
refuse even the smallest overdraft facility. In 1908, Cromwell
Engineering, which possessed a capital of only £100, was
refused a small overdraft of between £10-£20 by Ragg who
advised them 'to get a good guarantee or better to borrow it from
a friend'. Nevertheless, firms such as Cromwell, which were
reliant on banks for small sums of money, were almost certain to
have been forced into overdraft requests of this nature only after
fruitless efforts of attempting to acquire capital from family or
friends.
However, such was the nature of the Coventry car component
industry, firms which had little or no access to external funds
required the use of an overdraft as a matter of necessity. The
seasonal nature of the motor industry and the car assemblers'
practice of demanding substantial credit from their suppliers
78 LBA, B379a/12, 9 November 1902.
79 LBA, B379a/19, 27 October 1911.
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pushed many component firms to the brink of bankruptcy. 80 Both
Coventry Motor and Sundries in 1922 and Coventry Motor
Fittings in 1935 were forced into requesting an extension to
their overdraft limits after car assemblers had delayed their
payments. 81
 Unlike car assemblers, the weak position of many
component firms ensured that they were often unable to
negotiate credit arrangements 	 with their suppliers of raw
materials. Thus in 1914, Ragg noted that although Sterling
'were doing exceedingly well' they 'were always up to the
limit.. .due to the fact that they are buying metal to the utmost of
their capacity'.82
Another important consideration for the bank when dealing
with overdraft requests was whether the business was under
efficient management. The local bank manager would often
know the owners personally, and could therefore assess the
quality of management. An analysis of the daily journals of
both Lloyds and the Midlands Bank demonstrate that throughout
the period 1895-1939, branch managers frequently referred to-
the management of component firms. Two firms which were
constantly criticised by Lloyds for possessing poor management
were Doherty and Van Raden. In 1905, Ragg refused an
extension to an overdraft on the grounds that Mr Page of
Doherty Motor Accessories was 'no good as works manager,
instead of getting there at 6.30am, he gets there at 9.30am'.83
Likewise Ragg and his successor, E.A. Raybould, became
increasingly concerned with the management of Van Raden
B. Beaven, 'Growth and Significance of the Coventry Car Component
Industry', p. 114_ Also see Chapter 7.
81 MBA, 358/9, 6 June 1922, 358/13, 7 November 1935.
82 LBA, B379a119, 12 February 1914.
83 LBA, B379a/14, 20 October 1905.
142
between 1906-1918. In 1906, Ragg expressed his first doubts
about Van Raden's ability to manage when he noted that he
'would ruin a good business if he backed so much up in stocks
and book debts'. In 1908, Ragg continued to criticise the
management of the firm by pointing out that 'the salaries and
dead expenses were actually as much as the sales and told him
[Van Raden1 that it was like putting money down a drain'.84
Consequently, Lloyds' refusal to extend Van Raden' fairly small
overdraft limit, ensured that the firm's owners, the Robinson
family, were constantly required to finance the concern.
Conversely, if the customer possessed a good reputation in the
Coventry business community and was on friendly terms with the
branch manager, then there was a strong likelihood that an
overdraft facility would be granted. A personal understanding
between the owner and bank manager was critical for a
component firm that had recently been established since funds
were often small. Alick Hill, whom the Midland Bank manager
regarded as 'thoroughly capable man', 85 noted in his
reminiscences that it was imperative that he remained on
friendly terms with the manager of Midland Bank:
I will perhaps tell you some day of the pleasant (?)
feelings engendered by having to interview the bank on
Friday morning when the wages to be paid amounted to
some £50 and only about £20 stood to my credit in the
bank. However, my experience shows that in starting a
new industry in one's native city good wishes and goodwill
are even better assets than cash in the bank...86
M LBA, B379a/15, 30 July 1906, LBA, B379a/17, 11 September 1909.
85 MBA, 358/5, 18 April 1907.
86 MCL, M105/331.84/CC919/11, Renold Chain and Coventry Chain
Archive, The Link. The House Magazine of the Coventry Chain Co, April
1919, Vol 1, nol, (Coventry), p. 3.
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Moreover, in 1923, the Midland Bank branch manager took the
unusual step of sanctioning an overdraft request of £2,000 to
Frank Bullock, owner of Valves Ltd, without demanding
sufficient guarantees to cover the loan. The bank manager
explained his decision to head office by stating that his brother
was William Bullock, the managing director of Singers, who was
'possessed of considerable means'. 87 Ten years later, the bank
appeared to have continued with a similar policy after allowing
J.H. Butlin to found his own firm in 1933 by sanctioning an
overdraft of £1,700. The justification for granting an overdraft
to a firm in its infancy was based partly on securities offered,
but also because Butlin was a former manager at Charlesworth
Bodies and had a 'good reputation'.88
Although the bank manager performed an observational
function in assessing a firm's product strength and prospects,
capital and the quality of management, the bank manager would
often take on a more interventionist role after an overdraft had
been sanctioned. The sole motive for banks attempting to shape
the business policy of motor firms was to protect their original
loan or to improve the nature of their security. For example,
Midland Bank demanded that Rover sell off one of its body
suppliers, Cheylesmore Sheet Metal, when the car firm entered
into financial difficulties in 1932. 89 The banks were particularly
keen to warn their customers in the dangers of selling
debentures in the firm since it would put the bank's loan at risk.
For example, the branch manager of Lloyds, R.H. Ragg, actively
87 MBA, 358/12, 31 October 1923.
88 MBA, 358/13, 7 December 1933.
89 University of Warwick, Modern Record Centre, MSS 266/R0/1/1/5,
Rover Minute Book 1926-1936, 11 February 1932.
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intervened in the business policy of British Piston Ring in 1911,
threatening to withdraw all support for the firm if W.A
Oubridge, the owner, raised capital through debentures. Ragg
noted that:
He requires at least a further £500 capital and suggested
debentures. I strongly advised him to get his father to lend
the amount in preference shares.. .1 would lend him a
hundred or two occasionally, but nothing if debentures...
With the bank's threat of removing the facility of an overdraft,
Oubridge had little option but to alter his business policy and
adopt Ragg's advice.
In 1908, Lloyds also intervened into the business practices of
Johnston Hurly and Martin (JHM). Established in 1903, the firm
had survived the intense competition in the engine
manufacturing sector of the industry by trading almost solely
with the Calthorpe Car firm in Birmingham and allowing
generous credit terms. Worried that the bank's loan was at risk,
despite large order books, Ragg warned JHM that no extension
to their limit would be sanctioned unless they demanded
'cheques either weekly or monthly, as if they stopped the supply
of engines the company cannot manufacture'. However, once
this policy had been enforced upon JHM, Calthorpe reduced its
orders significantly, placing the engine supplier under further
financial pressure. By 1913, JHM was in serious financial
trouble, a situation which prompted Johnston to resign after it
was revealed that the firm hand accumulated debts of nearly
£2,000. 90 In other cases, it was not the threat of removing a
overdraft facility that shaped a firm's business policy, but the
conditions set by the bank when sanctioning it. For example, in
LBA, B379a/17, 12 December 1908, B379a/20, 4 April 1913.
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1902, William Hillman of Automachinery secured a substantial
loan from Lloyds on the condition that he re-organised the
management of the firm. In the following year, after a meeting
with William Hillman, Ragg noted in his daily journal that:
He said that about twelve months ago the business was
going back and he dismissed the manager and since he's
looking after it himself it has been considerably improved
and they are now doing wel1.91
Thus, in assessing whether a component firm was credit
worthy, both the Lloyds and Midland Banks possessed
considerable autonomy over lending decisions and exercised a
degree of influence in the customer's business policy. However,
local branch managers were not free from the constraints of
head office. Although head office would automatically deal
with larger overdraft requests, they would actively intervene if
they felt that the local branch manager was treating a firm too
leniently. In 1932, Coventry Motor Panels was refused an
extension to its overdraft after head office had complained that
it was 'disturbing to find these customers have made a loss of
over £3,500'. • The local branch manager had been fairly
generous with the firm since the bank possessed guarantees of
only £1,000, whilst the overdraft account had risen from £881
in 1923 to £1,745 in 1928. Meanwhile, the capital of the firm
had remained static at only £994 throughout the period.92
Another firm which came under close supervision from Midland
Bank's head office was Valves Ltd. On a number of occasions
between 1927-1933, the local branch manager was instructed by
head office to refuse the firm further extensions to its limit,
LBA, B379a/12, 10 February 1903.
92 MBA, 358/7 11, February 1932.
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fearing that good connections within the motor industry were not
sufficient justification. With a capital of only £1,500, Valves
relied heavily on an overdraft facility, a reliance that did not
please head office. In 1927, head office attempted to shape the
firm's business policy by rejecting an extension to an overdraft
which had already exceeded £2,000 on the grounds that the
management's wages were too high. Head office noted that 'what
is proposed as regards reductions? They are paying the Managing
Director £2,200 pa and £800 is paid away in dividends. This is
not satisfactory while the overdraft is so heavy'. In 1931, head
office once again rejected an overdraft extension which would
have increased the limit to £9,000. Without the overdraft,
Valves were unable to meet their existing orders and
consequently, the bank's decision forced Frank Bullock to
secure external funds, thereby reducing some of his control in
the firm.93
The very fact that the component industry was based upon
small scale units of production ensured that the clearing banks
had a large role to play in the establishment and functioning of
a firm. With the supply of capital often limited to family and
friends the overdraft facility was a necessity for many firms.
Moreover, the previous section has demonstrated that the banks
were not adverse to lending fairly substantial amounts to
component firms if they met an informal set of criteria. Indeed,
the two main banks involved the Coventry component industry,
appear to have continued to adopt the same lending criteria,
which had an emphasis on product strength, the capital of the
firm and the quality of management throughout the interwar
93 MBA, 358/12, 18 November 1927, 26 June 1931, 24 October 1931.
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period. However, firms which strayed from the path set by bank
managers after a loan had been granted were often subject to the
banks' intervention into the firm's business policy. Thus, not
only were banks an important source of financial support, but
they were also actively involved in shaping the business policy
of many car component firms.
Conclusion
The analysis of the sources of finance which were available to
Coventry car component firms has addressed some important
issues surrounding the relationship between British industry and
banks during the interwar period. There has been a sizeable
body of opinion which has concluded that the capital markets
and the banking system failed British industry. The accusations
made against Britain's financial institutions rest upon the
assumption that the capital markets and banks neglected British
manufacturing industry in favour of investments into more
profitable overseas projects. Indeed, many historians have cited_
the banks' treatment of manufacturing industry as a major reason
for Britain's economic decline during the twentieth c'entury.94
Evidence drawn from the Coventry car component industry has
demonstrated that the vast majority of firms did not issue shares
to the capital markets and instead were financed by families,
friends or business contacts. However, how much was this a
reflection of the lack of demand for this type of finance?95
Certainly, there existed a preference among car component firms
" Collins, Banks and Industrial Finance in Britain 1800-1939, (1991), p.
33
95 PL Cottrell, Industrial Finance 1830-1914. The Finance and
Organization of English Manufacturing Industry, (1980), p. 296.
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to rely on internally generated funds. Nevertheless, this does
not explain the difficulties faced by a company in the 'new
industries' when attempting to raise finance through the capital
markets. Thus the car component industry, which was small
scale and deemed unsuitable for public floatation, had little
option but to follow in the tradition set by small car firms and
extract external funding through the clearing banks. 96 Recently,
the role of the banks in British industry has been re-appraised.
Ross has defended the banks by claiming that they were far from
the passive partners with industry which some historians have
suggested, but were in fact, lending substantial amounts to
British manufacturing firms. 97 To some extent, the analysis of
the Coventry car component industry supports this view, as a
high proportion of firms relied heavily on the overdraft facility.
However, the criteria adopted by banks in assessing the credit
worthiness of a firm and the nature of the loan itself were
geared towards short-term aims. Banks were unwilling to
provide finances for capital projects, and consequently, the
prevalent form of finance offered by banks was the overdraft
facility. 98
 Indeed, bank loans were granted only if firms met the
banks' informal criteria and were subject to twelve month
reviews. Moreover, the banks played a more active role in
industry only after a firm had been granted an overdraft, and
when there appeared a risk to the bank's investment. Thus,
business policy was shaped, not through objectives which would
96 A.E. Harrison, 'F. Hooper and Co. The Problems of Capital Supply in
the Cycle Manufacturing Industry, 1891-1914', Business History, 24.
97 Ross, 'The Clearing Banks and Industry', p. 65.
98 Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, p. 58. See also M.H.
Best and J. Humphries, 'The City and Industrial Decline'. These authors
also note the short-term investment policy of British banks.
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necessarily enhance the firm within the component industry, but
with the ultimate short-term aim of safeguarding the bank's loan.
While the banks cannot be faulted in supplying short-term
finance to component firms in the shape of overdraft facilities,
it is clear that no long term strategy was developed between the
banks and component firms. Thus, the many component firms
which possessed little or no reserves, were unable to expand
their capital or invest in research and development projects, a
situation which ensured that the industry continued in its small
scale tradition.
Chapter 5
The Ownership and Management of Coventry Car
Component Firms 1895-1939.
This chapter examines the ownership and management of
Coventry car component firms between 1895-1939. A major
objective will be to uncover the management structure of firms
by analysing the size, composition and function of company
boards. The study will also investigate whether owners
appointed to key managerial positions formally trained staff or,
conversely, their family or contacts within the Coventry
business community. An overarching theme of the chapter will
be to consider the role of the family firm in the component
industry and whether their allegedly conservative business
instincts ensured that car component firms remained small units
of production. Indeed, the years between late nineteenth
century to 1939 have been singled out by historians, such as
Chandler, Payne and Lazonick, as a period in which the
continued dominance of family firms gave British business a
conservative outlook.'
Before the analysis drawn from primary source material can
commence, it is necessary to note the methodological
difficulties that analysis of the nature and function of a firm's
managerial structure presents. A major methodological problem
that emerged was the difficulty of uncovering and defining the
different roles which directors and managers possessed. This
I W. Lazonick, 'The Cotton Industry', in B. Elbaum and W. Lazonick
(eds), The Decline of the British Economy, (Oxford, 1986), pp. 18-50.
P.L. Payne, 'Emergence of the Large-Scale Company in Great Britain,
1870-1914', Economic History Review, 20, 1967, pp. 538-9. A. Chandler,
'Emergence of Managerial Capitalism', Business History Review, 58,
(1984), pp.496-7
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problem was not unique to the Coventry car component industry
as Leslie Hannah has asserted:
It is, in fact, more difficult in the British context than in
any other to distinguish among a founding entrepreneur
and his family, the financial interest, and the managerial
interest, simply because these roles were not clearly
differentiated in Great Britain.2
Indeed, in many cases, it was extremely difficult to differentiate
between the owner and manager of a firm, especially when they
were small scale family firms. In addition, in terms of
categorising firms, this study will class small owner managed
firms within the 'family firm' category since they shared many
attributes in the structure and management of a firm. Another
difficulty concerns the nature of the archive. Information on
the composition of small firms without an extant archive proved
difficult to procure. Whilst trade directories and The Stock
Exchange Year Books listed board members, a more fruitful
source was the Board of Trade papers held at the Public Record
Office. The Board of Trade files contain lists of share holders
and directors of firms which were founded or wound up during
the period under study. Despite the fact that many files were
randomly destroyed, this source provides a useful cross section
of firms and reveals the occupation and residential location of
entrepreneurs and shareholders involved in Coventry business.
Indeed, the Board of Trade files along with trade directories,
The Stock Exchange Year Book, business archives and various
biographies and obituaries, were the primary sources for Table
5.1 While it is impossible to obtain information on all of the
2 L. Hannah, 'The Visible and Invisible Hands in Great Britain',
Managerial Hierarchies, A.A. Chandler and H. Deams (eds), (Cambridge,
1980), p. 55
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firms operating within the Coventry car component industry, the
following evidence provides a useful insight into the managerial
structure of the industry between 1895-1939.
The Structure of Ownership and Management
The desire to place the owners and managers of firms into an
'entrepreneurial failure' thesis to explain why the continued
existence of small scale British firms between 1870-1939 has
been a major preoccupation for some historians for the past,
thirty years. Indeed, Payne concluded that 'all too frequently
the channels of advancement were blocked by family controP3
while Habakkuk asserted that family control ensured that 'a
constant haemorrhage of... ability from industry and trade into
land ownership and politics'. 4 In the light of this debate it is
pertinent to ask similar questions of the Coventry Car
Component Industry. What was the nature of the ownership and
managerial structure of firms and did its configuration put
Coventry car component firms at a disadvantage to the American
owned rival suppliers between 1895-1939?
Although the following tables do not contain information on
all of the component firms between 1895-1939, the sample does
provide a useful insight into the ownership and management
structure of the industry. Most of the tables were derived from
a data base containing 316 names of directors and share holders
of seventy Coventry car component firms. Information was
collected on the director's firm, residential location, occupation,
social class, shares held, and whether they were founders,
3 Payne, 'Emergence of the Large-Scale Compan y , pp. 538-9.
4 H.J. Habakkuk, 'The Managerial Revolution: A Case Study', The
Listener, 14 October 1954, pp.190-1.
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inheritors or considered professional managers (see appendix 1).
Surviving evidence was gleaned from the Board of Trade files
along with trade directories, The Stock Exchange Year Book,
business and bank archives and various biographies and
obituaries. Given that an individual's inclusion in the study
depended on the availability or reliability of the source
material, the sample can not be claimed to have been selected
'randomly'. However, the sample does contain a cross section of
directors and major shareholders from small, medium and large
firms. There is, though, a bias towards smaller firms as they
were numerically dominant in the Coventry car component
industry during this period.5
Table 5.1 is a detailed analysis of the stated occupations of
directors of Coventry component firms that were contained in
either a firm's articles of association or share registration
documents. From the sample of directors and major share
holders (see appendix 1) a total of 184 directors had declared
their occupation.
Table 5.1
Stated Occupation of Coventry Car Component Directors 1895-
1939
Gentleman Solicitor Car Manu Component
Engineer
Other
9% 4% 8% 65% 14%
Source: Appendix 11
Table 5.1 shows that 65% of directors connected with the car
component industry described themselves as component
5 Geoffrey Jones, used a similar methodology when encountering similar
problems researching the foreign multinationals in Britain before 1945,
See G. Jones, 'Foreign Multinationals and British Industry Before 1945,
Economic History Review, 3, (1988),
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manufacturers or engineers. Whilst this represented the largest
occupational sector, a small but significant number of directors
declared themselves car manufacturers (8%) and Gentry (9%).
The latter two categories were significant since they almost
certainly provided capital for component firms. For example,
appendix 1 shows that the wealthy Riley family, whose main
business interest was car manufacture, financed three component
firms, whilst the financial backers behind firms such as
Coventry Chain, Hewer Car Bodies, Forman Motor Co and
Thomas Pass all described themselves as 'gentlemen'. The break
down of directors' occupations can also reveal the social class
of directors. Using the criteria set by David Jeremy in the
Dictionary of Business Biography, the directors, through the
nature of their occupations, were placed into two broad
categories. 6 Class I included the gentry, large farmers and
landowners, large businessmen, professionals like doctors,
solicitors and senior managers or agents. Class II comprised
small businessmen, independent craftsmen, retail traders, clerks,
and white collar workers. In the case of Coventry's business
community, the directors who declared themselves car
manufacturers were largely derived from wealthy families such
as the Rileys and consequently were placed in class I along with
the occupational groups of gentlemen and solicitors. On the
other hand, in the course of research, it was discovered that the
vast majority of directors who stated that they were component
manufacturers or engineers were small businessmen or
independent skilled craftsmen.	 This group was subsequently
6 D. Jeremy (ed). Dictionary of Business Biography, (1984-1986). The
project's research methodology is examined in D. Jeremy 'Anatomy of the
British Business Elite 1860-1980', Business History, 26, (1984).
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categorised as class II. Although occupational status can hide a
multitude of variables, the exercise does provide a useful guide
to the class structure of the Coventry car component industry.
Table 5.2
Class Structure of Directors involved in the Coventry Car
Com onent Industry
CLASS! CLASS!!
Gentlemen 9% Component Manu/Engineer
65%
Solicitor 4%
Car Manu 8%
Total 21% Total 65%
Source: Appendix 11
Table 5.2 shows that a large majority, 65% of directors who
stated their occupation, were derived from class II. The high
proportion of directors in the class II category would suggest
that many of the firms involved in the Coventry car component
industry were either small scale, owner managed or family
firms. To test this hypothesis further, an analysis of the
founders of firms and the size of firms' boards was undertaken.
Clearly firms with one or two directors who founded the concern
would indicate that they were owner managed firms, while
boards with more than two family members would suggest that
they had considerable influence on a firm's affairs.
Table 5.3 analyses the size of boards of 38 firms for the
period 1895-1914 and 54 firms for the years 1915-1936. While
evidence for the size of firms was sketchy for the period prior to
the First World War, the average totals for both sets of years
show that the size of firms' boards did not alter dramatically.
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Indeed between 1895-1839 the component industry averaged only
three board members per firm.
Table 5.3
A Sample of the Size of Firms' Boards in the Coventry Car
Component Indust 1895-1939
Number on Board 1895-1914 1915-1939
1 Director Only 2 (Firms) 11 (Firms)
2 Directors Only 13 (Firms) 13 (Firms)
3 Directors Only 9 (Firms) 12 (Firms)
Over 4 Directors 14 (Firms) 18 (Firms)
Total Number of Firms 38 (Firms) 54 (Firms)
Mean Board Size 3 3
Source: Appendix II
From a total of 92 firms sampled during the years 1895-1914, 60
possessed only between one and three directors. Thus the
sample suggests that the typical board room structure in the car
component industry consisted of either a single director
operating an owner managed enterprise, two directors acting as
partners, or three directors of whom all may have had a stake in
the firm or may have been connected with the business through
family ties. Moreover, it is imperative to clarify the extent to
which owner managers who founded their firm or family firms
dominated the component industry since this group of business
men and women have taken centre stage in the 'entrepreneurial
failure' debate.7
Since there was very little difference between owner managed
and family concerns, both in behavioural characteristics and the
organisation of a firm, they were classified under the 'family
7 W. Lazonick, 'The Cotton Industry', pp. 44-5.
157
firm' category. 8 From the 263 directors listed in appendix 1, 100
directors (38%) founded family firms prior to 1914. Moreover,
of the 100 people that founded firms before the First World
War, 23 (23%) were still on their respective firm's board after
1930. Given that the entry and exit of firms was high during the
interwar period, and the possibility that a proportion of
pioneering founders would have died by 1930, the number of
founders continuing to control their firm was particularly high.
Indeed, the fact that over one third of the directors sampled
founded their own firm further confirms the hypothesis that the
Coventry car component industry was dominated by family
firms. Family influence in car component firms began to wane
only after the second world war when the motor industry
underwent a series of mergers. 9 This trend was reflected in the
ownership changes in three of Coventry's most well known
family firms. Thus by 1960 the Jackson family had been
replaced at Coventry Radiator, the Brett family were no longer
on the board of Brett's Stamping, and, for the first time in
almost two hundred years, the Rotherham family had lost control
of Rotherham and Sons. 1° Moreover, some firms which
persisted with a family dominated management structure after
the war increasingly ran into difficulties when their old-
established contacts were replaced and when during the late
1950s and early 1960s Coventry's importance in the motor
8 For the problem of defining the 'family firm' see R. Church, 'Family
Firms and Managerial Capitalism: The Case of the International Motor
Industry', Business History, 28, (1986). R. Church, 'The Family Firm in
Industrial Capitalism: International Perspectives on Hypotheses and
History', Business History, 35, (1993), pp. 17-43.
9 G. Maxcy, 'The Motor Industry' in P.L. Cook and R.L. Cohen (eds),
Effects of Mergers, (1958), 351-393.
10 The Times, 4 April 1957, p. 19.
158
industry sector started to recede." One such business which
suffered in this way was the Coventry Movement Company.
Although Coventry Movement Company was established as a
quasi-co-operative in 1889, by a group of watch manufacturers,
the firm's business strategy was largely dictated by family
considerations. The board of directors, such as Drinkwater,
Shufflebotham and Pierson who had been connected with the
firm since the late nineteenth century, had largely remained
unchanged by the 1930s and 1940s. Indeed, during this period it
was noted that the firm needed to elect additional directors as
they were 'all advanced in age 1 . 12 Both T. Bolton, son of the
chief engineer and C.H. Yeoman, the nephew of the chairman
were elected. As late as the 1960s, the majority of directors,
such as Pierson, Bolton and Yeoman, were direct descendants
from the founders of the firm. However, by the 1960s, the
strong family influences which ran through the firm were
actually cited as a major weakness in the structure of the
company. 13
Another indication of whether the Coventry car component
industry was derived from small family firms was the location of
a firm's head office between 1896-1939. A firm's head office
located outside of Coventry would suggest that the firm was a
subsidiary of a larger organisation.
11 A. Mallier and M. Rosser, 'Industrial Decline in Perspective: The Car
Industry in Coventry', Staff Seminar Paper, Dept of Economics, Coventry
University, (1982).
12 Coventry Record Office (hereafter CRO), ACC 1246/1/1, Coventry
Movement Minute Book 1932-1964, 30 September 1944.
CRO, Acc 1246/4/1, Report by Fisher and Co Management Accountants
and Consultants, March 1966.
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Table 5.4
The Number of Coventry Component Firms and the location of
their Head Offices
Date 1912 1919 1936
No of Firms 61 78 62
Co y HO 57 75 52
(94%) (96%) (84%)
External HO 4 3 10
(6%) (4%) (16%)
Sources: See Appendix II
Table 5.4 shows that between 1912-1936, the vast majority of
Coventry car component firms based their head offices in the
city. Thus although the number of firms with head. offices based
in Coventry declined slightly by 1936,
offices only accounted for only 10 per
industry.
Consequently,
concerning the component industry between 1895-1939. Did the
high proportion of family firms block the financial expansion of
concerns due to a reluctance to enter into mergers or public
floatation through a fear of losing control? Moreover, did the
high number of family members on boards at the expense of
technical and commercial staff put family firms at a
disadvantage to professionally managed firms?
The Family Firm and the Question of Growth
A key characteristic attributed to family firms is an
unwillingness on the part of the owner-manager or founder to
lose overall control of a firm through merger or public
floatation. Thus mergers or take-overs of family firms usually
occurred only if a concern ran into problems such as financial
difficulties, ageing owners with no next of kin, or disputes
between partners.	 Consequently, in terms of increased
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productivity and financial expansion, family firms have been
perceived as possessing conservative instincts. 14 Certainly, on
initial inspection, the pattern of mergers and take-overs in the
Coventry car component industry between 1895-1939 seem to
conform to this interpretation. For example, the motivation
behind the take-over of the body builders Hawkins and Peake by
Rover stemmed from an inability of the two ageing owners to
cope with the increase in trade. In 1906, the Lloyds Bank
manager reported that the reason for the sale was 'that the
business has so increased they cannot stand working from 8am
until to 8pm and want to take it easy'. 15 Similarly, in 1936, E.J.
Hardy, who had founded his firm Hardy and Company in 1903,
approached the Renold and Coventry Chain Company with the
view of a merger. Charles RenoId, Renold's managing director,
reported to the board that:
The idea first arose in the course of an accidental meeting
between Mr E.J. Hardy and Mr Ace [R&CC], and the
ostensible reason put forward by Mr Hardy for giving the
matter consideration was the fear of what might happen to
his company in the event of his decease (death duties etc.),
he being the owner of something like one half of the
capital. He had apparently considered floating the company
but felt there were certain objections to this. 16
Although E.J. Hardy was unsuccessful with his first merger bid
in 1936, the founder eventually achieved his aim by merging
with GKN some years later.17
The reluctance of families to relinquish control of firms was
14 R. Church, 'The Family Firm in Industrial Capitalism', pp. 17-43.
15 Lloyds Bank Archive (hereafter LBA), B379a/15, 28 June 1906.
16 Manchester Central Library Archive Section (hereafter MCL),
M501/650.021/R&CC 936/6, Renold and Coventry Chain Archive, Proposal
from Hardy-Spicer for a merger with R&CC, 8 December 1936.
17 M. Adeney, The Motor Makers. The Turbulent History of Britain's Car
Industry, (1988), pp148-149.
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illustrated by Alfred and John White who possessed a
controlling interest in White and Poppe, one of the motor
industry's most important engine makers between 1900-1919.
Throughout this period the concern was often unable to cope
with the large increases in demand since it preferred to extend
bank loans instead of inviting new capital. For example, in
1909 White and Poppe rejected an offer from the Deasy Motor
Company to increase the firm's capital to £10,000 as the deal
required the White family to relinquish aspects of production
policy to the car assembler. I8
 In fact, it was a dispute between
Peter Poppe and Alfred White over production policy which
resulted in a take-over of White and Poppe by Dennis Brothers
in 1919. Without Poppe's design skills, White had little option
but to take up Dennis' offer and effectively retire from the car
component industry. 19 Another dispute between partners also
resulted in a founder retiring from the industry after a
subsequent take-over.	 Two former Daimler engineers, W.S.
Tyler and C.E. Hatfield, established Coventry Motor Fittings in
1902. However, in 1915 Tyler, who already owned three
quarters of the concern's shares, purchased Hatfield's shares
after a disagreement over war time production strategy.
However, by 1917 Tyler found it increasingly difficult to
manage the firm on his own and consequently sold the whole of
the business to Louis Garrett a local manufacturer. 20
However, the most recurrent reason for families to relinquish
control of the firms they established was financial difficulties.
18 LBA, B379a/18, 6 December 1909.
19 D. Thorns and T. Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry in Coventry Since
the 1890s, (1985), p.86.
20 Anon, Motors and Motoring, (1908), p. 85. MBA 358/9 18 January
1915, 9 October 1919.
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For example, the small component firm Doherty Motor
Accessories experienced financial problems from its very
foundation in 1902. Founded with a capital of only £200, the
company was unable to purchase enough labour and materials to
keep up with the demand. In the same year Lloyds Bank
manager observed that the two owners, Page and Doherty:
Called and wished to make arrangements for an overdraft
of £100 to £150 as their business was increasing so fast
they now have an order in for £415,000. It appears one
gentleman offered to put £500 in the business, and another
£800, but they want to keep it in their own hands...
With such a small capital the bank would only sanction
occasional overdrafts of between £10-12 to cover wage bills and
advised Page and Doherty that 'if they could not otherwise find
sufficient capital perhaps it would be as well to accept the
gentlemens' offer'. 21 Within two years, after a run of bad debts
totalling £250, Page and Doherty were bought out by J. Marriot,
a partner in Phillips •and Marriot, a Birmingham engineering
company. 22
Similarly, the founders of two of Coventry's most important
electrical firms were both taken over after incurring financial
problems immediately after the First World War. ML Magneto
had been established by D.K. Morris and G.A. Lister in 1908, to
manufacture magnetos and small electrical components. Despite
increasing the capital to £15,000 in 1915, competition within
the electrical sector of the component industry was intense, and
consequently ML Magneto was the subject of a successful take-
over bid by Smith and Sons of Cricklewood in 1919. 23 In the
21 LBA B379a/12, 9 November 1902.
22 LBA B379a/13, 18 April 1904, 20 July 1904.
23 CRO, Acc 1107/1 ML Magneto Minute Book 1915-1930, 20 August
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same year, the founder Hermanus Van Raden left the firm he
founded after Van Raden and Company was purchased by Robert
Rankin and John Percy Starley, two businessmen in the battery
trade from the south east. However, Van Raden's departure from
the firm was not of his own making, but a decision made by the
wealthy Robinson family who had financed the firm since 1903.24
This relationship did not run smoothly since Carey Burt
Robinson, a Warwickshire gentleman and the firm's major
shareholder, was not convinced that Hermanus Van Raden
possessed the capability to run a business- effectively. During
an interview with his bank manager, Carey Robinson expressed
grave doubts about his son's
enthusiasm for Van Raden and
Bank manger reported that:
(Vaughan Robinson) continued
the firm. In 1907, the Lloyds
Mr C. Robinson. ..told me privately that the company had
not got a magneto.. .they have only accumulators which are
out of date, [he is] expecting very small things. He thinks
Vaughan Robinson will lose a lot of the family's money in
this concern, as there is not sufficient management, and
asked me if I could warn him about this in a fatherly way.25
Prior to the First World War, repeated attempts by Lloyds Bank
manager to persuade Vaughan Robinson to sell the family shares
consistently failed. After the war though, the family had little
option but to accept their bank manager's advice after the firm
was left with large stocks of unwanted military car components
which resulted in a severe financial loss to the Robinson family.
Indeed, Eric Starley recalled how his father, when purchasing
the company in 1919, discovered 'thousands of old electric car
1919. Public Records Office (hereafter PRO), BT 31 22688/139152, ML
Magneto Share allocation and capital 1915-1930.
24 LBA, B379a/13, 5 June 1903.
25 LBA B379a/16, November 12 1907.
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bulbs there and they smashed all these and took out the Tungsten
contact and sold those.. .they were all obsolete stuff.26
The founders' desire to remain in control of the company, must
then, be interpreted as an important reason for the high
proportion of founders remaining on company boards between
1895-1939. However, it is too simplistic to argue that continued
family control was a key factor restricting the growth and
expansion of firms in the component industry. After all, family
firms did not inherently oppose the growth of their firm, and in
many cases accepted the merger or floatation of their firm if a
degree of autonomy was safeguarded. 27 Moreover, the relatively
small numbers of mergers and take-overs in the Coventry
component industry between 1895-1914, cannot be simply
attributed to the continuation of family control, but to the
highly competitive nature of the industry itself. With the large
influx of small component firms, especially after the First World
War, car assemblers expressed little desire to takeover a
supplier when there were many component firms undercutting
one another. 28 Moreover, many of these small firms lacked the
resources to merge with other component firms or to issue
shares to the public. In other words, the economic structure of
the Coventry car component industry gave firms little
opportunity to merge or expand. Where a firm began to
experience substantial profits, family founders were often
willing to forgo a proportion of autonomy for greater capital and
26 Interview with Mr Eric Starley, former managing director of Radentie
Batteries, 2 October 1992.
27 R. Church, The Rise and Decline of the British Motor Industry, (1994),
pp. 26-32.
28 See Chapter 3 on the Exit and Entry of Firms in the component
industry.
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profits. 29
Thus, family ownership of a firm which began to experience
success in a particular branch of the component industry was not
a bar to further expansion through financial investment by
external parties or public issue. However, historians have
continued to seize on the personal characteristics attributed to
the small businessmen to demonstrate a direct causal link
between family firms and a conservative approach to company
expansion. 30 Certainly, there can be little doubt that the people
in control of owner managed or family firms shared a common
identity that was grounded in a elementary education
supplemented with an engineering apprenticeship. Moreover,
there is some evidence to suggest that this instilled a
conservative instinct in its recipients. 31 For example, an
analysis of three family firms Van Raden, Pistons Ltd and Hardy
and Company demonstrate that the owners all showed a common
adherence to conservative attitudes. On the subject of company
expansion, Eric Starley, a former Managing Director of-
Radentie Batteries (formerly Van Raden), recalled that 'my
father never wanted to be a sort of Lucas or anything in
expanding the business. ..he was content for the output to reach a
few hundred'. 32 Similarly, Gordon Parsons, a former Managing
Director of Pistons Ltd, remembered that his father 'did not want
the bother' of attempting to increase the firm's capital by
29 See Chapter 4 on the sources of finance of Component Firms.
S.B. Saul, 'The Motor Industry in Britain to 1914', Business History, 5,
(1962), p. 41. B. Elbaum and W. Lazonick, 'An Institutional Perspective
on British Decline', in B. Elbaum and W. Lazonick (eds), (Cambridge
1986), P. 5.
31 A.E. Harrison, 'The Competitiveness of the British Cycle Industry,
1890-1914', Economic History Review, 22, (1969), p. 302.
32 Interview with Mr Eric Starley, 2 October 1992.
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attracting external financial support. 33 Both firms remained
small family concerns with little or no capital expansion
between 1914-1939. Moreover, Edward J. Hardy, who had began
manufacturing car components in a small way in 1903, was on
the verge of selling his business six years later. The Lloyds
Bank manager noted that Hardy, who was the son of a small
Birmingham jeweller, was 'not ambitious, and does not want to
live beyond the position that he was brought up'. 34
 However,
after Hardy experienced a rapid increase in sales and royalties
in 1914 when he patented the first reliable universal joint, he
seemed to have had a change of heart. 35 Hardy relinquished fifty
per cent of control in the firm after entering into partnership
with an anonymous financial backer.
	
Through the aid of
external finance the firm swiftly expanded and by 1939, it was
producing over 3,000 universal joints a week and	 was
employing over one thousand people.36
Yet, all three car component pioneers had emerged from the
Edwardian era with similar social backgrounds and financial
resources. The difference then, does not so much lie in the
social and economic background of entrepreneurs, but more the
particular branch of the component industry the firm was
situated in. Thus, Van Raden had little realistic opportunity to
challenge the dominance of Lucas and consequently restricted
production to small runs of 'quality' batteries. Likewise,
Pistons Ltd had found a niche in a pistons market dominated by
the Leeds firm Specialoid, in supplying small batches of pistons
33 Interview with Mr Gordon Parsons, former Managing Director of
Pistons Ltd, 16 October 1992.
34 LBA, B379a/18, 22 March 1909.
35 LBA, B375a/21, 6 October 1915.
36 Adeney, The Motor Makers, pp148-149.
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to quality car makers. In the case of Hardy, the favourable
market conditions and investment offers (which Radenite and
Pistons did not receive), were to over-ride his conservative and
'unambitious' instincts. Thus, a firm which had entered a less
dominated sector of the component industry was always more
likely to be approached by external financiers. Moreover as
long as an element of family autonomy was safeguarded, family
firms positively encouraged expansion.
The favourable market conditions and the assurances over
continued family control were certainly present prior to the
public floatation of Cornercroft Ltd in 1936. Cornercroft had
been established in 1920, by two practical engineers Norman
Rycroft and John Corner." Despite the a small capital, which
was only £2,589 in 1928, the concern was the first component
firm to patent and manufacture the car wheel disc. 38 Whilst the
firm enjoyed modest profits that averaged approximately £4,500
a year between 1927-1935, it was not until after public
floatation that the company recorded profits of over £22,000 a
year in 1937. 39
 However, although Rycroft and Corner and
relinquished their shares in the company, they remained on the
board and retained their control over production matters. The
continuation of Rycroft and Corner in management positions was
mainly due to the fact that the major share holder was W.F.
Strickland, a 'commercial man' and conservative MP for
Coventry. 40
37 The term 'practical engineer' will be taken as someone who has served
an engineering apprenticeship.
38 Autocar, September 21 1934, p. 527.
39 CRO, Acc 1468/1/1 Cornercroft Monthly Balance Sheet August 1927-
1937.
40 CRO, Acc 1468/1/2 Cornercroft Minute Book 1936-1939, 22 June 1936.
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The vexed question of continued family control after public
floatation was a central issue in the growth of Coventry Chain
between 1907-1930. Although the Coventry Chain Company,
which was founded by Alick Hill in 1896, had developed
reasonably well, the firm did not experience any material
progress until 1906 when profits were estimated at between
£3,000-£6,000. 41 It was this at this juncture that the Hill family,
who were the sole shareholders of the company, were
approached by Daimler who persuaded the family to issue shares
to the public in 1907. 42 Whilst Daimler invested a substantial
figure, the public floatation of Coventry Chain resulted in the
board being divided into two main interests groups, the Hill
family based in Coventry and the 'London interests' represented
by Charles Goff, a businessman who had financial interests in a
number of major companies. 43 The original agreement between
these two parties decreed that since the London based executives
were mainly 'commercial men', the Hill family would preside
over the management and day to day running of the company.
Indeed, Alick Hill would almost certainly have rejected any deal
which would have reduced his leading role in the management of
the firm. Thus despite existing as a public company, the firm
had three members of the Hill family in key positions on the
firm. However, in practice such an agreement was difficult to
keep and, consequently, the firm's board meetings were often
stormy affairs. Even in Coventry Chain's official history, Basil
Tripp noted that:
41 Midland Bank Archive (hereafter MBA) 358/5, 18 April 1907.
42 Ibid.
43 For biographical information on Charles Goff see MCL,
M501/061.5/R&CC 932/2, 'The Goff Affair'.
61
Coventry business community. The manager of the Midland
Brick and Lime Works in Coventry wrote to a colleague insisting
that the output of bricks should be increased to at least eighty-
thousand a week to cope with prospective orders from companies
associated with autocar manufacture. He predicted that over
'10,000 more people will be working in Coventry in the course
of a year [and ] they cannot get houses to live in, it is far worse
than when the boom was on before. ..' s With the establishment of
the British Motor Syndicate and the success of the cycle
industry in 1896, business men entered the car manufacturing
industry with great optimism. The Coventry Graphic described
1896 as the 'signal for the starting of feverish activities in the
motor business. There was no time to wait for works to be built.
Everyone was anxious to "start constructing".9
However, as we have seen, a clearly identifiable car
component sector did not establish itself in Coventry until some
years later. The lack of a supply sector was recognised as a
problem by contemporaries such as Frederick Lanchester, one of
the pioneering engineers of the late nineteenth century motor
industry. Recalling his early experience of the motor trade,
Lanchester noted that:
the difficulties of management were very great partly
owing to the fact that no ancillary trades had been
developed, and we had to do everything ourselves, chassis,
magneto, wheels, body work, etc., everything except the
tyres. 10
8 Coventry Record Office (hereafter CRO), Ace 279/44/6253 Letter from
Midland Brick and Lime Works, 1896.
9 Coventry Graphic, 28 November 1913, p. 3
10 Littlewood, 'The Location of the British Car Industry 1888-1940', 14.
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London group of directors and the Brampton family. The Hill
family clearly lost the authority that Alick Hill had carried
within the business, and illustrates the importance that was
generally attached to founding directors. However, the second
phase in Coventry Chain's development also demonstrates how
family concerns could continue to dominate a firm, despite
merger and public issue, if the family manoeuvred themselves in
the higher echelons of company management.
Coventry Chain's merger with RenoId Chain in 1930, enabled
the RenoId family, through careful planning and alliances,
effectively to remain in control of the new public company.
Until 1930, RenoId Chain had been a private company,
established in Manchester in 1879 by Hans RenoId who still
remained on the board. Prior to the merger, Charles Renold, the
son of Hans and the company's Managing Director, identified
family control as the main priority." In 1927, a confidential
memorandum by Charles Renold outlined some of the
disadvantages that a merger with Coventry Chain could bring:
At present we have our fate in our own hands as far as
voting power is concerned. We would forfeit this in an
amalgamation due to the personal situation, however, there
seems no doubt that the Hans Renold Ltd men can entirely
dominate the Board of an amalgamation, and it is believed
that the Hans RenoId Ltd share holders in combination
with those of the Brampton family would command a
majority of share votes.
Indeed, Charles Renold's proposed board ensured that he placed
himself as Managing Director, Hans RenoId as Chairman, while
48 Analysis of the merger between Coventry Chain and Renold Chain in
terms of rationalization, standardization and the financial status of the
two firms prior to amalgamation is analysed in chapter 6. This section
will examine the merger's effect on the firms' board room composition and
managerial structure.
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Arthur Brampton occupied the Vice Chairman's position. The
three Coventry Chain directors, Fell Clark and Norman and
Arnold Hill were 'unprovided for'. However, although they did
not possess a managerial function, Renold noted that their
inclusion on the board 'might be desirable for appearances'.
Moreover, Charles Renold's detailed plan envisaged that the
important managerial decisions would take place in Manchester,
while Coventry would only be given 'simplistic' management
judgements to make. RenoId was also concerned that the
Coventry management would resist the imposition of the 'Renold
philosophy'. Charles Renold's solution was to replace the entire
top tier of Coventry management with 'RenoId men'. In 1927, he
wrote that there was a:
difficulty of absorbing organisations and staffs with
different outlooks and traditions to ours, and of infusing
"RenoId" outlook on them. We have several men coming on
and capable of wider scope. We can in fact put Hans
Renold men in all the key positions.'"
Nevertheless Renold's effective take-over of Coventry Chain did
_
not run smoothly. The discontent on behalf of the former
Coventry Chain directors spilled over into the open during the
second AGM of Renold and Coventry Chain Ltd in 1932.
Charles Goff, a former director of Coventry Chain, claimed that
he and others at the Coventry firm had been subjected to a witch
hunt by Hans and Charles RenoId, who would not rest until they
obtained their resignations. Indeed, Goff recalled that during
the merger negotiations, the Coventry Chain directors had
insisted that any new board would include a member of the Hill
49 MCL, M501/650.021/ HR 927/4, 'Special Financial Investigation 1927-
1928' by Charles Renold, 30 July 1927.
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family in a high managerial capacity:
When this company was formed [1930] the Managing
Director [Charles RenoId] promised Mr Kendrick
[Coventry Chain Chairman] and myself that he would do
his utmost to fit Mr Arnold Hill to occupy a high
managerial position in the company. He nobly fulfilled this
promise by dispensing with the services of Mr Arnold Hill
18 months after the formation of the company.
Goff also maintained that he had 'incurred the blind, vindictive
hatred of the Chairman and Managing Director, and they, with
certain others, were determined to encompass my removal from
the Board'. 5° However, with the alliance between the Brampton
and Renold families, Charles RenoId was successful in
implementing his aim of concentrating power in Manchester and
the Renold family.
The first section of this chapter has argued that although
family firms dominated the industry, it is misleading to
presuppose that	 family firms necessarily restricted the
expansion or merger of firms. Moreover, the section has
questioned the assumption that, due to their social and economic
background, small founders inherently lacked entrepreneurial
ambition. The question of whether family firms were willing to
welcome fresh capital into the firm rested on two central
factors. First, that branches of the car component industry
afforded the market opportunities for a firm's expansion, and
second, that a degree of autonomy remained in the hands of the
family. Thus, in other words, the process of whether firms
expanded	 relied less on the conservative characteristics
attributed to family firms, but was instead focused on the
5° MCL, M501/650.0211 HR 930/1, 'The Renold and Coventry Chain Co
Ltd Verbatim Report of the Annual Meeting of Shareholders', 17 November
1932.
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question of power and control within the firm. 51 The second
section of this chapter will investigate the other realm of owner
responsibility - the appointment of managers. Did Coventry car
component firms possess professionally appointed works
managers and, if so, were they derived from a particular type of
firm? Second, were the firms who did not appoint professional
managers at a technical and commercial disadvantage?
The Appointment of Managerial Staff and the Role of
the Coventry Business Community
In an industry dominated by the family firm, it is perhaps not
surprising to discover that few firms employed professional
managers at board room level. From the list of directors in
appendix 1, only 8.5 per cent stated their profession as
'manager' in the articles of association and share allocation
forms. Moreover, a closer investigation of these directors
reveal that they were derived from three categories of firm, the
multinational firm, the foreign firm and the firm which had been
subject to a take-over or merger. Thus the pool of professional
mangers in the Coventry component industry was mainly derived
from multinationals such as BTH and Dunlop and the foreign
firms like Hotchkiss et Cie and the Torrington Company.
Finally, professional managers were installed in some, including
Doherty Motor Accessories and Motor Panels after successful
take-overs.	 However, did the concerns which fell into these
categories possess a more effective management structure?
Within the context of the British firm, a merger or take-over,
51 For an interesting critique of Chandler's analysis of firms' growth and
the question of power and control within a firm see D. Boff and E.
Herman, 'Alfred Chandler's new Business History', Politics and Society,
(1980), 10, pp. 87-110.
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was the most common way in which professional managers were
installed into car component firms. The dangers for new owners
failing to introduce professional managers were evident in the
development of Doherty Motor Accessories' managerial structure
between 1905-1919. In 1905, Mr Marriot, who was a partner in
the Birmingham company Phillips and Marriot, purchased the
firm which had formerly been owned by Doherty, an engineer
and Page, a clerk. Consequently, the management structure
continued to be dominated by the Page and Doherty families.
However, without a financial interest in the concern, the
families appeared to lose enthusiasm for the business. The
manager of Lloyds bank noted that during 1905 the firm's
turnover and working costs should have resulted in a clear profit
of over £1,500, instead of the £300 loss. In his daily journal he
wrote that Mr Marriot 'thinks they have been robbed.. .Mr Page is
no good and as works manager instead of getting there at
6.30am, he gets there often at 9.30 am. ..the secretary Cooper, is
Page's brother in law and there is something evidently wrong...'52
The problem was exacerbated by Marriot death in 1913 for while
the firm's shares remained in his family they showed little
interest in improving its management. The day to day business
of the firm was left to Mr Fenton who, it appears, was less than
competent as works manager. In a stormy meeting with the
manager of Lloyds Bank, Fenton had claimed that the firm's
balance sheet was wrong and that in fact they were £1,000 in
profit. The bank manager responded by informing him that:
I had no confidence in the business, nor him, as he
promised.. .to always to be at the works by 9 o'clock. He
52 LBA B379a/14 20 October 1905.
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admits it is usually 11.00, but he is on the phone at 9.00. I
said that was no good. He thought I might remember that
the loan of £2,700 to Mr Marriot was never intended to be
a loan but a gift. I replied that I distinctly remembered
that it was a loan.53
The managerial staff at Doherty Motor Accessories was
eventually dismissed after the Marriot family sold their shares
to an external buyer who renamed the firm Osberton Radiators
Ltd in 1915.54
No such mistakes were made by Mulliners, a Birmingham
based body manufacturer, when they took over Coventry Motor
Panels in 1937. All aspects of Motor Panels' company business
had previously been managed by A.S. Smith, a major share
holder in the firm and a 'practical engineer'. 55 This arrangement,
however, was not acceptable to Mulliners who informed Motor
Panels that:
the Mulliners Board were not satisfied with the conduct of
the business of Motor Panels (Coventry) Ltd, and it was
strongly felt that Mr Smith's abilities could be better
engaged in closely applying himself to the works side of
the business leaving the office and costing developments
to the care of and under the control of Mr Rogers and Mr
Hart, one of whom would attend each morning in Coventry
for that purpose.
Although Smith would still receive £1,000, he was demoted from
Managing Director to Stocks Director and his position was
reviewed on a yearly basis. Thus, almost immediately after
taking over the firm, Mulliners sought to ensure close control of
the firm placing Mulliner managers in key positions on the
board.56
53 LBA, B379a/20, 19 March 1913.
54 R.J. Overy, William Morris. Viscount Nuffield, (1976), p. 19.
55 For List of directors of Coventry Motor Panels see CRO, Directory of
Coventry Manufacturers 1936-1937, Cheltenham, (1937).
56 University of Warwick, Modern Record Centre (hereafter MRC), MSS
2261ST1M11/1/2, Mulliners (Holdings) Minute Book 1930-1939, 29
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Another area of British business which saw the introduction of
the professional manager was in the multinational or foreign
firm. Chandler has argued that British industry, particularly in
the electrical engineering and chemical sectors, lacked the
integrated enterprises administered by American style
managerial hierarchies. 57 Moreover, contemporaries perceived
that American companies often transferred their efficient
management techniques though placing American staff in their
British subsidiaries. In 1945, the News Chronicle reviewed the
apparent differences between British and American firms. The
city editor stated that the names of 'Ford, Vauxhall, Singer,
Kodak, Hoover, Standard Telephone, are bywords for efficiency
[and] good management' and later contrasted them with
'inefficient British industries'. 58 Certainly there is evidence that
American managers were placed in some Coventry car
component firms. For example, in 1928, the American owned
Torrington Company employed four Americans and one British
person to perform the dual role of directing and managing the
company. 59 Moreover, these managers had very little influence
in the running of the firm since the real decision making was
concentrated in Torrington's parent company in Connecticut
USA.6°
However, these instances of American firms imposing their
managerial structures and expertise on British firms were to
December 1938.
57 A. Chandler, 'Emergence of Managerial Capitalism', Business History
Review, 58, (1984), pp.496-7.
58 Quoted in, Jones, 'Foreign Multinationals and British Industry', p. 440
59 PRO, BT31 30520/240712, Torrington Co Ltd, Articles of Association
and Share Allocation Lists 1929.
Author's private collection, Letter from G.R. Willaimson Company
Secretary of Torrington Company Ltd detailing the firm's history, 6 March
1992.
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prove the exception rather than the rule. 61 Indeed, once the BTH
organisation, Coventry's largest electrical component
manufacturer, is analysed closely, it is clear that the internal
organisation did not differ greatly from that of its British
competitor. BTH, which by 1930 was part of the American AEI
group, closely resembled the typical British managerial structure
of a loose confederation of subsidiaries with weak central
contro1. 62 Moreover, each subsidiary within the BTH group also
exercised a high degree of managerial autonomy. After the First
World War when production reached an all time low due to the
termination of military contracts, A.P. Young, a BTH engineer,
recalled that 'there was a strong feeling abroad to shut the
factory down', but the view was not shared by the Coventry
management who 'had a greater vision'. 63 Consequently, BTH in
Coventry was allowed to continue to stay in business since
power was diffused throughout the organisation and not
concentrated in one body that characterised in the classic
American management model. Indeed, the appointment of George_
Ralph, as Coventry's managing Director in place of C.R. D'Arcy,
was not so much a directive from above but from below. A.P
Young, who had been among the first pioneers to develop a
reliable magneto, had been unhappy with the production strategy
which the Coventry management had adopted during the First
World War.	 Young later recalled that the Coventry
management's decision not fully to embrace the manufacture of
61 For example in the 1930s, Ford UK replaced its American executives
with British managers which included Sir Percival Perry. See Church The
Rise and Decline of the British Motor Industry, p. 71.
62 Jones, 'Foreign Multinationals and British Industry', p. 440.
63 MRC, MSS 242/810/8, AP Young Collection, unpublished
autobiography, 'An Industry is Born', p. 42.
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the magneto raised questions in his mind on their ability to
manage the firm:
I had to face a grievous personal problem for I had never
been happy with the top management in Coventry. Now I
knew with certainty that this management was incapable of
directing the Coventry organisation in the manner needed
to meet the challenge of creating a new high tension
magneto industry.64
The senior management in Rugby, fearing that Young would
resign if he was not afforded with more influence in the
company, dismissed D'Arcy and his assistants and appointed
George Ralph as Managing Director, and Young as his assistant.
The second reason put forward by historians for the
superiority of foreign firms, was the influence of American
trained managers. However, together with other American firms
in the British Motor Industry such as Firestone, General Motors
and Ford, BTH employed few American managers, preferring to
appoint British staff in senior management positions. 65 Whilst,
H.N.S. Sporsburg, the Chairman of BTH in Britain was
American, most of the directorate in Rugby and the whole of the
Coventry board were derived from British personnel. Moreover,
the British staff that were appointed in American firms were
generally not qualified in management but had qualifications
and experience in engineering. For example, when Coventry's
BTH factory was established in 1912, the entire directorate,
C.R. D'Arcy, R. Rogers and F.V. Pipe, were all previously meter
engineers from the Rugby plant. 66
 The policy of appointing
engineers as opposed to professional managers, a distinctly
64 Ibid, p. 5.
65 Jones, 'Foreign Multinationals and British Industry', p. 441.
66 H.A. Price-Hughs, BTH Reminiscences. Sixty Years of Progress, p.
16,31
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British tradition, was to continue within Coventry's BTH plant
throughout the interwar period.
Why, then, did Coventry's largest American car component
firm adopt a managerial structure that had more in common with
British firms than its American counterparts? The answer may
lie in the fact that the characteristics usually attributed to the
family firm enabled firms successfully to compete in the
Coventry car component industry. One key factor which was
often characteristic of family firms was the lack of professional
training of managers in both technical and commercial spheres.
For example, the appointment of several top managers in the
motor industry were directly due to family connections. Major
Sydney Dick, John Black and Spencer Wilks all began their
careers in the motor industry after marrying three of William
Hillman's daughters and subsequently attaining top management
positions at the Hillman owned firm Automachinery. John Black
and Spencer Wilks later left the firm to take up managing
directorships at Standard and Rover respectively. 67 This move,
was in turn to create an opportunity for Dick's nephew Alick
Dick, who joined Standard in 1933. 68 Thus family appointees
usually did not possess any formal management or technical
education_ Indeed, this was the case, particularly, for the
founder of a concern who merely possessed an experience of
practical engineering and a knowledge of the branch of the
component the industry he was entering. Certainly, during the
formative years of the industry, formal training in engineering
67 Jeremy, 'William Hillman', Dictionary of Business Biography, (1985),
pp. 245-247.
68 Coventry University, Lanchester Oral History Archive (hereafter LOA),
Interview with Alick Dick, (n.d.). Jeremy, 'Alick Sydney Dick',
Dictionary of Business Biography. (1984), pp. 100-102.
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and management was limited. However, two major firms in
Coventry, Daimler and Coventry Ordnance Works, provided
invaluable practical engineering experience for prospective
founders. The two firms provided a contrast in the training of
engineers as Daimler's reputation had been built on the high
quality of its products whilst COW had become associated with
new manufacturing techniques and volume production.
Daimler's and COW's role in practical engineering was later
enhanced during the interwar period when they sent engineers on
day release to Coventry Technical College. 69
 During the
Edwardian period, however, informal experience in the motor
industry was certainly a prime consideration for local bank
managers when they assessed the prospects of a firm. Moreover,
alongside engineering experience, Daimler also offered
prospective entrepreneurs with an insight into the supply side of
the motor industry, a sector which had not developed rapidly
during this period. 70 Such was the scale of the Daimler
organisation that engineers left the firm to establish businesses
in a variety of branches in the component industry. Thus the
Lloyds bank manager noted that Doherty and Page, who
established Doherty Motor Accessories, were both 'practical
men' who had previously worked in the Daimler supply
department." Likewise, W.A. Tyler and C.E. Hatfield, prior to
establishing Coventry Motor Fittings in 1902, both worked at
69 D. Thorns, 'Technical Education and the Transformation of Coventry's
Industrial Economy, 1900-1939', in P. Summerfield and E.J. Evans (eds),
Technical Education and the State Since 1850. Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives, (1990), p. 40.
70 B. Beaven, 'The Growth and Significance of the Coventry Car
Component Industry 1895-1914', Midland History, 18, (1993).
71 LBA, B379a/11, 9 November 1902.
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Daimler's bonnet and radiator departments. 72 Bobby Jones, also
resigned from Daimler after working for some time as a body
builder to establish Robert Jones Ltd, which later changed its
name to Carbodies in 1928. 73 Finally, Daimler's electrical
department gave F.W. Highfield the experience to establish
Highfield Electrical Company after the First World War.74
Whilst Daimler trained engineers in a variety of skills, COW
was at the forefront of new technology and production
techniques. One recipient of this training was C.R.F. Engelbach
who, after leaving COW in 1921, became works manager at
Austin Motors and introduced a series of production line
methods. 75 Other significant engineers who gained practical
experience at COW included William Bullock who left to
manage Singer Motors, 76 and his brother, Frank Bullock who
established Pistons Ltd in 1911 and later Valves Ltd in 1916.
Indeed, prior to establishing Pistons, Bullock's founding partner,
Harry Parsons had also trained at COW as a practical engineer.77
Along with Daimler, and COW, a number of Coventry's
relatively new engineering industries provided practical
experience for entrepreneurs. For example, after leaving
London to become a practical engineer at Coventry's - Premier
Cycle, William A. Oubridge established the British Chuck and
Tool Company (later the British Piston Company) in 1909 and
72 Anon, Motors and Motoring, p. 85.
73 K. Richardson, Twentieth Century Coventry, (Suffolk, 1972), p. 57.
74 City of Coventry Official Handbook 1933, ( Cheltenham, 1933).
75 Jeremey, Dictionary of Business Biography, 2, (1984), C.R.F.
Engelbach, p. 288.
76 Jeremey, Dictionary of Business Biography, 1, (1984), W.E. Bullock,
p. 496.
n Interview with Mr Gordon Parsons, former Managing Director of
Pistons Ltd, 16 October 1992.
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Holbrook Bodies in 1920. 78 Another new concern, the Forman
Motor Company, produced three 'practical engineers' who left
the firm to establish Johnson Hurley and Martin in 1903 after
being disillusioned with Forman's management of the company.79
Butlin Ltd, was also established in a similar manner, when, in
1933, Butlin rightly perceived that Charlesworth Bodies was
facing bankruptcy. Subsequently, Butlin left the firm to
establish his own business using the contacts he had made at
Charlesworth to gain a foothold in the markets()
Therefore, as A.E. Harrison discovered in his research on the
cycle industry, the deliberate employment of formally educated
managerial staff in the component trade was the exception rather
than the rule. 81 Moreover, whilst formal technical training was
often lacking, managers with commercial training in sales and
marketing were also few and far between. However, in a supply
industry such as the car component industry, it was imperative
to possess an effective communication structure with other
suppliers and, above all, car assemblers. Consequently, firms
followed a tradition, that began in the cycle industry, of
appointing key individuals who possessed a good insight into the
trade and an intimate knowledge of important firms within the
area.	 The significance of this strategy was revealed by
analysing the number of directors who held more than one
directorship in the sample represented in Appendix 1. 	 The
sample of 263 directors taken from 70 component firms between
78 Harrison, 'The Competitiveness of the British Cycle Industry, p. 302.
Coventry Standard, Industry in Coventry Supplement, 8 November 1963.
CRO, Acc 606, Daffern and Stephenson Collection, Holbrook Bodies
Balance Sheets 1927-1929.
79 LBA, B379a/12, 15 April 1903.
80 MBA, 358/13, 7 December 1933.
81 Harrison, 'Competitiveness in the British Cycle Industry', p. 302.
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1895-1914, showed that twenty-one individuals (8%) held more
than one directorship. However, of these twenty-one directors,
seven (33%) held over two directorships. Table 5.5 shows the
most sought after directors that emerged from the sample and
the firms that appointed them as paid advisors.
Table 5.5
A Sample of Key Directors with more than two Directorships in
the Coventry Car Com onent Industr y between 1895-1939
Name Class Dir Occupation Firms
Baker H.J. 1 3 Co
Director
Daimler Motor Co (1899)
Mills & Fulford (1903)
Brett's Stamping (1836)
Bednell A. 2 4 Agent
TG John (1919)
Zephyr Carburettors (1919)
Bluemel Bros (1929)
Chey'more Sheet Metal
(1936)
Hill A.S.
1 3
Manu
Coventry Chain (1896-1921)
Bluemel Bros (1913-1921)
Smith's Stamping (1917-
1921)
Hill C. 1 3 Gentleman
Coventry Chain (1895)
Brett's Stamping (1899)
Charlesworth Bodies (1907)
Lindley
W.N. 1 3 Co
Director
Coventry Climax (1904)
Coventry Chain (1907)
British Piston Ring (1911-45)
Oubridge
W.A. 2 3 Solicitor
British Piston Ring (1911-42)
Valves Ltd (1916)
Holbrook Bodies (1920-1929)
Riley V. 1 3 Manu
Albion Drop Forgings. (1904)
Riley Engine Co (1914)
Midland Motor Body Co
(1932)
Source: Appendix II
The table shows that most of these key directors were derived
from social class 1 and did not have an engineering background.
Those who stated their occupation as manufacturer, such as
Charles Hill, Alick Hill and Victor Riley, 82 came from wealthy
Coventry families. Only William A. Oubridge, whose father was
82 LOA, Interview with A.C. Farrer, former Riley worker, 24 August
1982.
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a market gardener, 83 had any practical engineering experience
outside of a family firm. Indeed, Baker, Bednell, and Lindley
can be best described as 'commercial men' since they had no
engineering experience but a large network of contacts. 85 Alfred
Bednell's career as a company agent made him an ideal advisor
on business matters. This position was enhanced after his
appointment as the government's official contracts agent during
the First World War. 86 This may explain why at the end of the
war Bednell was a director of at least two firms, T.G. John and
Zephyr Carburettors, who had obtained large government
contracts."	 On the other hand, Alick Hill had gained a
reputation within the Coventry business community both for his
commercial enterprise and engineering skills. Born into a
wealthy Coventry watch making family, he perceived himself as
both inventor and entrepreneur. However, Hill's greatest asset
was his 'tactician's eye for financial battlefields and the cut and
thrust of commerce'. 88 This came to prominence when he
successfully retained a powerful position on the board of
Coventry Chain, the firm he founded, despite its public
floatation in 1907. Indeed, throughout his chairmanship of
Coventry Chain he was well known as being a tough negotiator.
Thus, while the Midland Bank manager regarded Hill as a
'thoroughly capable man who has good experience in America',
he noted after one particular meeting that he was:
83 LBA, B379a/19, 1 June 1911.
84 Richardson, Twentieth Century Coventry, p. 30. Coventry Standard, 5
January 1951, 5. Lindley was a partner in the Coventry solicitors
Rotherham and Sons.
85 LOA, Interview with A. Jarrard, September 1973, Tape 132.
86 H. Nockolds, The First 100 Years, Vol 1, (1976), p. 176.
87 MBA 358/615, October 1910.
88 Tripp, RenoId Chains, p. 132
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a most difficult customer to deal with and he was in one of
his obstinate [and] impossible moods. He asked for an
overdraft of £20,000 and not withstanding repeated efforts
of mine to get him to reduce the proposal to lower figures,
he refused to discuss any other amount.89
The appointment of key directors with an insight into the motor
industry also enabled firms to share resources. For example,
shortly after Alick Hill joined Bluemel's board in 1913,
Coventry Chain and Bluemel jointly opened sales depots in
London and Manchester. 9° Significantly, Bluemel and Chain
were not competing in the same markets, which enabled Hill to
offer his experience in dealing with car assemblers to other
firms within the car component industry. Consequently, by his
death in 1921, Alick Hill had been a director of Coventry Chain
since 1896, Bluemel Bros from 1913, and Smith's Stamping since
1917.
The importance of the personal contacts within the motor
industry should not be underestimated, especially since many of
the Coventry component firms did not possess an elaborate sales
organisation. Although the employment of agents throughout the
country was fairly common, agents were an expensive
commodity and were often dispensed with at the slightest
economic downturn. Consequently, orders won by agents were
often haphazard and few and far between during periods of
recession. 9i Moreover, the fact that Coventry, was an important
centre for British Car production, ensured that it was imperative
89 MBA, 358/5 18 April 1907 and 358/9, 21 December 1910.
MCL, M501/560.0124/CC 902/1f, Coventry Chain Minute Book 1902-
1931, 16 December 1913 and 21 October 1914.
91 A prime example of a firm which employed agents in an ad hoc manner
was the Coventry Watch Movement Company who relied on 'friends' in the
motor industry. see B. Beaven, 'The Growth and Significance of the
Coventry Car Component Industry', pp.
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for directors and managers of motor firms to integrate fully
within the Coventry business community. The importance of
integrating personally in the business community was not lost on
William Morris who purchased components from a wide range of
firms in Coventry. In 1928, it was recalled that Morris was:
practically always on the doorstep of each of his
manufacturers.., otherwise he would find himself landed
with, let us suppose, one hundred back axles and a dozen
front engines, fifty frames and no bodies. Therefore,
Coventry saw him at factories at six o'clock in the morning
and ten o'clock at night. ,•92
Similarly, the Lloyds Bank manager considered that Edward J.
Hardy's early success in the car components industry stemmed
from being 'well known to the manufacturers.' Prior to
manufacturing car components, Hardy had been a 'traveller' for
E. Lycett Ltd, a Birmingham cycle supply firm, before producing
cycle components himself until 1903. 93 Hardy's reputation with
manufacturers did, in fact, lead directly to a personal friendship
with Knight of Daimler which resulted in large orders from the
car manufacturer. In 1915, the two firms arranged a joint
venture to the United States to publicise Hardy's new universal
joint. The successful trip not only confirmed Daimler's faith in
Hardy's new patent, but also ensured that Hardy secured a 'very
big business and large profits for his firm1.94
The success of car component firms which drew contacts and
knowledge from the Coventry business community is
demonstrated by the fact that it was not only the traditional
small firm which followed this practice between 1895-1939.
92 Autocar, 24 August 1928, p. 362.
93 LBA, B379a/13, 29 May 1903.
94 LBA, B379a/21, 6 October 1915. Adeney, The Motor Makers, pp. 148-
149.
187
Even, British Thompson Houston, the American subsidiary
company, participated in this informal approach to sales, a
practice which overrode the sales departments and actually
caused some conflict within the organisation. In common with
the typical American subsidiary firms, BTH possessed a sales
organisation which was controlled by a local sales director.
However, in 1921, conflict broke out between A.P. Young, the
new Managing Director of BTH's Coventry branch and W.C.
Lusk the American sales director, over sales strategy. BTH had
lost a number of magneto contracts with car manufacturers such
as Humber and Morris through Lusk's unwillingness to negotiate
reductions in prices. Indeed, Lusk's authoritarian control over
the sales organisation, meant that salesmen were constantly
having to clear deals with the sales director, an impractical
strategy that went against the motor industry's traditional
informal negotiation methods. This was recognised by Young
who informed Lusk that:
business in the motor trade is frequently transacted far
from the wheels of toil, and most buyers in this
comparatively youthful industry like to strike a bargain. It
is appreciated that the sales organisation is to secure the
best possible price, but I would contend that the certain
knowledge that the salesman can, if necessary, drop his
price to a bed-rock figure which he has clearly in his mind
is a potent factor in determining whether or not the
salesman will come away with an order after the interview.
Moreover, Young considered that Lusk's control over the sales
department was too inflexible and ill suited to the demands of
the motor industry, and consequently, he often ignored the
Lusk's department and secured contracts himself. In obtaining
new contracts, Young followed the traditional method in the
motor industry and drew from contacts from the Coventry
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business community. For example, in 1921, BTH secured an
initial large contract for over 9,000 magnetos with Armstrong
Siddeley after Young volunteered to fit a magneto in Dr
Marriott's (a neighbour of Young) car. Young explained in his
sales report that:
I knew at the time that Dr Marriott was a very great friend
of Mr Siddeley, and that it was quite obvious, therefore,
that Dr Marriott's good experience with our magneto would
be communicated to Mr Siddeley and the quality of the
BTH magnetos would thus be bought very forcibly to Mr
Siddeley's attention.95
The sales drive was then centred on Coventry since eight from
the thirteen car assemblers that BTH succeeded in supplying
were based in the city.96
Although historians have criticised British firms for lacking
formal and centralised management structures based on the
American mode1, 97 it is clear that this was an inappropriate
system in the context of the Coventry car component industry.
Thus, even American controlled subsidiaries began adopting an
informal and flexible approach to sales that was rooted in the
tradition of the British motor industry. The motor industry's
informality and emphasis on personal relations was ingrained in
the very institutions of the Coventry business community. For
example, business contacts were often made through the network
of middle-class recreational institutions which were scattered
across the Coventry region. Fred Rees, who worked at
Automachinery during the 1930s recalled that the top
95 MRC, MSS 242/BT/6/1, 'A.P. Young Collection', Production
Department Report, 6 December 1921.
96 MRC, MSS 242/BT/6/1, 'A.P. Young Collection', Production
Department Report, Sales Figures 1921-1922.
97 Chandler, 'Emergence of Managerial Capitalism', pp. 496.
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management of the Coventry motor industry lived in the locality
and met at certain venues:
Major Dick [Automachinery's Managing Director] always
went to lunch at Drapers Hall [in Coventry], always went
every day... it was where all your top industrialists and
professional people went..."
Similarly, John Siddeley, the managing director of Armstrong
Siddeley, organised lunches for the leading industrialists in
Coventry. His son, Ernest Siddeley, remembered that:
On many occasions he used to have lunch in his own
private dining room at the works. I think he called it
politics and trade.. .my father would give a lunch one
month another would give a lunch another, but they were
all leading industrialists in Coventry.99
However, although a number of prominent car manufacturers,
such as Percy Martin of Daimler and Captain Black of Standard,
were members of the Ancient Fellowship of Cappers and
Feltmakers of Coventry, the unofficial recreational centre for
gentlemen involved in the motor industry was the Coventry and
County Club.m
The 'Coventry and Country Club' was formed on January 3
1899 by a group of Coventry industrialists. Entry into the club
was highly restrictive since the election of members was largely
vested in the club committee. Prospective members could be
refused entry if they were 'black balled' in the ballot, or if an
existing member objected within two weeks of new names
appearing on the notice board. The early club committees were
dominated by the 'new' industrialists and included Alick Hill,
" Taped Interview with Fred Rees, a former manager of Automachinery,
26 March 1933.
" LOA, Interview with Ernest Siddeley former managing director of
Armstrong Siddeley, Tape 121, 1969.
100 Jeremy, 'Percy Martin', Directory of Business Biography, 4, 1985, pp.
167-168.
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who chaired the early meetings, George and William Du Cros
and Alfred Bednall, businessmen who all had strong links with
the early cycle and motor industries. 101 However, despite the
exclusive nature of the club, the institution did not discriminate
against gentlemen from fairly small concerns.
	
Thus early
members, such as C. Foster, of Coventry Magneto, W.A.
Oubridge of British Piston Ring and W.J. Grindlay, the owner of
Coventry Motor and Sundries, were able to mix socially with
representatives from the major car manufacturers, which
included Standard, Daimler and Rover. Moreover, entrepreneurs
also had access to financial contacts since the Lloyds Bank
manager noted in his daily journal that both 'Mr Brown of
Midland Bank and Mr Blackburn of District Bank were members
of the club'. 102 Certainly, the importance of the club for small
firms was not lost on the new directors of Van Raden, who
arrived in Coventry from London in 1919 having just purchased
the firm, and immediately applied for membership. 103
Membership of the club rose dramatically during the First
World War since firms saw an opportunity to make new contacts
that could lead to munitions deals either with the government or
firms sub-contracting out. Significantly, one of the founders of
the club was Alfred Bednell, the prominent manufacturing agent
in Coventry and the Ministry of Munitions representative in the
City during the First World War. Harold Nock°Ids vividly
described the activities of Bednall, who by the 1920s was the
Coventry agent for Lucas:
101 CRO, Acc 578, Coventry County Club, Minutes of General Meetings, 3
January 1899.
102 LBA, B379a/13, 12 November 1903,
103 CRO, Coventry and County Club, MB 1911-21, 11 March 1919.
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Bednall, who had been the Ministry of Munitions
representative in Coventry during the war and knew
everybody worth knowing in the district, operated largely
from the bar at the County Club, which was the unofficial
head-quarters of the motor industry in Coventry and where
all the real business was done between manufacturers and
their suppliers.'"
The County Club's invaluable function, as a meeting place where
deals could be struck, continued into the Second World War with
businessmen joining as far a field as Birmingham, London,
Essex, Hearts and Sheffield. Such was the notoriety of the club
that one firm in Stoke-on-Trent even wrote to the secretary to
request membership for their commercial representative. In 1943
the club reached a capacity of 300 members and consequently a
waiting list of over 20 names was produced. Moreover, during
this heightened time of popularity, applicants who resided
outside a 50 mile radius of the club were refused entry.I05
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the Coventry car component
industry was dominated by owner-managed family firms between
1895-1914. However, it has been argued that the family firm
cannot be held responsible for the continued existence of the
small scale units of production which characterised the industry
during this period. Moreover, the chapter has maintained that
historians who have asserted that American style management
techniques should have been implemented during the interwar
years have overlooked the socio-economic context of the
104 Nockolds, The First 100 Years, (1976), 176.
105 CRO, Ace 578, Coventry County Club, Minute Book 1937, 1 October
1942, 25 March 1943, and 27 June 1947
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period. m6
 Family firms were open to external finance provided
that a degree of autonomy was maintained. However, the highly
competitive structure of the motor industry gave little
opportunity for component suppliers to expand since there were
few market opportunities and, consequently, external financiers
were not forthcoming. Thus the small family firm was more a
symptom of the structure of the component trade rather than the
dynamic force shaping it. This chapter has also argued that,
given the small scale nature of the industry, family firms did not
suffer from the lack of formally educated personal. Of more
significance to the component industry was the need to ensure
that directors and managers were integrated fully into the
Coventry business community, a necessity for an industry whose
primary function was to supply car assemblers. The importance
of the Coventry business community was reflected in the high
membership rates of the Coventry County Club which, to many,
was the 'unofficial home of the motor industry'. Indeed, the fact
that BTH at times abandoned its official sales organisation in
favour of securing informal contacts within the Coventry
business community demonstrates its effectiveness. This
community centred system only became outdated after the
economic framework altered after the Second World War. The
post war mergers in the motor industry provided the catalyst for
the decline of the family firm and the Coventry business
community, two intrinsically linked factors which had played a
prominent role in the ownership and management of Component
industry between 1895-1939.
Q6 For example see, Elbaum and Lazonick, 'Institutional Perspective', p. 5
Chapter 6.
Output, Technology and Standardization:
Institutional Rigidities and the Coventry Car
Component Industry.
For some time, neo-classical economics has figured
prominently in economic history. This conventional approach to
economic history assumes that market conditions approximate
those of perfect competition, a factor which implies that wider
institutional structures are constrained from having significant
economic affects by virtue of competition.' Thus an industry's
rise or decline can, on the whole, be attributed to the 'invisible
hand' of the market. Recently, however, a new body of research
has emerged which emphasises the importance of 'institutional
rigidities' in shaping an industry's development. For example,
Elbaum and Lazonick have attributed the decline of Britain's
economy in the twentieth century to rigidities in its economic
and social institutions. They state that:
we attribute the decline of the British economy in the
twentieth century to rigidities in the economic and social
institutions that developed during the nineteenth century, a
period when Britain was the world's leading economic
power and British industry was highly atomistic and
competitive in organisation. Our conclusions regarding
British economic decline run directly counter to the neo-
classical presumption that market competition is the best
guarantor of economic well-being.
1 D. McCloskey, Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain after 1840,
(1971). R.C. Floud, 'Britain 1860-1914: A Survey', in R.C. Floud and D.
McCloskey (eds), Economic History of Britain since 1700, vol 2,
(Cambridge, 1981).
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Thus Britain's typical economic structure remained atomistic, a
structure which impeded the exploitation of technical and
organizational innovations.2
As chapter 3 has demonstrated, the atomistic character of
Britain's economy resembled closely the structure of the
Coventry car component industry. Indeed, the car component
industry prior to 1914, has often been criticised for constraining
the growth of the motor industry through its 'inefficient'
practices. In 1959, Maxcy and Silberston suggested that the
slow development and inefficiency of the British car component
sector became a major restriction to the growth of the car
industry. Some years later, Turner supported this analysis by
claiming that 'it was the lack of an efficient component industry
which was to handicap Morris and other British producers in the
years before the First World War'. 3 Certainly, the growth of the
car component industry was fairly slow during the first few
years of the motor industry and output among component firms
varied dramatically. 4 However, no historian has actually
accounted for why output in the early car component industry
varied according to the origin of the firm or the particular
branch of the industry it was trading in. Moreover, whilst
historians have been keen to pin the blame for a lack of
rationalization and standardization on to the component
industry, they have failed to address the other half of the
2 B. Elbaum and W. Lazonick, 'An Institutional Perspective on British
Decline', in Elbaum and Lazonick (eds), The Decline of the British
Economy, (Oxford, 1985), p. 2.
3 G. Maxcy and A. Silberton, The Motor Industry, (1959), p. 13, G.
Turner, The Car Makers, (1964), p. 19.
4 B. Beaven, 'The Growth and Significance of the Coventry Car
Component Industry 1895-1914', Midland History, 18, (1993), pp. 105-
120.
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equation, namely the role of the assemblers. This chapter will
investigate three significant influences, the origin of a firm, the
impact of the First World War and the role of the car
assemblers, factors which may have constrained the growth of
the car component industry. 5 These important influences will be
analysed to establish whether they constituted institutional
rigidities to greater output, standardization and the
implementation of new technology within the car component
industry between 1895-1939.
The Origin of a Firm and the Impact of the First World
War: An Institutional Rigidity to Greater Output?
In 1915, a Ministry of Munitions report on the efficiency of
Britain's engineering industries concluded that:
no other country in the world could show such a high level
of workmanship or so much out of date machinery.
Repetition work on a large scale was comparatively rare in
England, and a well equipped engineering firm produced
an endless variety of articles, not always on a commercial
scale.	 _
Moreover, the report noted that many of the traditional
engineering industries were 'marked by a rigid individuality'.6
The report's findings on the nature of traditional engineering
industries does shed light upon the productive practices of some
Coventry component firms.	 Indeed, over half of the early
5 The origins of a firm and the impact of the First World War were
selected since they have both been the subject of much debate surrounding
the development of British industry during this period, see Elbaum and
Lazonick, 'An Institutional Perspective', p.2, D. Thorns and T. Donnelly,
The Motor Car Industry in Coventry since the 1890s, (1985), ch. 3. The
important role the car assemblers played in shaping the component
industry has been a neglected area of analysis and consequently it was an
important theme to investigate.
6 Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), MUN5/370/1126/1, Memo on
Engineering Efficiency June 1915-Nov 1918.
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The difficulty of getting body work made on an
interchangeable basis was due to the fact that the body
builders would not work to instructions. In those days
when a body builder was asked to work to drawings,
gauges, or templates he gave a sullen look such as one
might expect from a Royal Academician if asked to colour
an engineering drawing... when the body work came it
would not fit the chassis, and we had to cut the chassis
about the body work in each individual case.9
However, since the output of car assemblers remained small
during the formative years of the motor industry, the traditional
coach building techniques did not restrict car production.
Nevertheless, whilst firms using this technique could only
achieve a fairly low output, one major change in producing
bodies occurred prior to the First World War which was to
divorce coach making from its nineteenth century origins. The
introduction of metal panels, as oppose to traditional wooden
ones, not only ensured that the body was designed around the
requirements of a chassis, but also increased the output of
coach firms. 10
 Moreover, demand for the metal panelled body
also encouraged new firms to enter the industry with no previous
background of horse-drawn carriage production. This change in
production technique occurred between 1908-1912, and
coincided with the an increase in car production. It was during
this period that car assemblers such as Singer, Calcott and
Humber began producing new popular light cars designed for the
affluent middle class." Thus, even a traditional sector of the
component industry had responded to the demands of the car
assemblers since, by 1912, with the change in production
9 Ibid, p. 175.
1° Ibid, p. 190.
11 Beaven, "The Growth and Significance of the Coventry Car Component
Industry', p. 113.
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techniques and the influx of new firms, a highly competitive
industry had emerged. n
 However, not everyone approved of the
new production techniques. As late as 1912, Mr Hobley, owner
of Coventry Motor Bodies, complained that 'a properly built
wood body is a coach makers job, and cannot be made by a
combination of glorified joiners and tinkers'. Unfortunately for
Hobley, his views were not shared by car assemblers and, by
1919, Coventry Motor Bodies had been wound up.13
The watch trade, another of Coventry's traditional trades, was
also instrumental in providing car component firms. Once
again, recently diversified firms had little option but to adapt
their techniques to cope with the increase in demand for
components after the 1907-8 depression. Indeed, Rotherham and
Sons which began making a variety of small components such as
petrol gauges, grease cups and motor watches were quick to re-
organise their workshops from craft based techniques to more
repetitive methods. 14 A journalist who visited the Rotherham
factory in 1907 wrote:
A visit to Messrs Rotherham's great watchmaking factory
reveals the plan on which the division of labour is now
carried into effect... the subdivision of labour is even more
complete in this plan than in the older one, and machinery
can be employed for making large quantities of each part
also in a way that was not possible working on a more
restricted scale in the former method.15
Similarly in 1904, the Coventry Watch Movement Company
began re-organising the productive process around more
12 See chapter 3.
13 Lyddon, 'Craft Unionism and Industrial Change', p. 191.
14 Coventry Record Office (hereafter CRO), Acc 14571143/1-2, Rotherham
and Sons Vehicle Catalogue, (1906).
15 CRO, J. Woodward, 'Rotherhams: Watchmakers', (unpublished report,
1975), p. 65.
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conventional materials, could be quickly produced in large
quantities. 19 Such was the transformation of production
techniques in the cycle industry that by the turn of the century,
the Americans 'were rendered almost incapable of competing
with the British industry'. 20
Firms with a background in military production also had a
tendency to transfer the principles of rapid repetitive production
to the manufacture of car components. As early as the Boer
War, White and Poppe were producing large quantities of fuses
for the War Office using a combination of skilled and semi-
skilled labour and automatic machines. Indeed, the government
would only award contracts to firms who could demonstrate that
they could manufacture large quantities of military equipment in
short time spans. Thus, in order to fulfil the War Office's
contract worth over £40,000, White and Poppe secured a bank
loan of £4,000 to purchase new automatic equipment. 21 The
extent to which White and Poppe relied on automatic machinery
and semi-skilled labour was demonstrated by H.F. Landstad who
recalled that when he started work at the firm in 1901:
the shops, where I first started, were very busy on the
manufacture of time fuses and employed 60 girls and about
30 setters-up.. .the shops were so closely packed with
machinery that it was impossible to avoid being splashed
with oil. Indeed, everyone was soaked and stunk of
paraffin at that time.22
19 The Coventry Standard, 7 March 1952, p. 7.
20 Harrison, 'The Competitiveness of the British Cycle Industry', p. 299.
For more information on the mass produced cycle see P. McLeay, 'The
Wolverhampton Motor Car Industry 1896-1937', West Midlands Studies, 3,
(1969), p. 102.
21 Lloyds Bank Archive (hereafter LBA), B379a/11, 12 March 1900.
22 Coventry Warwickshire Collection (hereafter CWC), The Limit. White
and Poppe Ltd, 7, January 1919, p. 5.
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After the Boer war, fuse production for the motor industry
became White and Poppe's staple product after they won an
order worth over £25,000 with Armstrong Whitworth in 1904.23
However, this connection with the motor industry was to lead to
White and Poppe manufacturing its most famous product, the
motor car engine. Significantly, the firm did not greatly re-
organise the productive process and, consequently, White and
Poppe's workplace was far removed from the craft centred
workshops often associated with early engine making. 24 In
January 1906, White and Poppe's bank manager, wishing to
investigate how the bank's loan had been invested, reported that
'I went around the works yesterday, which was very busy and
fitted up with all the best machinery. They have an order for
two sample engines from a London motor company worth
£80,000..:. By October of the same year, White and Poppe had
over £135,000 worth of engine orders from five different motor
firms. 25 The firm's use of the latest technology to machine
engine parts to interchangeable limits enabled White and Poppe-
to manufacture over 20,000 carburettors between 1906-1912
while production of engines had reached 2,000 a year by 1913.26
Another Coventry car component firm with a background in
military production which was able to meet the increasing
demands of car assemblers prior to the First World War was the
Coventry Ordnance Works (COW). Established in 1906, the firm
had originally been formed to manufacture military equipment,
LBA, B379a/14, 5 October 1904.
24 T P. Newcomb and R.T. Spur, A Technical History of the Motor Car,
p_33, Autocar, 4 February 1908.
25 LBA, B379a/15, 12 January, 31 October 1906.
26 S,B, Saul, The Motor Industry in Britain to 1914', Business History, 5,
(1962)„ p, 41. Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, p. 23,39.
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Finally, a car component firm with a background in munitions
production which was to have the greatest impact on the motor
industry was Hotchkiss et Cie. This concern moved from France
to Coventry in 1916, and won a government contract to produce
large quantities of machine guns. 32 After the war, when
military orders rapidly declined, Hotchkiss, like White and
Poppe and COW, modelled their production of car components
on the techniques used in military production. In 1922, a
reporter, from the journal Machinery, noted that engine
production was carried out with the aid of 'many ingenious
methods' that were used to produce machine guns. The report
then proceeded to describe the principles behind their quantity
production:
the efficient arranging of the various manufacturing
departments under competent supervision, not only ensure
that the parts are machined in the shortest possible time
consistent with accuracy, but also that the work moves in a
continuous line through the respective shops from the time
the raw material is issued from the stores until the
finished units reach the development where they are
packed and despatched.33
This production strategy was achieved by installing long
conveyor belts that carried engine components, which joined the
main assembly line at right angles by another set of controlled
conveyors. 34 Between 1919-1922, Hotchkiss had produced over
20,000 engines and was the largest engine producing factory in
Britain. 35 In May 1923, Morris, who was the engine firm's main
customer, purchased Hotchkiss and almost immediately expanded
32 See chapter 3.
33 The report was first published in the journal Machinery and later
reprinted in a Hotchkiss publication. See CWC, Anon, A souvenir of a
Visit to the Hotchkiss Works, Coventry, (Coventry 1922), p. 1.
34 R.J. Overy, William Morris, Lord Nuffield, (1976), p. 85.
35 CWC, Anon, A souvenir of a Visit to the Hotchkiss, preface.
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output for the motor industry by closing down the machine gun
shop and converting it to engine production. By mid-July 1923,
Morris had increased production from 300 engines to 600
engines a week.36
Although firms which had originated from a munitions
background were often successful in implementing production
techniques to the manufacture of car components, the impact of
the First World War had mixed fortunes for the component
industry. The extent to which a car component firm benefited in
terms of increased output and the purchase of new machinery
hinged on whether the firm continued to manufacture pre-war
products or diversify into military products. For example, a key
war-time supplier was Coventry Chain, which in 1915 was forced
to re-construct its finances in order to cope with the
government's demand for an increased output. In order to meet
the capital requirements, 100,000 preference shares at £1 each
were created bringing the increased capital to £250,000. The
company's net profits increased from just under £15,000 in 1914,
to over £49,000 in 1920. Clearly then, the war enabled Coventry
Chain to strengthen its position in the component sector. The
reasons behind its success lay in the fact that the war seemed to
have inflicted minimal disruption to the type of product
produced and the company's customer relations. The directors'
report of 1915 stated that their business mainly consisted of
'manufacture of driving and engineering chains and engine parts
of motor cars, vans, lorries and planes'. Moreover, Coventry
Chain continued to supply their pre-war customers such as
36 Overy, William Morris, p. 27. R.C. Whiting, A View From Cowley. The
Impact of Industrialization upon Oxford, 1918-1939, (Oxford, 1983).
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Daimler, Siddeley-Deasy, Rover, and Wolseley as well as
expanding their markets in France, Russia and Italy.37
Consequently, Coventry Chain's post war conversion back to
civil orders was not as painful as rival chain makers.38
Likewise, ML Magneto's conversion to War Office work was
swift and efficient. After securing a contract with the
government, the firm refused any more orders from customers in
the domestic car and cycle trade and turned the whole works
over to manufacture magnetos and accumulators for military
vehicles. 39 The large government orders • between 1917-1918,
permitted ML to invest over £25,000 on new machinery.40
Moreover, with the introduction of volume production, ML could
reduce the cost of individual magnetos. In February 1917, after,
completing a War Office order for 5,000 magnetos, ML informed
the Ministry that due to the new equipment the manufacturing
costs of the next 5,000 'was now somewhat reduced...by 10/- per
magneto'. 41 After the war, ML experienced little difficulty in
converting back to domestic production since military magnetos
differed very little from domestic designs. Indeed, their strong
position within the magneto industry did not go unnoticed by
competitors and consequently ML was subject to a take-over in
1919 by Smith and Sons of Cricklewood.42
Other firms which experienced minimal disruption included
Van Raden, Smith's Stamping and Albion Drop Forgings. Van
37 CRO, Acc 594/143 Coventry Chain shares brochure issue 1915.
38 B. Tripp, Renold Chains. History of the Company and the Rise of
Precision Chain Industry 1878-1955, (1956), p.103,119.
39 CRO, Acc 1107/1 ML Magneto Minute Book, 28 July 1916.
40 Ibid, Outlay on machinery years ending 22 February 1917 and 12 March
1918.
41 Ibid, 14 February 1917.
42 Ibid, 20 August 1919.
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Raden avoided the problems of converting their works into
munitions shops and re-organising the productive process by
successfully tendering a contract for military vehicle batteries.43
Demand for stampings rapidly increased during the First World
War when a prolonged strike by foundry workers encouraged
many engineering firms who had previously used castings, to buy
components made by the drop forging method. Moreover, the
increased trade was centred on vehicle components. Smith's, for
example, had little difficulty in converting plant to peace-time
demands since out of £171,300 worth orders placed in 1917,
£145,500 were for motor transport components.'" The increased
demand for stampings was reflected in Albion's inability to take
on further business between August to October in 1914 as they
were working to capacity with over £50,000 on their books. Such
was the profitability of government orders that, in 1915, Albion
purchased £10,000 worth of new plant and were planning a
£20,000 extension to their premises.45
Not all firms, however, were able to continue their domestic
products during the war, a factor which caused immense
conversion problems. Paradoxically, COW, which had formerly
manufactured military equipment, were consistently unable to
meet government production targets!6 The transition from
producing car components to shells, fuses and guns was
surprisingly difficult considering the company's history of
producing armaments.
	 Such was the company's pre-war
43 CRO, Acc 1562/66/1, Van Raden, 'Jubilee Report', (unpublished
typescript, c1949).
44 CRO, Acc, 634/1, Smith's Stamping Minute Book, 1903-1918, 16
February 1917.
45 LBA, B375a/21, 30 October 1914, 27 September 1915.
46 PRO, MUN 5/373/1200/5, 'History of the Supply of Guns from COW,
October 1914-July 1917', (1917).
207
commitment to producing car components that at the outbreak of
war, no orders for armaments had been placed with the firm for
five years and therefore only a small staff were conversant with
the manufacture of field guns. 47 Along with the problems of re-
training labour, firms were confronted with the difficulty of
converting or purchasing new machinery in a bid to increase
production. In the case of the relatively large Ordnance Works
the government funded the purchase of a number of automatic
machines in the belief that it would speed up production.
However, COW discovered to their cost that new machines were
often unreliable. A Ministry of Munitions inquiry into faults
'occurring in a large proportion of the firm's output', reported
that defects were due 'partly to a defective machine.. .and partly
due to the employment of men new to the particular work
involved'. By 1916, these setbacks prompted the Ordnance
management to report that work in progress was 'very behind
schedule'. 48
 Table 6.1 demonstrates the extent of the problems
and the degree to which COW fell short of the projected targets
set by the Ministry.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
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Table 6.1
The p romised and Actual Out p ut of COW Nov 1915-A ril 1916
TARGET TARGET ACTUAL ACTUAL
Month
18"
Powder
Cases
4.5
Howitzer
Guns
18"
Powder
Cases
4.5
Howitzer
Guns
November
1915
5,000 6,000 850 -
December 5,500 8,000 4,500 -
January
1916
8,000 18,500 9,350 -
February 8,000 30,000 7,850 2,950
March 10,000 17,500 8,650 6,850
April 8,000 14,000 8,100 7,650
Source: PRO MUN 5/6/170/8, 'COW Report Showing Plant in Existence
and Labour for the Manufacture of Shell Components', 25 May 1917.
Table 6.1 shows clearly the that it was not until December 1915
that COW managed to exceed their target for 18" powder cases.
However, the real problem lay in the Howitzer gun shop which
due to 'defective machinery and shortage of skilled men' did not
enter into production until February 1916. Even after
production began the numbers produced fell drastically short of
the output promised to the government. The reason behind the
differences in production totals between the cases and guns once
again rest with the shortage of skilled labour. The powder
boxes could be easily manufactured using semi-skilled labour,
while gun manufacture required the extensive use of skilled
workers. Moreover, although the Ordnance Works had gained
experience in gun production between 1905-1909, their output
during this period averaged only 340 per year. Thus to achieve
the production level required by the Ministry, the Ordnance
Works could not replicate their pre-war production practices
since they were not geared towards volume production.
The impact of war also forced the Coventry Movement
Company to re-evaluate their product strategy and diversify into
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new areas. In October 1914, it was reported that 'some
important orders had been suspended, other had been reduced'.
These orders were mostly derived from the motor car trade, and
consequently the firm had little choice but to comply with the
government demands and start manufacturing aircraft
components. 49
 Moreover, many of the firm's problems stemmed
from the need to purchase new materials and plant and
manufacture unfamiliar products. Thus in 1915 the treasurer
informed the board that reduced trading profits were due to 'the
taking up of new classes of work in consequence of the war and
the rigidity of government inspection resulting in certain work
being scrapped'. 5° The firm received little help from the
government since after receiving £1,500 for their first order
completed in 1916, the Movement Company had to withdraw
£1000 to pay for the materials and plant used in the contract.51
Even in 1917, when the firm considered starting a night shift to
cope with the increase in demand for aircraft parts, the board
reluctantly concluded that even 'if it was found possible to start
a night shift further capital outlay would be required in
connection with motors and other matters and no profit from the
additional output could be expected'. 52 The shortage of working
capital was a major problem for many small firms since the war
often forced firms to work beyond their means. For many small
component firms the purchase of new machinery was too
expensive.	 Many simply fitted their existing multi-purpose
machines with new and relatively inexpensive jigs and fixtures.
49 CRO, Acc, 542/1 Coventry Movement Company Minute Book 1913-
1932, 26 October 1914.
Ibid, 25 March 1915.
51 Ibid, 31 January 1916.
52 Ibid, 27 August 1917.
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These machines could then produce long runs of shells or other
war material, performing a limited range of tasks, as if they
were specially designed machines. 53 Thus the source of the
problem was not generally connected with the inability to buy
new machinery but the necessity of purchasing large orders of
raw materials. It was reported by the local bank manager that,
the British Piston Ring Company, which possessed a 'fairly small
capital', had 'done exceedingly well' prior to the war. The firm
was almost £3000 in credit in August 1914, yet eight months
later the British Piston Ring Company was £500 in debt due to
necessity of buying in large quantities of raw materials for war
time orders.54
The first section of this chapter has argued that the origin of a
car component firm did have a bearing on the firm's ability to
increase its output. For the firms that had previously been
involved in Coventry's traditional trades, the conversion from
craft based to more repetitive and less skilled techniques was
often inaugurated by the external pressures of a highly
competitive market structure. 55 However, despite the external
nature of the conversion, the traditional car component firms did
not restrict the production of assemblers since the high entry
rate of firms during the crucial period 1908-1914 gave
assemblers many sourcing options. A major force in this highly
competitive environment were the firms conversant with
repetitive production techniques which usually possessed a
background in either the cycle or munitions trades. Moreover,
53 W. Lewchu k, American Technology and the British Vehicle Industry,
(Cambridge, 1987), p. 158.
54 LBA, B375a/21, 12 August 1914, 21 April 1915.
55 See the introduction to this chapter.
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this section has also shown that the First World War had both a
positive and negative affect on the component industry. Clearly,
firms which were permitted to continue to manufacture their
pre-war product gained in both rapid production techniques and
new plant over those which were forced into diversifying into
munitions. However, whilst the origin of a component firm and
the impact of war were important factors in determining the
nature of a firm's initial output, they cannot be considered as a
long-term rigidity in the system which in some way held back
car production.	 An over-riding factor was the highly
competitive market structure which was influenced by the
purchasing practices of the assemblers. Consequently, in
explaining the fairly low output levels of the early car
component industry (between 1896-1906) and the continued low
output of some component firms to 1939, it is perhaps more
fruitful to examine the demands placed on component firms by
car assemblers.
Output and Standardization: Car Assemblers' Demands
as an Institutional Rigidity
Whilst historians such as Maxcy, Silberston and Turner,
identified the low levels of production by component firms as a
significant factor in explaining the slow growth of the industry,
little attention has been focused on the demands made by car
assemblers. This section will argue that far from restricting the
production practices of assemblers in Britain between 1895-
1939, the level of output and standardization in the component
industry was dictated by the car assemblers themselves. The
highly competitive market allowed the assemblers frequently to
212
order both small and large runs of components with a variety of
different designs.
Nevertheless, the question of standardization was discussed by
both assemblers and component makers throughout the period
understudy. The first serious attempt within the motor industry
to encourage the standardization and interchangeability of
components was made in 1912. A conference entitled the
'Standardization of a Automobile Parts' was convened by the
Engineering Standards Committee in London in July 1912. The
committee, chaired by sir John Wolfe-Bury, decided to draw up
a list of components that could be manufactured to a
standardized pattern. The committee which had representatives
from the War Office, GPO, AA, SMMT, and Institute of
Mechanical Engineers concluded the conference by noting that
'The greater the tendency, as in England, to draw from a large
number of factories, the greater the economic necessity for
standardization'.56
The practicalities of pursing such a policy were fraught with
difficulties for assemblers which needed to balance the call for
standardization against the necessity to preserve its
individuality in the market. 57 For example, Standard Motor
Company, founded at Coventry in 1903, immediately proclaimed
that their underlying goal was to produce a standardized car. In
December 1905, the Chairman, Reginald Maudslay reported that
'after spending a considerable sum in experiments, the company
had standardized their pattern and the cars now built appeared to
be turning out satisfactory'. This was to prove a false dawn in
56 The Times, 3 July, p. 25, 27 August, p. 8 1912.
57 The Times, 5 March 1913, p. 24. For an analysis of the British car
market see chapter 7.
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the standardization of components. In fact several different
models were produced in small quantities with frequent
modifications. 58 In 1910, Maudslay argued that Standard should
manufacture a small car for the popular end of the market, a
project which would require an increase in production and the
purchase of longer runs of components. However, Maudslay's
suggestion that car production should be doubled to batches of
fifty was rejected by Standard's chairman Charles Friswell:
It was generally acknowledged that the previous system of
working one batch after the other would have to be
abandoned and the works would be so organised to give
delivery of the various models more or less
simultaneously. It was pointed out that this would be more
costly, consequently less conducive to profit...59
Thus an overriding factor in Standard's decision not to enter the
popular end of the car market was not the lack of a reliable
component supply but a reluctance to re-organise their
productive process. The production of a small popular car was
finally undertaken in 1913, after Friswell had resigned from the
board. 6° However, like other firms producing early volume cars
such as Riley, Singer and Humber, Standard did not change its
strategy of purchasing short runs of components. Car
assemblers discovered that the highly competitive component
industry did not make the purchase of long runs of standardized
components an economic proposition. Moreover, given the
seasonal nature of the car trade, the purchase of small runs of
components avoided an unnecessary build up of stock during the
58 Jeremy, 'C. Friswell', Directory of Business Biography, (1985), p. 433.
59 University of Warwick, Modern Records Centre (hereafter MRC), MSS
266/ST/1/1/1, Standard Motor Company Minute Book 1903-1914, 19 April
1910. See also Jeremy, 'R. Maudslay', Dictionary of Business Biography,
(1985), p. 197.
60 Jeremy, 'R. Maudslay', Dictionary of Business Biography, p. 197.
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winter months when car sales in Britain declined. 61 Low
switching costs encouraged assemblers to continue to order short
runs of components from specialist suppliers since this strategy
allowed them to switch to more competitive rivals should they
emerge. The car assemblers' dominance over their suppliers was
one of the key reasons why output remained fairly small for
many component firms and why Standardization did not
materialise until after the Second World War.62
For Coventry car component firms, the problems of short runs
of components and the lack of standardization was particularly
acute during the interwar period. A major reason for this was
that during this period, Coventry became the focus of assemblers
which targeted the luxury market. 63 The fact that Coventry
became dominated by luxury car makers (such as Daimler, Lea
Francis, and Alvis) which required short runs of components
encouraged the entry into the industry of a number of small
component firms, a situation which perpetuated the difficulties
for existing supply firms. Indeed, the luxury car makers
continued use of antiquated production practices had a direct
affect on the supply sector. For example, although Lea Francis
purchased almost all of its components from outside suppliers,
the firm consistently ordered only short runs of components.
Thus bodies supplied by Charlesworth, axles and gear boxes
from Armstrong Siddeley would be ordered in batches of
between ten and twelve even after the Second World War.
61 The Motor, 30 July 1907, P. 794, 14 January 1908, P. 764.
62 The power relationship between car assemblers and car component
industry is discussed more fully in chapter 7.
63 CRO, A.T. Mallier and M.J. Rosser, 'Industrial Decline in Perspective.
The Coventry Car Industry', (unpublished staff seminar paper'), Coventry
Polytechnic, 47, January 1982, p. 8.
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Moreover, as late as the 1930s the engine shop continued to use
the traditional method of scraping engine castings to fit the
components. Chris Beaven, a Lea Francis worker during this
period, recalled that:
We would all get a sack truck and pick up a complete
engine block from a field behind the factory [which had
been left to harden], and we would take the engine back to
the shop.. .Then we would get it sand-blasted and we would
scrape the engine block until the crankshaft and con-rod
would all fit...it took us four to five days to do each
engine.
The engines were then tested individually and if the engine did
not run smoothly it was dismantled and the engine block and
components were scraped and ground down once more. Such a
system did not utilise components with shell bearings that
allowed greater standardization and eliminated the need for
engine blocks to be scraped individually. Although volume car
makers such as Morris, Standard and Singer were using shell
bearings, Lea Francis continued ordering short runs of non-
standardized components. 64 However, short runs of non-
standardized components were not only the requirement of
Coventry's quality car makers but were also required by the
volume producers. Indeed, car assemblers engaged in volume
production tended to reserve Coventry firms for more
specialised products. Nowhere was this more apparent than the
body building sector.
Of the big six car manufacturers of the 1930s Morris, Rootes
and Standard purchased bodies from Coventry firms. However,
even Morris purchased only small quantities of luxury bodies for
64 Taped interview with Chris Beaven, former engine worker at Lea
Francis, 18 September 1993.
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the MG car from Hollick and Pratt and Charleswoth during the
1920s and 1930s. Morris continued only to order specialised
bodies from Hollick and Pratt after taking over the firm in 1923
as he perceived that the high labour costs and restrictive
practices in the Coventry coach trade militated against the city
becoming an area of mass production. 65
 Similarly, Humber and
Hillman purchased only small batches of bodies from a variety
of Coventry firms such as Holbrook bodies and Coventry Motor
and Sundries. Rootes' mass produced car, however, was centred
on the Hillman Minx, for which mass produced bodies were
purchased from Pressed Steel in Oxford. 66 Until the 1920s,
Standard had sourced bodies out to a number of Coventry firms
such as Midland Light Bodies, Holbrook Bodies and Swallow.
However, in an attempt to increase production the board decided
to 'wherever possible' make bodies within the factory. 67 Indeed,
between 1931-1933, Standard purchased only 97 bodies from
Swallow and 51 bodies from Holbrook bodies. The major orders
for bodies after 1936 were derived from Fisher and Ludlow
which had sited a new factory near Standard in the Canley
district of Coventry.68
The medium sized and luxury car producers also used
Coventry coach firms for more specialised work. Although
Rover produced most of its bodies within its own factory or
through Midland Light Bodies in which it had a controlling
interest, the car firm utilised Coventry's specialised coach
65 P.W.S Andrews and E. Brunner, The Life of Lord Nuffield, (Oxford,
1955), p. 127.
66 Lyddon, 'Craft Unionism and Industrial Change', p. 242.
67 MRC, MSS 266/ST/1/3/1, Standard Board Minutes 1923-1970, 25
August 1925.
68 MRC, MSS 266/ST/1/3/1, Standard Board Minutes 1923-1970, 11 June
1932, 3 June 1933.
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sector. During the 1930s, which saw car assemblers engaging in
'competition by variety', 69 Rover employed an agent to handle the
orders for specialised bodies. Nine different coach builders
produced 34 different bodies. A third of these firms,
Charlesworth, Swallow and Car bodies were located in
Coventry. 70 Riley, followed a similar strategy by ordering large
quantities of bodies from its subsidiary Midland Motor Body
Company. Riley ordered small batches of more specialised
bodies from the small Coventry firm Hancock and Warman.
Likewise, Armstrong Siddeley, built the majority of their bodies
in-house, sourcing only small quantities to Holbrook Bodies in
the late 1920s. 71 Although both Alvis and Lea Francis, were
luxury to medium producers, neither firm possessed a coach
building shop and consequently relied heavily on local coach
builders. However, to ensure switching costs were low and to
avoid an over dependence on one supplier, both firms spread
their orders across a variety of coach firms. Firms supplying
Lea Francis included Charlesworth, Cross and Ellis, Holbrook
Bodies and Carbodies, while Lea Francis relied on Robinsons,
Cross and Ellis, and Avon of Warwick. 72 Daimler's sourcing
policy resembled other luxury car makers since it spread its
body orders over a wide range of suppliers. In 1930, Coventry
suppliers included Charlesworth, Carbodies, Barker, and
Hancock and Warman. Significantly, each individual order did
not exceed 100 bodies and, instead, for larger orders Daimler
69 See chapter 2.
Lyddon, 'Craft Unionism and Industrial Change', pp. 246-7
CRO, Local History of Coventry, Tapes, 79,80.
72 CRO, Acc, 985/1/1, Alvis Minute Book 1925-1934, 3 February 1928, 21
September 1932, Acc 985/1/3 Alvis MB 1935-39, 21 February 1936.
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sourced outside of Coventry. 73 For example in 1934 Daimler
placed an order with the Birmingham company Mulliners, which
was conversant with new production techniques, for 3,000
bodies.74
The net affect of the car assemblers' body policy was to
increase the number of small body firms that used fairly
traditional body building techniques. Indeed, it was estimated
in the 1930s that it would require the assembler to purchase at
least 5,000 identical bodies from an all metal pressing firm to
cover tooling costs. 75 It was perhaps no surprise then that car
assemblers turned to firms using the more traditional composite
methods of body production, especially during the 1930s when
competition between assemblers was characterised by frequent
changes in car design. 76
 Clearly, the type of product that car
assemblers' demanded from Coventry coach firms had a
constraining affect on this particular branch of the component
sector. However, evidence drawn from other sectors of the
Coventry component industry also demonstrates that assemblers
took advantage of the highly competitive environment in which
supply firms operated.
In only a few cases did an assembler make an investment in
their supply firm to increase production. In 1907, Daimler's
investment in Albion Drop Forgings and in Coventry Chain, was
directly related to Daimler's desire to increase rapidly its
supplies of forgings and chains. 77 Indeed, within two years,
73 CRO, Acc 594/143 Daimler Collection, 'Purchase of Bodies 1930'.
74 MRC, MSS 226/ST/M/1/1/2, Mulliners (Holdings) Minute Book, 13 July
1934.
75 Lyddon, 'Craft Unionism and Industrial Change', p387.
76 See Chapter 7.
77 LBA, B379a/16, 6 February 1907
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Daimler's investment had enabled Albion to improve its
technology. In 1909, the Lloyds bank manager commented that
Albion 'have just put down a big hammer which with accessories
cost £2,900 over deferred payment. This he [manager of Albion]
says will pay itself in two years. It is principally for Daimler
work 1 . 78 Between 1909-1912, Albion increased their turn over
with Daimler from £9,000 pa 79 to £30,000 pa. This large
increase in output was achieved only after Albion had invested
over £9,000 in new plant and machinery. However, £6,000 of
this investment was derived from Daimler debentures to be
repaid within the following four years. 80 By 1914, Albion's
yearly turnover stood at £60,000, largely through the demand
and investment by Daimler, a factor recognised by The Coventry
Graphic. After a tour of the Albion factory, a journalist, noting
the advanced technology, commented that:
The growth of one industry generally gives rise to another,
both being interdependent; and thus while drop forging has
furnished the motor car with parts of the utmost lightness
and strength, the motor industry by requiring such-
essential parts has given great impetus to drop forging.81
Similarly, Coventry Chain experienced a marked expansion in
plant and factory size after Daimler's investment. Between
1904-1907, Chain had grown 'satisfactory' with little additional
plant, personnel or factory extension. However, within ten
years, factory size had increased from 68,000 square feet to over
1,000,000 square feet and the number of workers at Chain had
risen from 420 to 1,240.82
78 LBA, B379a/18, 14 June 1909.
79 Ibid, 9 August 1909.
LBA, B379a/20, 16 September 1912.
81 The Coventry Graphic, 27 February 1914, pp. 22-23.
82 MBA, 358/5, 18 April 1907. Manchester Central Library (hereafter
MCL), M501/061.5 CC 907/1 RenoId and Coventry Chain Archive, 'The
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Daimler's investment in key suppliers was to prove the
exception rather than the rule. Increased output and investment
in new technology for most Coventry car component firms was
determined by the nature of the car assemblers' demand. For
example, small firms such as Pistons Ltd were often perceived
by assemblers as 'secondary' suppliers. Gordon Parsons, the
former Managing Director of Pistons, recalled that volume
production for suppliers was almost impossible as firms, such as
Swift, Lea Francis and Humber, would often approach Pistons at
short notice for small runs of components. In the 1930's Parsons
remembered that 'when Lea Francis was in financial trouble, the
main suppliers would not supply them so they came to us'.
Thus, not only was the order small and temporary, but also,
there was a real possibility of not being paid. Consequently,
investment in new technology was rare. Throughout the interwar
period and after, Pistons' basic plant was derived from a 1920s
investment programme after Ford had placed a temporary order
with the firm. Parson's later asserted that this was a significant
moment in the firm's history as it was 'the great day.. .when we
bought a centreless grinding machine'. From then on, Pistons
Ltd did not have the financial resources to purchase new
machinery and had to resort to adapting existing machine tools.83
Another firm which was unable sufficiently to invest in new
technology was the nut and bolt producer, Automachinery. The
car assemblers' practice of using 'secondary' suppliers meant
that their demands were often inconsistent. The repercussions
Development of Coventry Chain 1907-1931', (unpublished Report 25
November 1931).
83 Taped interview with Gordon Parsons, former Managing Director of
Pistons Ltd, 16 October 1992.
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for Automachinery were threefold, since components could not
be standardized and capital was tied up in stock, which
subsequently ensured that investment into technology was low.
Fred Rees, who worked at Automachinery during the 1930s,
vividly described the technological problems faced by
component makers.
No one wanted to know that we were an old-fashioned
company where money hadn't been spent, where you hadn't
been updating your machinery, eventually in later years
they tried to set standards for making a bolt. The car
people never understood us bolt making people, you can't
run a bolt making company like you can a car
company.. .they think we had brand new machinery working
to 90% efficiency.. .when a machine broke down we had to
cannibalise another one to get it going, and they never
understood it, they didn't want to understand it. It was a
headache.84
The problems of investing in new machinery did not simply
affect individual firms, but in some cases, whole sectors of the
component industry lacked new technology. For example, one
sector which was consistently criticised for using dated
machinery was the stamping branch of the component industry.
In 1925, Bernard Brett, Chairman of the Drop Forging
Association observed that:
some of the equipment has been running for many years,
and although the appliances fulfil their duty, in these days
of strenuous competition every body has to look around to
see where economy can be effected.85
Firms involved in the stamping branch of the component
industry were required to hold high stock levels in a multitude
84 Taped interview with Fred Rees, former Managing Director of
Automachinery, 26 March 1993.
85 CWC, B. Brett, 'Some Remarks on Drop Forging Equipment. A Lecture
given before Members of the Drop Forging Association 1925',
(unpublished Report, 1925).
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of components which consumed much of their reserve capital
that could have been invested in new machinery. 86 Also, new
technology, such as 'Double Action Steam Hammers', which
could have speeded up the productive process, were unsuitable
for small batch production. Thus although Smith's Stamping was
criticised for inadequate machinery, Mr Clark (the Managing
Director) concluded, after a visit to America, that U.S.
production techniques could not be adapted to British demands.87
For example, car assemblers required Brett's Stamping to make
up to ten different stampings ranging from clutch pedals to
connecting rods. Moreover, each car assembler demanded that
Brett's produce the components to their own specifications, a
process which required the supplier to produce dies that were
unique to each car assembler. 88 Consequently, the motor
industry's depression in 1921, which resulted in bankruptcy for a
high number of small Coventry car assemblers, left many
stamping firms with a wide range of obsolete dies and stock89
In some cases, however, the assemblers' demand for small runs
of non-standardized components was exploited by suppliers.
The production policy of Van Raden and Company changed
significantly after the firm was sold to the Starley and Rankin
families in 1919. Prior to the take-over, Van Raden had
attempted to supply car assemblers with a whole range of
electrical components. As early as 1903, Van Raden produced
eleven different accumulator coils, six varieties of spark plugs
86 See later section of this chapter on the accumulation of component
stock
" CRO, Acc 634/1, Smith's Stamping Minute Book 1918-1939, 26 April
1922, 29 September 1925.
88 CRO, Acc 1167/1, Brett's Stamping, Works Order Book c1914-1920.
89 See Chapter 7 which analyses the problems that Smith's Stamping faced
during the 1920s.
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and five varieties of carburettor. By 1916, the highly
competitive electrical sector of the component industry and the
demands placed by car assemblers, required Van Raden to
produce 46 different accumulators, six different lighting sets,
and 31 varieties of ignition coils. Clearly this was a position
that Van Raden could not sustain since much of its working
capital had become locked into outdated stock. 90 After the take-
over, Rankin and Starley rationalised the production strategy by
concentrating on the manufacture of short runs of specialised
car batteries. The electrical branch of the component industry
had, by the 1920s, become fiercely competitive with the
emergence of the all dominating Lucas group. Van Raden found
it impossible to break Lucas' hold on the volume car battery
market since the Birmingham based firm could afford to offer
assemblers special deals involving a whole range of electrical
equipment. Eric Starley, a former Managing Director of the
firm in the 1930s, recalled that:
Lucas took over the supply of electrical equipment to [car]
manufacturers which included the battery, so if the [car]
manufacturer didn't have the battery, Lucas would knock
ten bob off or something which wasn't enough to buy a
battery from elsewhere.
Moreover, even larger battery firms found it almost impossible
to break into the battery market due to Lucas' domination of a
range of electrical goods. The large battery manufacturer
Chloride complained that during the 1920s and 1930s:
when it attempted to obtain business from another of
Lucas' initial equipment customers, Lucas made use of its
advantage by quoting or suggesting a very low 'deletion
CRO, 1562/29/14, Van Raden Collection, Van Raden Trade Catalogue,
(Coventry, 1903, 1916).
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price' for the battery to the customer who wanted to buy a
set excluding the battery."
Unable to compete in the volume battery market, Van Raden
began making small runs of specialist battery for the quality
sector of the car market. Table 6.2 shows that by reducing the
range of goods offered, Van Raden was not only able to increase
its turnover, but also ensure that stock levels remained fairly
low.
Table 6.2
Van Raden's Turnover, Stock and Profits/Loss after Product
Specialisation 1919-1930.
Turnover, Stock and Profit of Van Raden 1919-1930
Years
Source: CRO, Acc 1562/9/1-59, Van Raden balance sheets 1919-1930.
The largest output of car batteries was achieved immediately
prior to the Second World War when it reached just 500 per
week. Indeed, such was the specialised nature of their product,
that by 1939, Van Raden was making over 300 different types of
battery. Moreover, the small levels of demand, meant that Van
58 House of Commons, Monopolies Commission Report on the Supply of
Electrical Equipment for Mechanically Propelled Land Vehicles, 18
December 1963, p.68.
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Raden could not purchase and sustain automatic machinery until
after the Second World War. Although, two automatic machines
were purchased in 1927, they became too expensive to run and
consequently, 'one was smashed up and the other was exported to
India as a water pumping machine'.92
Although the assemblers' practice of selecting small Coventry
firms as temporary suppliers ensured that many component firms
were unable to buy or sustain automatic machinery, another
demand of the assemblers had an equally negative affect on the
component industry. The assemblers' insistence that suppliers
accumulated high stock levels to safeguard themselves from
bottlenecks in car production meant that much of the component
firm's capital was locked in stock. The problems for car
component firms were intensified as the stock was non-
standardized and, consequently, supply firms were in a
vulnerable position if an assembler decided to switch suppliers.
Moreover, this problem was not confined to small component
firms. The British Thompson Houston Company (BTH), a major
supplier of magnetos to the motor industry, was frequently
required to hold large stocks of components to cope with the
sudden demands made by assemblers. During the early 1920s,
BTH's Production Department came under severe criticism by
the firm's sales manager for its large accumulation of stock.
However, the high stock levels were defended by A.P. Young,
the Managing Director, who stated that suppliers were 'expected'
to make immediate shipments of orders with:
92 Taped interview with Eric Starley, former Managing Director of Van
Raden (later Radenite Batteries), 2 October 1992.
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no information prior to the estimate from the Sales
[Department] as to the quantities to be made from the
stock. This is exactly in regard to the recent Triumph
order... On the one hand Mr Garton [Sales Manager] is
commenting on the excess stock being made by the factory,
and on the other hand places an order for 290 [magneto]
machines, 170 of which have to be delivered immediately.
Young concluded by claiming that the Sales Department did not
appreciate the 'large range and variety' of magnetos that the
assemblers required BTH to stock.93
Similarly, Dunlop's Rim and Wheel factory in Coventry
experienced severe stock problems during the early 1930s. The
depression of the late 1920s to early 1930s resulted in a
considerable excess of supply over demand, and subsequently,
stocks of tyres, rims and wheels mounted rapidly in the hands of
the component manufacturers. 94 In 1932, the Coventry board
reported that 'there was a decrease of £.17,525 in our gross
profits as compared with the year 1931. Although the volume of
our business was actually increased, the selling prices were
reduced to meet competition'. 95
 The price cutting that followed
was a direct result of high stock levels and forced Dunlop to
explore more profitable manufacturing activities. Indeed, by
1936, the profit on car wheels had reached such a low level that
the firm decided to target aero components as its staple product.
In the same year, Dunlop Rim and Wheel's gross profits had
increased from £81,166 to £121,038. The board reported that
93 MRC, MSS 242/BT/6/1, A.P. Young Collection, 'Production
Department', 6 December 1921.
94 House of Commons, The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices
Commission. Report on the Supply and Export of Pneumatic Tyres, 8
December 1955, p. 6.
95 Greater London Record Office (hereafter GLRO), Acc 2166/18, Dunlop
Rim and Wheel, balance sheet 31 December 1932.
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the marked increases shown were mainly due to a rapid
development of:
aero equipment and increased cycle rim sales. In addition,
the gradual decline in the wire wheel trade, where the
margin of profit was very low, has resulted in a higher per
cent of gross profits in 1936 in comparison with 1935.96
Between 1930 and 1939, Dunlop reduced its manufacture of wire
wheels from 283,141 to 40,304 a year, whilst the production of
aero components increased from 2,284 in 1931 to 75,472 in
1939.97
The impact that high stock levels had on a component firm's
efficiency is explored in Table 6.3 which analyses the surviving
evidence for stock and turnover levels of five car component
firms between 1919-1939. The ratio was calculated by dividing
turnover by stock levels which indicates how efficient a firm
was in dealing with its stock. A firm which recorded a low
ratio possessed a poor relationship between turnover and stock.
The table shows that all five firms possessed high stock levels
as even a ratio of 12 did not represent a particularly efficient
relationship between stock and turnover. Indeed, the ratio of 12
indicates that Van Raden possessed 19 days of excess stock at
any given time during this period. 98 The table also suggests that
Dunlop's diversification from the car rim and wheel sector to the
aero sector was a factor in the firm's improved ratio between
turnover and stock. However, the surviving evidence for the
96 GLRO, Acc 2166/22, Dunlop Rim and Wheel Balance Sheet, 31
December 1926,
97 GLRO, Acc 2166/15-16,25, Dunlop Rim and Wheel Balance Sheets, 31
December 1930,1931,1939.
98 Current stock levels held by car component firms are between 1 to 2
days. Information supplied by Hill Precision, Coventry.
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Bluemel firm illustrates the high stock levels that small
component
Table 6.3
The Ratio of the Value of Turnover to Stock of Five Car
Component Firms, 1919-1939.
Ratio of the Value of Turnover to Stock
19 '20 11 '22 '23 '24 '25 '26 '27 '28 '29 '30 '31 '32 '33 '34 '35 16 17 '38 39
Years
Source: Balance sheets for: Bluemel (CRO, Acc Daffern & Stephenson
Collection Acc 606; Van Raden (CRO, Acc 1562/9/1-59 ); Coventry Chain
(MCL,M501/657.41/CC922/3);RenoldChain(MCL,M501/657.41/HR9031/1);
Dunlop (GLRO, Acc 2166/18-25).
firms had to endure. Between 1925-1930, Bluemel rarely
recorded a ratio above 1, a figure which indicates that the value
of stock levels was actually higher than the value of turnover.
For example, in 1925, Bluemel's stock was valued at £38,674
while its turnover only reached £37,979. Fortunes did not
improve the following year as the stock was valued at £38,344,
over £5,000 more than the turnover. 99 The evidence is consistent
with the premise that car assemblers demanded component firms
hold high levels of stock. Moreover, the table suggests that
stock accumulation was a problem for all sizes of component
99 CRO, Acc 606, Daffern and Stephenson Collection.
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firms since it includes two small firms (Van Raden and
Bluemel), two medium sized firms (Coventry Chain and Renold
Chain) and one large company (Dunlop).
The car assemblers' requirement that component firms held
large amounts of non-standardized stock had significant
repercussions for the degree of research and development in the
industry. Indeed, during period when firms experienced a
shortage of capital, investment into research and development
was usually the first programme to be dispensed with. For
example, during the 1920s when competition in the electrical
branch of the component sector was at its most fierce, shortage
of capital, brought on by the large accumulation of stock, forced
ML Magneto into some drastic action. In September 1925, the
chairman reported to the Board that severe cut backs had been
made 'by stopping all development, research improvements, etc.
in fact anything which involved immediate outlay for
deferred'. 100 Certainly, the highly competitive nature of the
component industry, particularly in the electrical sector, meant
that rate of innovation and technological improvements to car
components were fairly low. Thus, some components which
were manufactured in a highly competitive branch " of the
industry remained at an early stage of technical development.
Indeed, in 1920, a motoring correspondent noted that:
when it considered what immense praise had been lavished
on various parts of the motor car, and to what degree of
excellence some of them have been raised from the old
standards of inefficiency, it is astonishing that what is
perhaps the most important organ of all should have shown
practically no progress at all in the past 10 or 15 years.
CRO, Acc 1107/1, ML Magneto Minute Book 1915-1925, 9 September
1925.
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The carburettor of today, taken in the mass, is very little
improvement on the best of 1905.101
Consequently, innovation and research was confined to the
branches of the component industry which were less
competitive. Thus firms which patented their own components
such as Coventry Chain and Cornercroft cornered the market of
their particular product which, in turn, ensured that some
capital was available for research.
This section has argued that the firms within the Coventry car
component industry were characterised by short runs of non-
standardized components, low investment in technology and the
high accumulation of stock. However, these characteristics did
not materialise through an inefficiency inherent within the
component industry but had emerged from an institutional
rigidity related to the assemblers. Indeed, the demands placed
on Coventry car component firms by assemblers presented an
institutional rigidity within the motor industry to greater output,
standardization and the implementation of new technology in the
component sector. The following section will analyse the extent
to which component firms combined to rationalize output,
technology and stock levels, in a bid to manipulate assemblers
demands.
Responses to Institutional Rigidities: Associations,
Monopolies and Mergers
The extent to which car component firms attempted to
manipulate the demands made by the car assemblers was
demonstrated by the fact that almost every branch of the trade
possessed a trade association. Moreover, the emergence of the
101 The Times, 10 April 1920, p.6.
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highly competitive market, made it imperative for suppliers to
try and act in unison to avoid the problems of price cutting.
The key objective of car component associations was to
strengthen the suppliers' bargaining position with the car
assemblers. Significantly, however, most of the trade
associations emerged just after the First World War when
demand for car components exceeded supply due to the
difficulties in sourcing raw materials. Thus it was during this
period that the stamping sector formed an association as it was
'the only means whereby drop forgers can meet and exchange
their views', as a 'means of obtaining mutual strength'. 102
Likewise, the shortage of nuts and bolts ensured that the Nut
and Bolt Association was 'fairly strong' immediately after the
First World War. Fred Rees, a former Managing Director of
Automachinery, recalled that throughout the interwar period nut
and bolt producers sought 'protection against the car assemblers'
and it was informally agreed between suppliers 'not to undercut
each other too much'. However, such arrangements were often _
difficult to adhere to, as the evidence drawn from the chain
making sector of the car component industry demonstrates
clearly. 103
The increase in the manufacture of chains during the First
World War, combined with the post war demands of car
assemblers, raised the question of standardization. It was not
long before the chain industry experimented with a trade
association - the Association of British Chain Manufacturers
102 CWC, B. Brett, 'Some Remarks on Drop Forging Equipment. A Lecture
Given before Members of the Drop Forging Association, 1925',
(unpublished Report 1925).
103 Taped interview with Fred Rees, former Managing Director of
Automachinery, 26 March 1993.
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(ABCM) 104
 In 1918, The ABCM was formed 'in an effort to
regulate competition'. The association included all of the major
chain makers such as Coventry Chain, Hans RenoId and
Brampton Brothers. The association's objectives were focused
on the standardization of components and the creation of a price
list to undermine the car assemblers' bargaining power. The
association was successful as long as demand exceeded supply, a
situation which prevailed in the chain industry immediately
after the First World War. The association was able to exploit
the deficiency in chains by publishing price lists that enabled
component firms to enjoy generous profits. In 1920, a letter
from Alick Hill, Managing Director of Coventry Chain, to Arthur
Brampton chairman of the ABCM, outlined the increased profit
margins which the published list had brought component firms:
The prices that have been ruling are, as far as my company
is concerned, fictitious and as long as demand greatly
succeeded supplies, naturally one has little
objection.. .even at the figures named in the new schedule,
at the same time taking into consideration the discount
proposals, the prices thus arrived at would still be
materially on the high side, judging by costs.u35
The association was successful when chains were in demand.
However, with the advent of harder times, car assemblers were
once more able to undercut component firms as, one by one, they
withdrew their membership from the association. By 1923, it
was noted that the ABCM 'had lost most of its importance1.1136
Thus, in terms of protecting supply firms when it was most
104 B. Tripp, RenoId Chains, p. 112.
105 MCL, M501/658.61/HR 918/If, Renold Chain Collection, Association
of British Chain Manufacturers, Letter from A.S. Hill to A. Brampton, 5
June 1920.
1 °6 MCL, M501/658.61/HR 918/7, Renold Chain Collection, Association
of British Chain Manufacturers, (unpublished report on the history of the
association), n.d.
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needed, from the highly competitive environment and the
demands of assemblers the ABCM had been a failure. Moreover,
since the association had only been in existence for six years, it
did not have sufficient time to pursue a programme of chain
standardization. For example, it was calculated that as late as
1930, there existed over 1,000 different varieties of vehicle
chain. 107
The failure of trade associations was often due to a large
component maker attempting to enforce standardization of
components by gaining a monopoly position in the industry. If
this position was attained by a supplier, it was perceived that
car assemblers would have little option but to alter their
inflexible requests for short runs of non-standardized
components. An example of a Coventry component firm which
followed this policy was the British Thompson Houston
Company (BTH) of Lower Ford Street. BTH was one of
Coventry's largest component firms and had diversified into
producing car magnetos during the First World War. In similar
circumstances to the chain industry, a trade association, the
British Ignition Apparatus Association (BIAA), was established
during the First World War. On the surface it seemed that BTH
was in favour of the organisation. Indeed, A.P. Young, a former
Managing Director of the Coventry factory, later wrote in his
autobiography that the Association nurtured a 'spirit of co-
operation' between small and large firms alike and that it:
set a pattern in the industry, which if it had been followed
in other industries during the past half century, the face
107 MCL, M501/650.021/R&CC 931/1, RenoId Chain Collection, R.G.
Renold, Rationalization of the Management of Companies Under a
Merger, (n.d.) p. 8
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and spirit of British industry would have completely
changed. The ugly face of capitalism would have indeed
disappeared. 108
However, in private during the 1920s, Young was concerned that
there were 'far too many separate and distinct firms engaged in
the business' which had encouraged car assemblers into
demanding small runs of non-standardized magnetos. In a
confidential memorandum to H.N.S. Sporborg, the Chairman of
the company, Young declared that:
there is a wonderful opportunity for some magneto
manufacturer to rapidly force themselves into a dominant
position by the adoption of a bold and comprehensive
policy. In the process, some of the smaller firms will
undoubtedly go out of business, and the economic basis of
the industry will thereby be improved...I firmly believe
that the BTH Company could achieve such a position.m9
The BIAA, like the chain association, collapsed by the early
1920s due to BTH's aggressive price cutting policy. n° However,
despite gaining a major stake in the magneto market, BTH was
unable to enforce standardization practices on the car
assemblers. By the late 1920s and early 1930s, car assemblers
began using alternative ignition devices to the magneto, and
consequently, BTH was forced into diversifying from the motor
to the aero industry.m
The quest for monopolising the chain market was one of the
motivations behind the take-over of Coventry Chain by RenoId
Chain in 1930. Although officially described as a merger, it is
108 MRC, MSS 242/BI0/8, A.P. Young Collection, 'An Industry is Born',
(unpublished autobiography', (n.d.) p. 29.
109 MRC, MSS 242/BT/6/1, A.P. Young Collection, 'The Magneto
Situation', c1921.
110 For the affect that price cutting had on the magneto industry see CRO,
Acc 11071/1, ML Magneto Minute Book 1915-1925, 16 August 1923. Also
see chapter 3 on the changing structure of the magneto sector of the
component industry.
1 11 See chapter 3.
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clear that the amalgamation of the two firms was not conducted
on an equal basis. The collapse of the Association of British
Chain Manufacturers in 1923 had an adverse affect on Renold
Chain's profits. Without the protection of the association and in
order to retain its customers, Renold was forced into some
drastic price cutting to compete with Coventry Chain who
consistently recorded higher net profits between 1923 to 1930.
Table 6.4 shows the net profits of both Renold Chain and
Coventry Chain between 1922-1932.
Table 6.4
The Net Profits/Losses of Renold Chain and Coventry Chain
1922-1932
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Source:	 MCL,	 Acc	 M501/657.41/CC922/3,	 Coventry	 Chain	 Annual
Accounts	 1922-1932; Acc M501/657.41/HR903/1, 	 Renold Chain Annual
Accounts 1922-1932.
The table shows the extent to which Renold relied on the
association, since after its demise in 1923, net profits fell
rapidly recording a loss of nearly £10,000 in 1925. By contrast,
Coventry Chain's close relationship with Daimler ensured that
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profits did not drop below £40,000 prior to the take-over, and
reached over £.100,000 in 1928. The table also reveals that
RenoId was making very little progress in displacing Coventry
Chain's dominant position in the chain making sector. By the
late 1920s, Charles RenoId the Managing Director of Renold and
the architect of the take-over, had reached the conclusion that
Renold's bargaining position with car assemblers could only be
enhanced if RenoId and Coventry were amalgamated. Charles
Goff disclosed in a stormy AGM in 1932, that Renold had
approached Coventry Chain three years earlier with a threat of
instigating a price cutting war if the Coventry firm did not agree
to a merger:
When the amalgamation negotiations started the Managing
Director [Charles RenoId] thoroughly frightened Mr
Kendrick [Coventry's Chairman].. .by saying he was going
to reduce the prices of chains. That was a big bluff, and he
could not afford to do it. The Renold Company was head
over heels in debt.
Indeed, at this point RenoId was in debt to the bank for over
£100,000. In the same meeting a former Coventry Chain
director, A. Whitehouse complained that the Coventry Chain
shareholders had 'made a present of Coventry Chain's assets to
Hans RenoId' and that they now had 'no more control in the
affairs of the combine than the man on the moon'. Whitehouse
went on to explain that the 'primary products have been
transferred to Manchester and a large part of the Coventry works
is shut down'."2 Renold's new found position as the dominant
producer of chains on the British market did enhance its
112 MCL, M501/HR 650.021/930/1, Personal Papers of Charles Renold,
'The RenoId and Coventry Chain Co Ltd. Verbatim Report of the Annual
Meeting of Shareholders, held at the RenoId Works, Didsbury Manchester,
Thursday 17 November 1932.
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position with car assemblers which, in turn, led to a greater
stanardization of chains after 1930. By 1934, the variety of
products produced at Coventry had decreased from thirteen to
six different products, whilst the number of different chains the
company (including Manchester) produced was reduced from
2,764 to 622.113
One strategy employed by the electrical branch of the
component industry to reduce the bargaining power of car
assemblers, was the creation of 'manufacturing rings'. Here, the
large component manufacturers attempted to publish price lists
that undercut smaller firms outside of the association.
Moreover, firms also engaged in product demarcation which, in
effect, enabled large firms to possess a manufacturing monopoly
over certain products. The component manufacturers' justified
their attempts to attain a monopoly position in their staple
product by claiming that it would increase the standardization of
components. The large battery maker Chloride declared that 'the
United Kingdom battery industry needed "rationalisation"_
between the wars, and that by its acquisitions of other
businesses it was, in effect, taking the initiative in this respect
and making the company "the nucleus of that rationalisation". 114
Despite Lucas' assertion that it had never been their policy to
'drive out competitors by making and selling cheap and inferior
goods' but instead 'to confine competitors to the part of the
business which we did not desire to hold', rivals saw Lucas'
113 MCL, M501/650.21/R&CC931/1, C. Renold, Rationalization of the
Management of Companies Under a Merger, (c1934), Appendix VI.
House of Commons, Monopolies Commission Report on the Supply of
Electrical Equipment for Mechanically Propelled Land Vehicles, 18
December 1963, p. 347.
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involvement in 'The Ring' rather differently. 115
 Eric Starley, a
former Managing Director of Radenite Batteries (formerly Van
Raden), recalled that when intense competition in battery
manufacturing emerged in the 1920s to 1930s, his small business
became the target for the larger manufacturers:
there was a thing called 'The Ring' with all the big
manufacturers like Lucas and Chloride. ..in the early
thirties they all got together to make cheaper batteries
under peculiar names... such as Pearl and Sapphire and was
obviously done to undercut the smaller manufacturers.. .we
just carried on producing our quality batteries.I16
Certainly, the electrical branch was one of the few sectors of
the component industry which experienced any success in
product demarcation and monopoly markets since, by the 1920s,
the sector was dominated by large firms, such as Lucas, Smith
and Sons, and Chloride. However, in a report on the major car
component firms, the Monopolies Commission noted that the
dominant stance of the car assemblers in relation to the size of
orders and standardization of components still prevailed. It
concluded that Chloride 'does not appear immediately to have
employed its market strength to develop the large scale
production of standard products. Like Lucas, it could not have
made much progress before the war in the direction of
standardisation without the co-operation of the motor
industry'. 117 Indeed, the market dominance of Lucas in the
electrical sector of the component industry did not exempt the
115 House of Commons, Monopolies Commission Report on the Supply of
Electrical Equipment for Mechanically Propelled Land Vehicles, 18
December 1963, p. 54.
116 Taped interview with Eric Starley.
117 House of Commons, Monopolies Commission Report on the Supply of
Electrical Equipment for Mechanically Propelled Land Vehicles, 18
December 1963, p. 347.
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firm from having to produce fairly small runs of non-
standardized designs. In a speech to the Lucas A.G.M in 1930,
Oliver Lucas outlined the difficulties that car component firms
had in standardizing products.
One of the biggest difficulties on the manufacturing side
has been the further increase in the number of models and
patterns we have to produce. It is unfortunate that this
should be necessary. It is a definite handicap in fighting
American large production. Instead of being able to keep
out machines steadily at work, we have to stop them far
too often to change tools...
Lucas, concluded by revealing the extent to which car lamps
were non-standardized. He complained that both the external
and internal components of the lamps had to be unique for each
customer 'to ensure the individuality of his car'. 118 Thus, even
the bargaining power of these major electrical firms was not
enough to overcome the institutional rigidity of the car
assemblers demand.
Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the factors which determined the
output, technological implementation and the extent of product
standardization in the Coventry car component industry. The
research has demonstrated that short run factors, such as the
origin of a component firm and the importance of the First
World War did have a bearing on a firm's ability to produce long
runs of components using the latest technology. Unlike firms
with a traditional background, firms conversant with the cycle
and munitions trades smoothly switched their repetitive
production techniques to the car component industry. The First
118 The Times, 30 October 1930, p. 23.
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World War, however, had mixed fortunes for component firms,
as the implementation of new technology hinged on whether they
were able to continue to manufacture their pre-war product.
Post-war conversion, for many firms, proved difficult since the
new plant was of little use in domestic production. Whilst these
were short term factors, the chapter has identified an
institutional rigidity within the motor industry which car
component firms had difficulty in surmounting. The demands of
car assemblers often dictated the supply firms' output,
implementation of technology, stock levels and the extent of
product standardization. Moreover, the assembler's powerful
position in the relationship with their suppliers was not
restricted to small suppliers but also large firms with near
monopoly status. The highly competitive structure of the
industry (analysed in chapter 3) ensured that switching costs
were low throughout the interwar period, a characteristic that
affected both large and small firms alike. Thus the car
component industry's trade associations and combines were to
achieve little success when it mattered, in times of economic
depression. Once this evidence is taken into account, it is clear
that the Coventry car component industry was not 'inherently
inefficient', but simply responded to the demands placed upon it
by the car assemblers, who more often than not required short
runs of non-standardized components. This institutional rigidity
within the motor industry was highly significant in shaping the
car component industry. The following chapter will investigate
the origins of this institutional rigidity by analysing the
relationship between the car assemblers and car component
makers and will raise the question of why backward integration
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was not extensively adopted in the British motor industry
between 1895-1939.
Chapter 7
Backward Integration in the British Motor
Industry: The Experience of Coventry Car
Component Firms 1895-1939
The 'decline' of the British economy has often been linked
with the failure of manufacturing firms to integrate vertically
the productive process. Indeed, both Chandler and Lazonick
view Britain's failure to adopt the American model of business
organisation with its emphasis on vertical integration, as a
major factor in Britain's economic decline. Certainly, the low
levels of integration in Britain's motor industry was in stark
contrast to the American automobile industry. Thus, throughout
the interwar period, whilst British car firms purchased between
65-80 per cent of components from external suppliers, American
auto firms bought only between 25-30 per cent of components
from specialist suppliers. 1 This chapter will analyse the origins
and development of the supply relationship between car
assemblers and car component makers between 1895-1939. In
analysing the relationship between car assemblers and car
component makers, attention will be focused on the production
strategies employed by assemblers, the significance of research,
development and re-tooling costs, and the credit arrangements
between buyers and suppliers. However, this investigation will
I G. Maxcy and A. Silberton, The Motor Industry, (1959), p. 27, R.N.
Langlois and P.L. Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration: The
Lessons from the American Automobile Industry', Journal of Economic
History, 49, (1989), pp. 368-9.
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be set against the major structural changes in the motor industry
and the development of the domestic car market in Britain in a
bid to explain why car assemblers continued to draw extensively
from the component industry.
The Years of Transition 1895-1908
The British motor industry between 1895-1908 was
characterised by the high number of firms entering and leaving
the car industry. Indeed, the transitionary nature of the industry
is demonstrated when it is considered that of the 221 car firms
that were founded in Britain between 1901-1905, at least • 112
had failed between 1906-1910. 2 Table 7.1 shows that between
1898-1906, the output of cars in Britain was erratic and small,
and consequently, the demand for specialist component
producers was low.
Table 7.1
AvDroximate Out ut of Cars 1900-1905
Firm 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905
Albion 1 21 35 33 65 128
Argyll - 25 60 100 300
A ustin - - - - -
Daimler 150 - - 250 - -
Humber - - - - - 1,000
Napier ._ - - - 299
Lanchester 8 50 75 -
Sunbeam - - 100 161
Swift - 24 - -
Vauxhall - - - 43 76 -
Wolseley - - - 450
Total 151 54 169 501 541 2,038
Source: S.B. Saul, 'The Motor Industry in Britain to 1914', Business
History 5 , 1962, p. 25.
2 S.B. Saul, 'The Motor Industry in Britain to 1914', Business History, 5,
1962, p. 23.
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The low levels of car production between 1895-1908 encouraged
many car assemblers to produce the whole car themselves. One
observer during this period noted that 'in England there are a
few factories that buy complete engines from one or two firms,
but for the most part even the smallest shop tries to make its
own parts.' 3 For example, in 1924, a journalist remembered that
the first Sunbeam Car had been produced entirely by one
manufacturer.
It is gratifying to recall that the power plant of the first
Sunbeam car was built throughout by John Marston Ltd in
1899. The parts were cast locally and bored by that parent
enterprise which built the radiator. Even the spark plugs
used were made by the firm. Which car builder in the
world to-day makes his own sparking plugs?4
Likewise, when the Rover Company belatedly entered into car
production it produced a variety of components including
carburettors, spark plugs, clutches, gears and lubricators. 5 The
car makers' attempt to produce the whole car was not limited to
large car manufacturing concerns. Small firms, such as Payne
and Bates, a Coventry car producer at the turn of the century,
possessed a factory complete with a drawing office, pattern
shop, foundry, machine shop, fitting and test shop, paint shop
and show room. 6 	Indeed, during the formative years of the
3 A.E. Berriman, The Materials of Motor Car Production, (London,
1912), 24.
4 The Sunbeam Motor Company, The History and Development of the
Sunbeam Car 1899-1924, (Wolverhampton, 1924), P. 17.
5 University of Warwick, Modern Record Centre (hereafter MRC), MSS
226/R0/1/1/2, 21 March 1906.
6 London University, Pollitt Papers, Book 1, 8/108, Letter from F.S Payne
to Pollitt 25 February 1946.
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motor industry, car manufacturers took great pride in
proclaiming that they had designed and produced most of the
vehicle themselves. In 1908, an observer commented on the
prevailing attitudes of the motor manufacturers:
All the larger firms show a disposition to adopt the motto:
'direct from the raw materials to the motorist: no middle
man: no sub-contracting: no intermediate profits'. They
make - with the exception of the ignition coils and
pneumatics - the whole car under one factory roof.7
The car firms' strategy of attempting to produce the whole car
was not only intended to cut out the middle man, but was also
used for marketing purposes. In a market which was becoming
increasingly competitive due to a large influx of motor
manufacturers entering the trade, it became important for a firm
to stamp its own individuality on its cars. The practice of
introducing variety and individuality onto small runs of cars was
made easier when the manufacturer produced most of the car
its
However, after this experimental stage of the motor industry
had subsided, the lack of a supply sector became a recognised
problem. Contemporaries such as Frederick Lanchester, one of
the pioneering engineers of the late nineteenth century motor
industry, recalled that:
the difficulties of management were very great partly
owing to the fact that no ancillary trades had been
developed, and we had to do everything ourselves, chassis,
7 Anon, Motors and Motoring, (1908), p. 84.
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magneto, wheels, body work, etc., everything except the
tyres.8
Consequently, during this transitionary stage, the few firms
which supplied important components, such as engines and
chassis, were invariably motor car manufacturers themselves.
The larger car manufacturing concerns did not suffer from a
shortage of capital and could therefore afford the expensive
experimental costs. In 1901 W.H. Thomas, the manager of the
Motor Manufacturing Company, outlined the importance of car
manufacturers in supplying components to smaller firms.
Some of the principal cycle firms who started in the motor
business by making their own motors have since dropped
the engine making finding it cheaper and more satisfactory
to purchase motors already made and fit them into their
own frames. Altogether we supply something like 36 firms
with motors alone to be fitted to various cars of their own
construction.9
However, the most prominent component supplier during this
period was Daimler. Prior to the First World war, Daimler
enjoyed a close relationship with Rover, supplying the firm with
variety of miscellaneous components and, later, whole engines.m
In 1911, Daimler also provided the Deasy Motor Company with
sets of engines after it had repeatedly failed to produce its own
engine. Significantly, when supplying other companies, Daimler
imposed some strict demands within the agreements. The
purchasing company had to agree not to buy engines from other
8 D.R. Litlewood, 'The Location of the British Car Industry 1888-1940',
(unpublished MA thesis, University of Leicester, 1962), p. 14.
9 Coventry Warwickshire Collection (hereafter CWC), A. Lowe, 'City of
Coventry', (1901-02), 2-4.
I° R. Whipp and P. Clarke, Innovation and the Auto Industry, 1986, p. 61.
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suppliers and, secondly, Daimler insisted on a deposit of 5 per
cent of the total value of the order and the full payment in cash
on delivery of the products.n
However, while the manufacture of components lay in the
hands of the car makers, the majority of smaller firms still
found it uneconomic to buy supplies from outside sources. The
car producers' demand of cash on delivery, caused severe cash
flow problems for small car makers. Two small firms which
pioneered the concept of buying components were Climax and
Sturmey Motors. Sturmey Motors which was established in
1903, bought bodies from Hollick and Pratt and engines from
Willans and Robinson from Rugby. However, without the
extensive in-house production facilities, the firm was unable to
survive the post war re-structuring of the motor trade. 12 A
similar fate was to await Climax which was established in 1904.
On the concern's formation, the manager of Lloyds Bank noted
that 'they are buying cars from a French company and in some
cases are purchasing the chassis from E.J. West.. .1 should think
they have a reasonable probability of doing well." 3 Despite the
bank manager's optimistic assessment of Climax's unusual
production methods, the firm lasted only three more years before
entering into liquidation."
11 MRC, Mss 2261R011/1/3 Rover Minute Book 1909-1917, 28 November
1910; Coventry Record Office (hereafter CRO), Acc 1060/121/1 Contract
between Daimler and Deasy 18 September 1911.
12 Lloyds Bank Archive (hereafter LBA) B379a/13, 22 July 1903.
13 LBA, B379a/ 14, 23 December 1904.
14 LBA, B379a/16, 20 September 1907. Morris of Oxford was the first
concern to buy extensively from component suppliers. However, Morris
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The Turning Point: The Car Makers' Use of the
Component Sector 1908-1914
The turning point in the car manufacturers' use of component
suppliers occurred between 1908-1914. It was during this period
that car assemblers, such as Morris, Singer, Standard, Calcott
Bros and Humber, began producing new light cars designed for
the more affluent middle class. These cars, which were
produced in larger batches than previous designs, were miniature
versions of the larger prototypes but with an engine capacity
limited to 1500 c.c. 15 Although the extant census data does not
distinguish between private and commercial vehicles, Table 7.2
does demonstrate effectively the concerted increase in
production which followed the erratic and small totals achieved
during the formative years of the motor industry. The increase
in car production together with the depression in the cycle
industry encouraged a number of cycle firms to enter the car
component trade. Consequently, the relatively high influx of
new entrants during this period allowed the car producers a
greater selection of concerns dealing in supplies. Although
most firms did not follow Climax and Sturmey by attempting to
build cars entirely through the assembly of components, firms
increasingly avoided the practice of producing a whole car from
raw materials since a great
began production in 1912 by which time there was a large number of
component firms.
15 D. Thorns and T.Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry in Coventry since
the 1890s,(1985), p. 63.
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Table 7.2
The Out ut of Vehicles in Britain 1908-1913
Year Total Number of Vehicles
1908 10,500
1909 11,000
1910 14,000
1911 19,000
1912 23,200
1913 34,000
Source: PEP Engineering Report, Motor Vehicles, 1950 p. 10
deal of capital was tied up in component stock. Consequently,
along with an increase in the number of car component firms
there occurred an increase in the import of foreign car
components. Table 7.3 shows that whilst the import of cars fell
between 1907-1909, the purchase of foreign car components
increased.
Table 7.3
Figures Issued by the Board of Trade: Value of Import of Cars
and Components 1907-1909 Ps .
Year Cars Components Total
1907 1,675,224 1,935,602 3,610,826
1908 1,203,708 2,152,446 3,356,154
1909 900,626 2,346,136 3,246,762
Source: The Times, 17 November 1909, p. 8.
In 1908, The Times remarked that although the import of
components showed an increase it was 'directly due to the
British assembling of parts into cars, which cars when finished
pose as British-made. Although not very flattering, nevertheless
it is more satisfactory than importing whole cars'. 16 The
constantly changing design of cars and the unstable market
conditions of the Edwardian period caused immense problems
16 The Times, 17 November 1909, p. 8.
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for car producers which further encouraged firms to experiment
with external economies. r In 1901, Daimler reported that over
£48,000 of their capital was tied up in stock which 'consisted
almost entirely of finished parts'. 18 Indeed, by 1908, Damiler
was fitting complete electrical lighting sets to their cars which
had been wholly purchased from outside suppliers.'9
The car makers' decision to purchase or make components
seems to have been determined by the type of product required.
Components which did not demand large research and
development costs continued to be produced by the car
manufacturer. For example in 1912, Standard Motor Company
still found it more economic to produce its own hood and side
screen despite receiving a tender from the Rotax Hood and
Sidescreen Company. Mr Budge, the manager, found their quote
of £10/10 per set 'unfavourable' since he calculated that after
fitting costs, the total of Rotax's estimate per set, was £3 more
than Standard's price for the same article. 20 However, from 1908
onwards, some of the most frequently bought out components
were engines (and engine components), electrical equipment,
bodies, wheels and tyres. Significantly, all of these products
required fairly high research and development costs, a burden
the car assemblers were keen to pass on. The change in
17 W. Lewchu k, 'The Return to Capital in the British Motor Vehicle
Industry 1896-1939, Business History, 27, (1985), P. 21.
CRO, Acc 606, Daffern and Stephenson, Daimler Balance sheet 1901.
19 Coventry Standard, 4 January 1952, p.4.
20 MRC, MSS 226/ST/1/2/1 Standard Motor Company Minute Book, 2 July
1912.
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production policy is captured by the fortunes of the Deasy Motor
Company. Formed in 1906, the concern bought the former Iden
Motor Company factory in Parkside and invested over £700 on
new body department. The intentions of Captain Deasy were
clear, when in the same year he announced that:
A separate department for the manufacture of bodies is
being established. This will enable the company to deliver
cars complete in every way, thus saving much time to
customers and expense to the company. 21
Captain Deasy's optimism was not well founded as after the 1906
Olympian Motor Show only eleven cars were sold. It was also
reported that the eleven cars had developed serious faults, the
most serious of which were defective breaks and a weak back
axle. 22
 Clearly, Deasy did not possess the expertise, and the
research and development capital required successfully to
produce a whole car. The change in production strategy was
recorded by a former Deasy Motor Company employee who
remembered that in 1909:
the works were producing not only every portion of the
car, but the carriage bodies as well. Naturally, it took
some time to thoroughly investigate the position before we
could grasp the advantages of this system... we decided to
discontinue the production of carriage bodies as a very
heavy loss had undoubtedly taken place in this
department...23
While bodies represented the most expensive component to
produce, the research and testing of engines also proved
21 CRO, Acc 1060/1/1/1-4, Deasy Minute Book 1906-1910, 28 May 1906.
22 CRO, Acc 1060/1/1/1-4 Deasy MB 1906-1910, 1 December 1906.
23 CRO, Acc 1060/1/1/1-4, Deasy Minute Book 1906-1910, 20 June 1910,
Armstrong Siddeley Motors, The Evening and the Morning, 1956, 21.
252
extremely costly. By 1910, Deasy was assembling a large
proportion of the car by purchasing the body and chassis from
Rover and the engines from White and Poppe and Daimler.24
Likewise, research and development costs into the early
carburettor were also particularly high. During 1909-1910, after
Standard's own carburettor failed, the firm abandoned
experimentation into this area by purchasing no less than seven
different units in a bid to find a reliable and low-cost
carburettor. 25 By 1914, it had become clear that the component
industry was an integral sector of the motor industry since
Standard, Deasy and Rover were purchasing engines, bodies,
electrical equipment, wheels and tyres from outside suppliers.26
The assembler who transferred research and development costs
to component makers also benefited from relatively low
switching costs. Despite increasing car production, assemblers
continued to order small runs of components from specialist
producers to enable them to switch to more competitive rivals
should they emerge. Moreover, some branches of the component
trade, such as electrical equipment, had only just progressed
from the experimental stage of manufacture. Consequently, by
employing the strategy of ordering short runs of components, the
assembler was protected from purchasing large quantities of
24 CRO, Acc 1060/1/1/1-4, Deasy MB 1906-1910, 20 June 1910.
25 MRC, MSS 226/ST/1/2/1 Standard MB, 5 January, 2 February, 6 April,
11 May, 21 September, 19 October 1909, 6 July, 25 August 1910.
26 CRO, Acc 1060/1/1/1-4, Deasy MB 1906-1910, 15 March 1907, 20 June
1910, MRC, MSS 226/R0/1/1/3, Rover Minute Book 1909-1917, 21 March
1910.
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faulty stock. 27
 Standard, a company which perhaps most relied
on bought out components, learned this lesson from bitter
experience after they ordered large sets of steering components
in 1909. The board minutes record that the production of the
Standard's 4 Cylinder car was severely delayed due to:
Messrs Baker being behind with the steering parts. The
order being given to them was condemned, especially after
our previous experiences. Messrs Dover making a mistake
with the steering wheels was also brought before the Board
- another detail which threw us back.28
From this point onwards, Standard was careful not to commit
itself to one supplier. For example, between 1909-1912, the
Standard Motor Company, in a bid to purchase cheap and
reliable magnetos, ordered short runs of components from Hirst
Magneto, Bosch (on two separate occasions), Simms Magneto,
DU Magneto, and Elseman Magnetos. 29 Low switching costs also
enabled assemblers to purchase supplies from rival component
companies at very short notice, a strategy which could be-
financially costly for suppliers. In 1907, Johnston, Hurley and
Martin was left with fifteen unwanted engines worth over £1,200
after a customer switched suppliers. A more serious loss was
incurred by White and Poppe, which in 1914, was left with
27 For a short period, Rover started making some of its components again
after receiving faulty supplies of small fittings, see MRC, MSS
226/R0/1/1/2, 29 January 1907.
28 MRC, MSS 266/ST/1/2// Standard MB, 23 February 1909.
29 MRC, MSS 266/ST/1/2/1 Standard MB, 5 January, 6 April, 13 July, 10
October 1909, 11 October 1910, 10 October 1911, 18 June 1912.
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£15,000 worth of engines after Morris decided to import cheaper
American engines."
The assembler's policy of ordering short runs of components
from different suppliers helped shape the structure of the
Coventry motor industry in two major areas. First, the number
of component firms increased between 1908-1914, aided by the
fact that the assemblers' demand for only small runs of supplies
meant entry barriers for component firms were relatively low.3i
Second, with the increase in small scale firms, the assemblers
were able to take a powerful position in the buyer and supplier
relationship. 32 The car producers' determination to transfer their
production costs to component suppliers was assisted also by the
early structure and development of Coventry's economy. Many
suppliers were small units of production which had diversified
into the motor industry after suffering from the depression in
the cycle industry. Thus by 1905, with the rapid decline of the
cycle industry, car assemblers held the upper hand in
negotiating price, delivery and payment arrangements, a
situation which was to continue through the interwar period.
Perhaps the critical advantage that car manufacturers drew
from their relationship with suppliers, was their demand that
component suppliers offer substantial credit after purchasing
materials. While this practice, which had become an established
30 LBA, B379a/18, 24 March 1909, B379a/21, 17 October 1914.
31 See chapter three.
32 M. Porter, Competitive Strategy. Techniques for Analyzing Industries
and Competitors, (New York, 1980), p. 6, 10.
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custom by 1914, saved some car manufacturers from almost
certain extinction, it bought many component suppliers to the
brink of bankruptcy. Indeed, it was during this period that mis-
trust grew between assemblers and component makers which
stemmed directly from this 'established custom'. In 1903, F.H.
Ragg, the Coventry Lloyds Bank manager, warned E.J. Hardy, a
newcomer to the car component industry, 'to be careful and not
to trust the motor companies or get too much on his books.'33
However, despite its relatively small size, competition within
the Coventry component industry was fierce, and consequently
even fairly large concerns were obliged to offer generous
contracts and credit terms to car producers. Even White and
Poppe, which was the largest engine and carburettor producers
in Coventry found it imperative to grant credit in order to
acquire contracts. At an early stage in the development motor
industry, White and Poppe attempted to reduce the amount of
credit offered to their customers. When in 1906 Singer
requested £17,000 worth of engines, White and Poppe demanded
that Singer pay a deposit of £3,000 and accept the order on a
weekly basis. White was reluctant to accept such a large
contract without any guarantees and claimed that he 'could not
afford to run any risk, as if the deliveries were not taken it
would lock up so much money in aluminium and brass'. White
and Poppe's bid to limit credit failed since Singer immediately
33 LBA, B379a/13, 29 May 1903.
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reduced their orders from £17,000 to £3,000. 34 Thus in 1912,
White and Poppe had little option but to grant Singer interest
credit on goods worth more than £8,000 after the firm fell ten
weeks behind in its weekly payments. Consequently, despite a
full order book, White and Poppe requested constantly extended
limits to their overdraft since their capital was tied up in stock
and credit. The cash flow problems were so severe that White
and Poppe was only saved from bankruptcy after large orders for
munitions work were placed. 35 Another smaller engine firm,
Cromwell Engineering, not only felt obliged to offer good credit
terms but also manufactured products 'when required'. Once
again F.H. Ragg highlighted the firm's predicament in the Lloyds
daily journals when he noted that:
The Rex owe £20 supplied in January for special pumps
suitable only to themselves, and they have a similar order
nearly finished. On the contract it was stated 'for delivery
when required', and they are obliged to stand out of
money, as the Rex are very quiet.36
The problems of granting credit and the accumulation of stock
were not unique to the engine producers but applied throughout
the component industry. In 1912, Charlesworth Bodies was
forced to borrow from its bank after Singer delayed cash
payments. 37 Charlesworth's financial situation was not helped by
the great variation of bodies that manufacturers demanded. For
example, in 1908 Charlesworth, which by this time was
34 LBA, B379a/15, 30 November 1906.
35 Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, 72-73
36 LBA, B379a/17, 11 June 1908.
37 Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, 51.
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supplying Riley, Rover, and Singer, exhibited twenty different
bodies at the Olympian Motor Show.38
Another strategy which car manufacturers employed to delay
cash transactions was the payment of credit bills, a system
which was deeply unpopular among component makers. The car
manufacturers' policy of paying bills became particularly
common during times of recession in the motor industry. During
the motor industry recession of 1907-1908, Doherty Motor
Accessories refused a contract with Rover despite trade being
'very quiet' as Rover would only pay in £300 bills. Doherty,
which with capital of only £450, was constantly short of working
capital, declared to Rover that it 'would be better off without
it'. However, in many cases car producers altered payment
arrangements after contracts had been agreed. The Lloyds Bank
Manager of Coventry reported that, in November 1910, Rover's
cash flow problems had rebounded on Doherty: 'Mr Fenton [the
works manager] says that the Rover Company are pressing him to
take bills for his monthly account from now to February, when
they will resume cash payments again.' 40 In 1908 the engine
makers, Johnston Hurley and Martin found itself in a similar
situation with the Calthorpe Motor Company of Birmingham
which it was 'heavily reliant on'. By paying in the form of bills,
Calthorpe avoided the regular cash payments of £260 that had
been agreed upon, and in effect enjoyed long periods of interest
38 Autocar, 31 October 1908.
39 LBA, B379a117, 18 December 1908.
LBA, B379/19, 28 November 1910.
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free credit. A furious Hurley stated that he 'would never accept
another bill' and that 'he would not be dictated to' by Clathorpe.
However, Hurley continued to accept payment by bills and
Calthorpe continued to break payment agreements at will.41
The firm which suffered most at the hands of the car
manufacturers' credit arrangements was the electrical
components producer Van Raden. By 1902, Van Raden had
acquired contracts with Daimler, the Motor Manufacturer
Company and Wolseley by offering generous credit terms. A
concerned bank manger from Lloyds reported in his journal that
'he [Van Raden] was getting too much on his books, but he says
that it is good. He is obliged to give credit or he loses orders'.42
This method of attracting business caused firms like Van Raden,
which was in a competitive branch of the component trade, acute
financial problems. Van Raden's rivals in the electrical sector
included Lucas of Birmingham, Smith and Sons, Hirst Magnetos,
both of London and Bosch of Germany. Thus, with this intense
competition, Van Raden was forced into increasing the
generosity of his credit terms. By 1908, Van Raden was
providing £1,000 worth of interest free credit to car
manufacturers and consequently extended its bank overdraft to
£1,500 to pay for its own debts. 43 In the same year, Lloyds bank
refused Van Raden any further extensions to their limit and
warned the owner, Vaughan Robinson, that unless the concern
41 LBA, B379a/17, 12 December 1908.
42 LBA, B 379a/12, 8 September 1902.
43 LBA, B 379a/17 21 August 1908.
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could retrieve their outstanding payments, then financing the
firm would be like 'putting water down a drain'. Indeed, the
bank manager told Robinson in no uncertain terms that he had
'never seen such losses.. .and if it was not for the old connection
I should demand the overdraft'. 44 By 1912, the same bank
manager, was recommending that Robinson wind up the business
since it was 'not likely to go on beyond twelve .months'. 45 In
fact, Van Raden survived under the control of the Robinson
family until 1918 when it was sold, complete with large sets of
outdated stock, to Rankin and Starley, two men in the battery
business from London.46
The dominance that car manufacturers exerted over component
firms did not stop at the fiscal advantages gained from
contracts. By 1914, the links between some manufacturers and
component firms became extremely close. Although vertical
integration was not a common occurrence before the First World
War, a few significant car producers took over component firms
in order to guarantee supplies. In 1907, Rover purchased its
body supplier Hawkins and Peake for £.600. Rover asserted that
the purchase would in the short term 'protect the supply of car
bodies' and in the long term the firm predicted that 'great
savings can be effected'. 47 The same objectives lay behind
Deasy's purchase of the London based Burlington Carriage
44 Ibid, 27 January 1908.
45 LBA, B 379a/20, 27 December 1912.
46 Taped interview with Mr Eric Starley, 2 October 1992.
47 MRC, MSS 226/R0/1/1/2, Rover Minute Book 22 November 1906 and
29 January 1907.
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Company in 1912. Prior to this transaction, Deasy's bodies had
been supplied by Rover, and consequently, Deasy was keen to
place less reliance on a major competitor for the supply of
coach work. 48 The personal friendship between Percy Martin of
Daimler and Alick Hill of Coventry Chain may have influenced
the close relationship between these two firms. Daimler, which
had been Coventry Chain's largest customer, invested £30,000 in
its chain and nut and bolt suppliers after Chain was financially
reconstructed in 1907. In effect, Daimler had acquired a
considerable degree of control over its suppliers since part of
the deal allowed Daimler to appoint two directors on Coventry
Chain's Board.'"
Besides lowering the cost of components and protecting
supplies, car manufacturers often invested in component makers
to guarantee quantity levels. From 1907, Daimler steadily
increased its investment in Albion Drop Forging to enable the
supplier to increase their output s° By 1912, Albion had been
awarded Daimler's entire drop forging work worth between
£20,000 and £30,000 per year. However, Albion had to rely on a
loan from Daimler of £6,000 to finance the £10,000 worth of
buildings and plant required to fulfil the contract s ' Despite the
100 per cent profit on ordinary capital Albion enjoyed in 1912,
48 CRO, 1060/1/1-4, Siddeley-Deasy MB, 30 June 1913.
49 Midland Bank Archive (hereafter MBA), 358/5 , 18 April 1907.
50 LBA, B379a/16, 6 February 1907.
51 LBA, B 379a/20 2 June 1912.
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the Lloyds bank manager warned of the dangers of placing too
much reliance on one car firm:
At the present time the Daimler take about half their
output and this will make three quarters. There is a
demand for similar goods from other firms. I told him [Mr
Haynes, the chairman] it was a large account to do with
one firm.52
However, with the financial leverage that Daimler now held in
the firm, it is doubtful whether Albion had any realistic
alternative other than to comply with Daimler's increasing
production demands.
Despite the temptations of component firms to accept external
finance, that would boost their order books, most suppliers prior
to the First World War attempted to maintain a degree of
independence. As early as 1902, Doherty reported to the bank
manager that it had resisted a take-over bid by an anonymous
concern in the motor industry. 53 In 1906, Van Raden eventually
turned down a joint offer by two of its largest customers,
Wolseley and Argyle of investing £10,000 in the firm. Although
this would have increased the concern's capital to £20,000, the
bank manager warned them that it 'Practically meant giving the
two companies named the power, and that would not do any
good.	 It is a good business if they will work within their
capital'. 54	Another firm keen to protect its independence was
White and Poppe.	 Although it continually suffered from a
52 Ibid, 16 September 1912.
53 LBA, B 379a112, 9 November 1902.
54 LBA, B 379a/ 15, 30 June 1906.
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shortage of capital due to the enforced credit arrangements, in
1909, White and Poppe turned down an offer from the Deasy
Motor Company of £10,000 worth of capital in ordinary shares.
White and Poppe could not agree to Deasy's demand of a 10 per
cent reduction in engine prices and a request to be given
preferential treatment in production and delivery. 55
 The
vulnerable position of component firms to take-over bids by car
manufacturers is demonstrated by the fortunes of Johnston,
Hurley and Martin (JHM). In 1910, JHM's largest customer,
Calthorpe Motors, attempted to take-over the firm by methods
which the Lloyds bank manger described as a 'shabby trick'.56
Mr Hands of Calthorpe, who was a debenture holder in JHM, let
his monthly interest accumulate and then, during a period in
which Calthorpe had delayed payment of its monthly account,
Hands put in a claim for his debenture interest. A concerned
Hurley reported to his bank that:
they would have been a good deal better without the
Calthorpe Company and that Hands, the solicitor and the
auditor leagued together, thinking that they could not pay
the debenture, and the concern would be in Hands' power
at his own price...57
This failed take-over bid ensured that JHM became extremely
cautious in its dealings with Calthorpe, only supplying the firm
55 LBA, B 379a/18, 6 December 1909.
56 LBA, B 379a/19, 29 September 1910.
57 Ibid, 11 October 1910.
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with one engine per week and never allowing more credit than a
£150 per month to accumulate.58
Thus the component firms' interaction with car producers was
more complex than a conventional buyer and seller relationship.
However, between 1895-1914, it is clear that the car assemblers
emerged as the dominant force in their relationship with
component firms. The business practices forged by car
assemblers during this formative period of the motor industry
had become 'established custom' by 1914. Not only did the car
manufacturer use the specialist producer to acquire parts which
they found difficult to make, but also used the component sector
to pass on production costs and obtain interest free credit. The
car component firm's important role in providing financial
assistance to car manufacturers explains why there was little in
the way of vertical integration in the motor industry up to
1914.59
Vertical Dis-integration and the Importance of the
Domestic Car Market, 1918-1939.
During the interwar period the British motor industry made
enormous gains in the production of cars for the domestic
market. In the late 1920s over 75 per cent of car production was
dominated by Austin, Morris and Singer. By the 1930s, these
three companies had been joined by Vauxhall, Rootes and
58 Ibid, 29 May 1911. See also chapter 4 on the sources of finances of
firms.
59 G. Maxcy, 'The Motor Industry', in P.L. Cook (ed), Effects of Mergers,
(1958), p. 353.
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Standard who became volume producers. 60
 However, these
achievements had only occurred after the major assemblers
altered their relationship with suppliers and began ordering a
greater variety of components from external sources. Church
has noted that this strategy:
allowed not only the big spenders, Ford and Vauxhall, to
join Morris and Austin as leaders, but also Standard and
Rootes, firms whose modest resources yet attractive
designs enabled these companies to establish themselves as
serious competitors among the Big Six.
Indeed, during the early 1930s it was estimated that as much as
80 per cent of the average vehicle comprised of bought out
components. 61 Clearly, by 1939, volume production had become
associated with the utilisation of the component sector. This
trend was recognised by Automobile Engineer which stated that
'in modern manufacture the tendency is for the supply of certain
components to pass more and more into the hands of
specialists'. 62 However, although the motor industry made some
impressive strides, the initial push towards volume production
after the First World War ended in failure. Indeed, it took a
restructuring of the motor industry, from the myriad of small
firms towards a concentration of major car producers to achieve
volume production. 63 The following section will examine how
Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, p. 84.
61 R. Church, Herbert Austin. The British Motor Car Industry to 1941,
(1979), p. 135. Langlois and Robertson, 'Explaining Vertical Integration',
p. 368.
62 Automobile Engineer, May 1939, p. 158.
63 For a detailed discussion of the re-structuring of the car industry see
Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Industry, ch 4.
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the re-structuring of the industry affected the relationship
between car assemblers and component suppliers in Coventry
which had been established prior to the First World War.
The British motor industry during the 1920s and 1930s was
unquestionably dominated by company mergers and take-overs.
However unlike the US, this period did not witness widespread
backward integration by car assemblers.	 Nevertheless there
were some notable exceptions. In 1919, White and Poppe
practically left the car component industry after the concern was
bought by the commercial vehicle builders Dennis Brothers of
Guilford. Consequently, the firm concentrated on producing
commercial vehicle engines until Dennis transferred the
business to the south east in 1935. 64 In 1923, Morris acquired
Hollick and Pratt the coach builders, which became a centre
designated for the production of specialist body work, and the
Coventry engine makers Hotchkiss and Cie. Similarly, in the
same year, Morris effectively took control over Doherty Motor
Components after persuading the radiator producer to. open a
factory closer to his Cowley plant. 65 Rover, another important
car concern, also integrated backwards in the production line
during this period. Rover, which had already purchased Midland
Light Bodies (formerly Hawkins and Peake) in 1907, took over
the Nero Engine Company in 1916, with the view of expanding
64 Surrey Record Office, 1463/2/3 Dennis Brother Minute Book 1913-
1920,	 pp. 252-254, 1463/2/5 MB. 1931-1943,
pp.132-133.
65 R.J. Overy, William Morris, Viscount Nuffield, 1976, pp. 19,26.
-
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their productive capacity to manufacture a small car. 66 However,
contrary to Chandler's assumptions, 67 the purchase of a
component firm did not necessarily guarantee supplies as
Daimler discovered to its cost. Daimler, who held substantial
shares in the body firm Fairy and Charles, were forced to
intervene and re-organise production after the coach firm ran
into severe financial difficulties which led to its eventual
closure in 1921. Due to its financial commitment, Daimler was
unable simply to switch suppliers and subsequently took control
of production by removing the indigenous management and
replacing him with Mr Cammack, a Daimler employee. The cost
to Daimler of re-organising production and keeping the works
open to finish its order was approximately £50,000 over the
original price agreed for the bodies.68
The relatively few cases of backward integration or even
heavy investment by assemblers into suppliers was due to two
main factors. First, the financial weakness of many assemblers,
such as Rover, Singer, and Standard, meant assemblers were
anxious to continue to take full advantage of the low switching
costs and generous credit arrangements that were extracted from
the small component firms. Second, and by far the over-riding
factor, was that the assemblers' use of the component sector was
the optimum production strategy with regards to competing in
the domestic car market. Thus in analysing the reasons why
66 MRC, MSS 226/R0/1/1/3, Rover MB 1909-1917, 21 August 1916.
67 A. Chandler, Strategy and Structure, (Cambridge, 1962), p. 116.
68 CRO, 594/143 Daimler Archive, Fairy and Charles file, 31 March 1921.
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British car assemblers' production strategy was so radically
different to their American counterparts, this section will first
explore the continued fiscal advantages of utilising the
component sector and second will examine the importance of the
British car market in determining the car assemblers' production
strategy.
The configuration of the motor industry during the 1920s and
1930s ensured that most car assemblers retained their powerful
position with their small suppliers. In Coventry, where small
component firms continued to numerically dominate the
industry, this was particularly noticeable. The Coventry motor
industry had mirrored the national trend during the 1920s by
experiencing a large number of entrants and exits in both car
assembling and, to a lesser extent, car component firms.
Although, in 1931 there were eleven car producers in Coventry,
forty had entered and left the trade since 1918. Similarly, the
number of car component firms had dropped from seventy four
in 1919 to sixty four by 1936.69
The increase in small component firms during the 1920s and
1930s and the continuation of low switching costs were
exploited to the full by both large and small car assemblers
alike. Thus despite the emergence of large component firms
such as Dunlop, Lucas, and Smith's Motor Accessories, car
assemblers continued to receive supplies from small component
makers. Despite the advantages that large component suppliers
Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, p. 85.
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could offer, such as a rapid production of long runs of
components, many assemblers were more concerned with
securing the cheapest components on the market, and receiving
generous credit terms from their suppliers. Moreover, if a car
assembler was experiencing financial difficulties, not only did
large component firms turn down requests for credit, but they
could also afford to refuse its business altogether. Component
firms working with very small capital could not afford the
luxury of turning down business, despite the risks involved. For
example, Coventry Motor Panels, with capital of just under
£1,000 made a substantial loss of over £3,500 when Swift went
out of business in 1931. The Midland Bank manager in 1932
noted that:
They [Motor Panels] are making arrangements for the
capital to be increased. Last year was disastrous. The
Swift Company let them in for £1,300 and they suffered
severe competition from Sun Ray Metal Pressings.. •70
During the 1920s, a similar loss was experienced by Pistons Ltd
which had a capital of only £500. Gordon Parsons, the son of
the company founder, recalled that 'in the 1920s we were doing
pistons for Bellsize Motors in Manchester.. .they went bust and
my father got a Bellsize car in lieu of debt...we were all happy
because we could go out in it'. This situation did not alter
dramatically for Pistons during the 1930s as, Gordon Parsons
remembered that 'when Lea Francis was in financial trouble the
7O MBA, 358/7, 20 January 1932.
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main suppliers would not supply them so they came to us.'71
Indeed, for many firms, the use of small component firms out
weighed the advantages gained by large suppliers as they could
retain their bargaining power, which was reduced with larger
component firms. Assemblers, would often approach small
component firms with the offer of large contracts, that required
the supplier to purchase more plant.	 Once committed, the
assembler would then demand that the cost of the components be
reduced. Indeed, during the interwar period, Pistons Ltd were
extremely cautious with their dealings with assemblers. Gordon
Parsons noted that his father, Harry, made a conscious effort to
avoid over-committing the company to one assembler:
We had seen what had happened to some of them [the
suppliers].. .people who had dealt with some of the car
companies, they were worried to death about getting paid.
Standard Motor Company was notorious in Coventry for
being a bad payer.. .they put a lot of work out in Coventry.
I remember one firm named Wilkinson, they used to do a
lot of work for Ford.. .he made gears.. .he got taken for a
ride by Fords they wanted thousands and thousands of
gears and he put in plant to make them and they kept
saying that he had to get his price down and so he'd knock
a bit off and so eventually he was working at a loss.72
In some cases even larger supply firms were persuaded to
commit almost its entire production to one car assembler. A
Coventry car firm which diligently followed this strategy was
the Standard Motor Company. Standard, which was one of the
first car concerns to purchase large quantities of components,
71 Taped interview with Gordon Parsons, formerly owner of Pistons Ltd,
16 October 1992.
72 Taped interview with Gordon Parsons, 16 October 1992.
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increased its reliance on the supply sector during the interwar
period. Moreover, by the early 1930s, Standard had moved into
a purpose built factory in Canley, Coventry which was designed
to accommodate the influx of components from external sources.
In 1933, a journalist, after visiting the new factory, noted that it
was designed 'principally for the assembly process, and had
incorporated 'unique' production line techniques. He concluded
by describing the process in which components purchased from
suppliers entered the factory and how stock levels were
constantly monitored:
supplies arriving at the works are charted in the stores
department, a horizontally moving red line indicating
arrival, whilst a moveable vertical indicator records the
consumption. In this way an hourly check on the position
of all supplies is maintained. When the consumption
indicator approaches within a figure of the incoming
supply figure danger signals are posted in the appropriate
columns whilst the executives concerned are warned.73
Another consequence of this production policy was that,
independent component firms began to site factories within
close proximity of Standard's Canley premises. In 1937, the
body manufacturer Fisher and Ludlow agreed to site a factory
next to Standard and work closely with the assembler over
production techniques and totals. However, as the Standard
board minutes revealed, this commitment by Fisher and Ludlow
ensured that the body maker incurred a heavy capital outlay.
they [Fisher and Ludlow] also have the confidence and
courage to come to Canley to construct a factory at very
73 Automobile Engineer, February 1933, p. 45.
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considerable capital expenditure on their part, and
building operations have already commenced. We are
collaborating with them in the construction and plant for
this factory, and it will be laid out and equipped only as a
modern production unit should be.74
Thus, while the structure of the motor industry remained as it
was, this arrangement proved extremely beneficial for Standard,
which, without having to make an investment, had on its door
step a modern well equipped body factory.
Component firms which, on the other hand, had not committed
production to one assembler, were constantly at risk to
assemblers switching suppliers if orders were delayed. The
risks for body makers were particularly high, since the
assembler often demanded that the supplier incur the re-tooling
costs. The re-tooling costs were high as assemblers, during the
1930s, were constantly making many different versions of the
same vehicle in a bid to capture a greater share of the market.
In 1933, the Midland Bank inquired why Coventry Motor and
Sundries had sustained a loss despite good business. The bank
manager reported that:
Mr Grindlay says the loss shown is due to the cost of jigs
and tools for new motor bodies, which during the last 18
months have cost £3,000.. .they are very busy.75
Similarly, the BSA group would only offer Coventry Motor
Panels a contract to produce bodies for Daimler and Lanchester
if the supply firm purchased £1,200 worth of equipment.76
74 MRC, MSS 226 ST/1/3/1 Standard Board Minutes 1923-1970, 10
November 1937.
75 MBA, 358/13, 17 October 1933.
76 MBA, 358/7, 20 June 1934.
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Moreover, the installation of new tools usually lasted between
six to twelve months, a period in which body firms were forced
to reduce productive capacity.77
This strategy of increasing the use of component suppliers and
reducing in-house production costs, was adopted by almost all
car assemblers during the interwar period. For example Austin,
which had always promoted the practice of in-house production,
was spending more than £60,000 a year on subcontracting for
bodywork. Indeed, by 1931, 55 per cent of the net sales value of
Austin's output was derived from outside sources. 78 Even
Daimler, a concern notorious for making many of its own
components, began increasing its intake of external components
in a bid to reduce overhead costs and stocks by £400,000 during
the late 1920s and early 1930s. It was during this period that
Daimler suffered a loss in its market share of the £1,000 range
of cars to Rolls Royce and Bentley, and the £300-£500 market
which Morris had cut into. 79
 Consequently, between 1928-1932,
Daimler reduced its Coventry body shop from over 120,000
square feet to 57,000 square feet. By the early 1930s Daimler
was supplied by over twenty five body firms, five of which were
based in Coventry. go This policy brought the car firm
considerable reductions in production costs, however, the few
bodies still built by Daimler were proving uneconomic. A
77 Automobile Engineer, July 1934, P. 273.
78 Church, Herbert Austin, p. 135.
79 CRO, ACC 594/70, Daimler Car Policy 1936.
80 CRO, ACC 594/70 Daimler factory 1928-1932, ACC 594/143 Daimler
coach suppliers 1930-1935.
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report by the managing director on car policy in 1935 confirmed
the belief that:
our general costs of bought out materials for the chassis.
whether raw or finished, are on a reasonably economic
level. On the other hand the body costs, the chassis
production wages and the total overheads are excessive
beyond the premium that the Daimler and Lanchester cars
can command.81
A small car assembler which also pursued the practice of
purchasing components during the interwar period was Alvis.
Despite experiencing severe problems with suppliers, Alvis,
which was formed in 1919, did not attempt to secure supplies by
purchasing a component maker during the 1920s and 1930s. By
1925, the chairman reported that the shortage of coach work and
the poor quality of the bodies received was having a 'serious
effect upon the company's business'. 82 Although some pressure
was placed on the board to purchase its own body shop from the
firm's founder, T.G. John, the board concluded that despite its
draw backs, the outside suppliers proved more economic.
Indeed, between 1926-1928, low switching costs enabled Alvis
to use three different body builders in a bid to acquire cheap
and good quality bodies. 83 However, the over-riding factor
preventing a takeover, was the initial outlay required, the lack
of any credit facility which would have been extracted from
suppliers, and the high cost of production. In 1932, this matter
was once again discussed by the board.
	 While T.G. John
81 CRO, ACC 985/70 Daimler Report on Car Policy, 9 November 1935.
82 CRO, ACC 985/1/1 Alvis Minute Book 1925-1934, 23 June 1925.
83 Ibid, 18 March 1926, 2 February 1928.
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continued to recommend that Alvis acquire one of the Coventry
body firms which had just gone out of business, the board
pointed out that a much larger output would be required to cover
the £15,000 to £20,000 necessary to purchase a concern.
Moreover, the managing director 'thought that the company was
buying coachwork at competitive prices and that the people who
were making the bodies were not making a profit'.
Consequently, much to John's disappointment, the firm
continued to purchase from outside suppliers. 84 The problems
encountered by Daimler and Alvis does not only provide an
insight into an assembler's (large and small) decision of whether
to make or buy, but also highlights the extremely difficult
circumstances that component firms were working under during
the 1920s.
Clearly, this period of transition caused immense problems for
component firms since they had to balance the needs of a small,
and possibly bankrupt, car firm with the requirements of the
larger car assembler bidding to enter into volume production.
The difficulties for component suppliers during this period were
encapsulated by the activities of Smith's Stamping Company.
Like many component firms, Smith's believed that the 1920s
heralded a great new era for the British motor industry. In an
effort to attract more motor car custom, the firm published a
brochure that was circulated around the motor industry, and for
the first time, secured a stand at the London Motor Show of
84 Ibid, 18 November 1930, 20 January 1932.
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1921. 85 Although Smith's had already secured a large order for
600 sets of components per week from Morris, the stamping firm
wanted to avoid becoming merely a Morris subsidiary. This
strategy met with some success when, in 1921, Smith's won a
large order for car forgings from the Ford Motor Company.88
However, these contracts ensured that Smith's placed a great
deal of commitment in the motor industry, and consequently,
during the 1920s, rushed head long into contracts with smaller
and less stable firms. Between 1921-1929, Smith's received
regular orders from a number of small concerns such as Commer
Cars, Vulcan Motor Company, Alvis, AC Cars, Bellsize Motors,
and Calcott Brothers. Significantly, only Alvis survived as an
independent company after the interwar period. 87
 While Smith's
wanted to avoid becoming over-committed to large concerns
such as Ford - and Morris, the firm faced more serious problems
with the smaller car firms' constant inability to pay for goods
received. Throughout this period all of these small car firms
enjoyed generous credit terms ranging from £1,000 to £2,000
from Smith's. 88 This drain on Smith's capital was compounded
by the reluctance of larger car assemblers to pay their account at
the agreed time. For example, in March 1928, despite several
deputations by Smith's to Standard, the car firm had still not
85 A. Muir, 75 Years of Progress, 1958, p. 56.
86 CRO, ACC 634 Smiths's Stamping Minute Book 1903-1918, 30
November 1921, 28 May 1924.
87 J. Wood, Wheels of Misfortune. The Rise and Fall of the British Motor
Industry, 1988, pp. 71,124.
88 For a typical example see CRO, ACC 634, Smith's Stamping Minute
Book, 28 February 1925.
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paid for goods worth almost £1,500 received in November.89
Inevitably, Smith's post war optimism began to fade rapidly with
the onset of the 1921-1922 recession. As early as 1921, Vulcan
appealed to Smith's for extended credit on supplies already
received as the bank 'had definitely stopped further credit
allowances'. Smith's, realising that it would stand to lose the
whole account if it refused, agreed, on the condition that Vulcan
increase its orders to 75 per cent of its total requirements.90
Although, this may seem a rather reckless request to a firm in
severe financial trouble, it does show the extent of Smith's
commitment to the small vehicle assembler. However,
conversely, once car firms had opened accounts with the
stamping firm, Smith's was reluctant to cease supplying parts to
the customer or to refuse credit arrangements as it would have
forced small firms out of business, a scenario in which Smith's
stood to lose everything. The small car firm's practice of
regularly changing car design to stamp some individuality on to
the model, also put pressure on smaller component firms such as
Smiths. In some instances, assemblers refused to pay for goods
that were no longer required for the new model which had been
ordered and delivered on time. For example in 1925, the Calcott
Company, in a desperate attempt to increase their share of the
light car market, introduced a new high-powered model.
However, in the same year, Calcott experienced a net loss of
89 CRO, Acc 634 Smith's Stamping MB 1918-1927, 28 March 1928.
90 CRO, ACC 634 Smith's Stamping MB 1918-1927, 9 June 1921, 15
September 1921.
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£26,000 and consequently, at first, refused to accept Smith's
delivery for components designed for the older model. The
Smith's company minutes noted that the Calcott Company:
were experiencing considerable difficulty and a great part
of the material owing for was practically obsolete due to a
change of car type and the delivery had been taken under
pressure. Mr Godfrey [Smith's manager] had arranged with
Mr Calcott to take two saloon cars in contra account at a
net price of £425 each.. .the question of further payment
would be raised.91
Unfortunately, Smith's never received the remainder of the bill
as shortly after this meeting, Calcotts entered into liquidation
and was eventually taken over by Singer in 1926.92
Thus far, the evidence has revealed that the relationship
between car assemblers and component makers remained similar
to the pre-war arrangements. This assertion is further supported
once the credit arrangements are examined during the interwar
period. For example, despite Coventry Motor and Sundries
receiving 'some very good contracts' from BSA, Humber,-
Hillman, Riley, and Morris, the Midland bank manager reported
in June 1933 that the:
temporary excess shown is due to the fact that several of
their customers are backward in paying.. .at present they
owe over £4,600 due to them [Coventry Motor and
Sundries] at the end of May.93
A more serious debt was experienced by Coventry Motor
Fittings, which, in 1935, was owed over £13,000 by Standard.
91 CRO, ACC 634 Smith's Stamping MB 1918-1827, 15 November 1925.
92 Thorns and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry, pp. 89-90.
93 MBA, 358/13, 27 June 1933.
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The Midland Bank reported that, although Coventry Motor
Fittings' business 'was increasing', they had only secured a
contract with Standard by allowing the car assembler to
regularly take two months credit on their purchases, which
amounted to over £5,000 a month. Such was the scale of this
credit, that it consumed almost all of Coventry Motor Fittings'
bank overdraft. 94
 Similarly, Carbodies, which by the 1930s had
increased its productive capacity, also experienced similar
problems with assemblers. In 1933 the local Midland Bank
described Carbodies as:
one of the most important motor body factories in the
district whose output is almost exclusively taken up by
Lanchester and Daimler. The factory occupies one of the
best sites in Coventry.. .the buildings are new, equipped
with modern machinery and covers 3 acres.
Due to this expansion, however, Carbodies was in a position to
refuse orders from slow or bad debtors. In 1934, Robert Jones,
the owner of the concern, was even prepared to accept a drop in
sales after he refused several orders from the Riley Company
because 'they were such bad payers'.95
Nevertheless, on the whole, the component firms' obligation to
accept credit sales continued for small and large supply firms
alike. For example, Cornercroft, a firm which despite enlarging
its capital from £2,700 to £150,000 through public floatation
during this period, did not succeed in reducing its credit sales.96
94 Ibid, 7 November 1935.
95 MBA, 358/14, 16 August 1933, 5 October 1934.
96 See chapter 4.
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Table 7.4 shows that the sales between 1926 and 1937 for the
months of March and May, the high season of the motor trade,
were dominated by credit sales.
Table 7.4
Cornercro t Sales for the months of March and Ma y 1926-1935.
Date Credit
Sales
Cash Sales Total
Sales
Credit
Sales as a
°A) of Total
Sales
1926 May 1,121 296 1,417 72
1927 May 1,854 738 2592 72
1928 Mar 2,112 798 2910 73
1929 Mar 2,298 476 2774 82
1930 Mar 2,190 623 2813 79
1931 Mar 1,822 701 2523 72
1932 Mar 1,570 507 2077 76
1933 Mar 4,596 733 5329 86
1934 Mar 6,815 820 7635 89
1935*Mar 6,365 1,044 7409 86
Source:CRO, Acc 1468/1/1, Cornercroft Minute Book 1926-1936, Monthly
balance sheets March and May
*1935-1936 Cornercroft became a public company
Indeed, the table reveals that as sales increased the proportion
of credit sales also rose from approximately 72 per cent in 1926
to 86 per cent in 1935. Moreover, the table also highlights the
constant pressure exerted upon component makers for credit
sales. The table represents sales figures for the spring and
summer, months which were considered the high season for the
motor trade. Consequently it was a period when car makers
experienced severe cash flow problems prior to the sales season
in the summer and autumn.
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Alongside the fiscal advantages of continuing to make use of
small component firms, such as the switching costs, the transfer
of re-tooling costs and the extraction of generous credit terms,
the car assemblers utilised the supply sector to comply with the
demands of the British market. Indeed, at the heart of the
debate of why British and American car firms adopted different
production strategies was the nature of their respective domestic
car markets. However, the significance of the British domestic
car market has too often been overlooked. Thus Chandler
explains the lack of backward integration in the British motor
industry as a lack of managerial foresight which he alleges was
characteristic of British industry throughout the period.
Similarly, Lewchuck attributes Britain's production strategy,
not to the peculiarity of its domestic market, but to the strength
of labour bargaining on the shopfloor. Both of these accounts
are not sufficient in explaining why there was low integration
in the industry and instead they simply imply that British
managers chose the wrong turn in their pursuit of mass
production. An analysis of the British car market will shed light
on the rational behind the car assemblers' decision to continue
utilising the component sector.
As chapter six has confirmed, standardization within the
British component industry was almost non-existent. This
factor, combined with the high cost of raw materials ensured
that British car components were on average more expensive
than the American equivalent. Table 7.5 shows that in 1922, a
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range of essential components were substantially cheaper in the
US compared with Britain.
Table 7.5
The Cost of Essential Car Components in Britain and America
or the Year of 1922.
American British made
Component Equiv. in L's Components
£ s d £ s d
Engine 23 3 3 64 15 6
Electrical 3 9 6 10 4 11
Equipment
Carburettor 16 10 . 1 15 6
Lamps 15 2 4 19 4
Radiator 1 17 6 2 18 0
Body 9 5 324 1 3
Source: University of Warwick, MRC, MSS 266/AU/1/1/1(ii), Austin
Minute Book, 'Visit of the Chairman and Mr E.L. Payton to the USA„
1922, p. 10.
The evidence for 1922 was consistent with a later report which
reviewed the prices of components and raw materials during the
interwar period. The report, which was produced in 1945 by the
Reconstruction of the Motor Industry Committee, noted that
prior to the war 'American producers had reached a high degree
of standardization especially of components and this feature was
almost wholly lacking in the British industry'. In contrast,
although Britain produced one-tenth the American output, it
manufactured over '120 different types of engine as against 30
or 40 in the USA'. The Committee concluded that during the
interwar period:
the price of steel and components is higher here [Britain]
than in the USA but again this is partly related to the
multiplicity of models calling for large numbers of
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different specifications which are produced in a relatively
small quantity.97
However, another important factor which highlighted the
differences between British and American firms was their
overseas trade. Whilst a large proportion of American cars
were exported to a world wide market, the vast majority of
British firms targeted their domestic market which had been
protected since 1915 by the Mckenna Duties. By 1937, only 20
per cent of the output of British private cars were exported.98
Moreover over 80 per cent of these exports were delivered to the
Empire, a market which had similar traits and demands to the
British domestic market. 99 Indeed, both of these markets
possessed little social depth and instead catered for a small but
significant middle class. The extent to which British and
American domestic car markets differed was encapsulated in a
report produced by Herbert Austin after a visit to America in
1922. Austin calculated that the conditions of living were so
vastly different that it would be necessary to add at least 25 per
cent, and in some cases 50 per cent, on to American products to
arrive	 at a reasonable
	
comparison to British goods.
Significantly, Austin also noted that:
It was easy to observe that their [working class] spending
power generally was considerably in excess of similar
classes in our country. A large proportion own cars, and
97 Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), CAB 124/626, 'Office of the
Minister of Reconstruction. The Motor Industry Post War Reconstruction',
3 and 15 April 1945.
98 Ibid, 3 April.
99 PRO, CAB 124/626, Report on the 'Resettlement of the Motor
Industry', by J.Jewkes, 28 March 1945.
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we were told that there were well over 200,000 cars in
Detroit, which has a population of about 1,100,000.100
The strength of the American market is further demonstrated by
the fact that of the twelve and half million cars on the road in
1922, almost ten and half million had been purchased in the
USA. 101
With such a small market and with the added pressures of the
emergence of a second hand market, British car assemblers were
forced into 'competition by variety' during the 1920s and 1930s.
Thus in an attempt to attract the middle-class consumers, car
manufacturers adopted a policy of annual model changes to
stamp an individuality on their designs. A report by J. Jewkes
on the nature of the British car market provides an insight into
the demands made on the British car firms during the interwar
period.
If it is generally agreed, motoring is and will continue to
be one of the semi-luxuries of the public, then the
attraction of a motor car lies not merely in the fact that it_
enables one to travel quickly but also that it is a kind of
hobby and a form of social display. If this is true, then to
reduce the motor-car to a utility standard would probably
tend to cut down the demand for cars. The manufacturer
had not introduced variety for the fun of it. He dislikes
having to change his jigs and tools every year more than
any body else. But he is compelled to do this in order to
maintain the existing volume of sales, because when a
person buys a car he very frequently attaches great
importance to new gadgets and new attractions on it.
100 MRC, MSS 266/AU/1/1/1 (ii), Austin Minute Book, 'Visit of the
Chairman and Mr E.L. Payton to the USA', 1922, p.p. 4-5.
101 Ibid, p. 9.
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Clearly, then, far from taking the wrong turn on the road to mass
production, the British manufacturers' adoption of a more
flexible production strategy, through the use of component
suppliers, was the optimum policy once the peculiarities of the
British market are assessed. Indeed, the rationale behind their
production strategy is strengthened further by the experience of
American car firms in Britain which traditionally possessed a
highly integrated productive system. Jewkes concluded his
report by noting that:
It is not without interest in this competition that the
American firm which operates in this country, General
Motors, although it mass produces in America, finds it
necessary to produce a fair range of types [of car] in this
country. 102
Thus the highly integrated production strategy which enabled
American firms to mass produce homogeneously designed cars
was a policy which proved unsuccessful in Britain. Similarly,
Ford, which was the market leader in Britain prior to the First
World War, slipped significantly during the interwar period.
Ford's highly integrated system was not flexible enough to allow
annual model changes which the largely middle-class dominated
market demanded. Consequently by 1929, Ford had dropped into
fourth position in the sale of cars, behind Morris, Austin and
Singer, capturing only 4 per cent of the market share. I03 A
highly integrated system, therefore, was no guarantee of market
102 PRO, CAB 124/626, 'Resettlement of the Motor Industry', by J.Jewkes,
28 March 1945.
103 Maxcy, 'The Motor Industry', p. 367.
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dominance. Graph 7.6 demonstrates that between 1929-1938
Ford's rate of return was consistently below that of the other
'Big Six' car manufacturers. The graph also shows clearly that
Vauxhall's change in production policy towards a more flexible
low integrated structure occurred during the mid-1930s when
their rates of return on capital began to increase. 
Graph 7.6
Rates of Return on Capital of the 'Big Six' Car Firms 1929-1938 rim
Date
Source: Maxcy and Silberston, The Motor Industry, (1959), P. 160.
In a marked contrast to Ford, the 'Big Six' had adopted the
optimum production policy of a vertically dis-integrated
structure which allowed annual model changes through the
utilisation of external economies.
The interwar era was a period of change and continuity in the
relationship between car assemblers and producers. The
structural changes in the motor industry which involved an
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influx of both car assemblers and component firms into the
trade, coupled with the surge towards volume production,
encouraged the extensive use of the component sector.
However, the instability of the small car assemblers of the 1920s
and the demands of the volume producers, added an extra
pressure to the already financially weak supply firms. Indeed, it
was the buyer's bargaining power which did not alter during this
period. The relationship which demanded that component firms
cover the cost of re-tooling and supply credit to assemblers were
practices which were established prior to the First World War.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that it is misleading to assume that the
British car industry failed to emulated American mass
production techniques due to a reluctance to engage in backward
integration. Indeed, both Chandler and Lazonick under-play the
significant role of the British domestic market in restricting
production totals and dictating manufacturing techniques.
Moreover, in the case of the British motor industry, the
significant role of the car component industry in providing a
broad financial support to car assemblers has been ignored. It
has also been argued that the factors which helped determine the
buyer and supplier relationship between the car assembler and
car component maker were closely linked to the changing
structure of the motor industry. The financial weakness of many
component firms, which had stemmed from diversifying from a
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declining cycle industry was reflected in their relationship with
car assemblers during the formative years of the motor industry.
Indeed, the early assemblers' prime concern of acquiring the
cheapest component available while also demanding generous
credit terms from their suppliers were practices which continued
throughout the period under study. These demands continued to
be met by component makers since the change in the structure of
the motor industry during the interwar period further weakened
their position. The increase in small assemblers and the surge
towards volume production by the 'Big 3' encouraged the
extensive use of the component sector. The small domestic new
car market and the growing second hand market encouraged car
manufacturers to make annual model changes, a process which
required a flexible production strategy. Indeed, the most
flexible approach was the utilisation of the component sector
since, with switching costs low, a variety of components could
be altered at short notice. Furthermore, in a bid to avoid
becoming over-committed to the 'Big 3', component makers
gained contracts with the myriad of small assemblers which had
entered the industry during the post war boom. For many
component firms, this proved a costly exercise, as the failure
rate for small assemblers during this period was high, leaving
suppliers such as Smith's Stamping with long runs of unpaid and
unwanted stock. For assemblers the interwar years proved
profitable since, although they increased production and variety
into their models, switching costs remained low and the
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suppliers were still obliged to offer credit and continued to bear
the brunt of re-tooling costs. Thus, when judged in its
historical context, it becomes clear the car manufacturer's
adoption of low levels of integration was the optimum
organisational strategy given the flexibility required for the
British car market.
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of firms and the nature of the product market, (iii) examine the
sources of finance, (iv) analyse the ownership and management
of firms, (v) investigate the extent of rationalization and
standardization, and (vi) analyse the supplies and production
policy adopted by the car assemblers.
By assessing the competitiveness of the product markets in the
five branches of the component trade, it was possible to identify
key agents that shaped the industry. Hirschman's model proved
invaluable in analysing the nature of competition in the industry
since it focused on the exit and loyalty mechanisms. A car
assembler (customer) which employed the voice mechanism
would almost certainly be trading with a component industry
which was not overly competitive. Conversely, the car
assembler which consistently selected the exit option was able
to take advantage of a supply industry that was highly
competitive. The evidence for the Coventry car component
industry showed that the structure of competition within the five
branches of the trade can be divided into three periods.
Between 1895-1912, the high number of component firms
entering the trade and the few exits recorded indicated the
industry was still in its emergent phase. The continued success
of Coventry cycle firms during the mid-1890s and the early
variation in the design of cars meant there was virtually no
market for the specialist producers. However, the component
industry entered its second phase after the motor depression of
1907, when between 1912-1919, car makers began producing
vehicles in larger batches. It was significant that this period
witnessed a large number of firms entering and leaving the
industry. Indeed, the First World War and the post-war car
boom cemented this highly competitive market structure since
both factors encouraged the entry of small engineering firms.
The final phase identified was the period 1919-1939. Here,
there were significant changes in the five branches of the trade.
Within the electrical, tyre and wheel branches large firms, with
head quarters outside of Coventry, developed monopoly
interests, ensuring that a high number of Coventry firms were
forced out of these sectors. However, the highly competitive
market structure continued in the body sector which recorded
high numbers of entries and exits between 1919-1939. In
relation to Hirschman's model, the evidence demonstrated that
the car assemblers' consistently opted for the exit mechanism in
their relationship with their suppliers. Thus the high turnover
of firms from 1912-1939, shows that car assemblers were able to
take advantage of a highly competitive component industry
which was derived of small component firms which possessed a
fairly low survival rate.
The research revealed that the vast majority of Coventry car
component firms possessed a relatively small capital and were
financed by family, friends and contacts within the business
community. Moreover, few firms attempted to raise capital
through the Stock Exchange due to a reluctance on behalf of the
capital markets to finance firms associated with the 'new
industries'. Recently, Ross has defended the clearing banks by
claiming that the banks were active in providing substantial
funds to British industry.	 However, in Coventry, the banks'
financial agreements with firms in the motor industry did not
extend past the overdraft facility.	 Although this financial
source proved invaluable to component firms, the overdraft
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facility could not be described as a long term investment
strategy. Indeed, a bank's intervention into the business policy
of a firm occurred only when there appeared a risk to the bank's
investment. In these circumstances, business policy was not
shaped through the objectives which would have necessarily
improved a firm's position in the car component industry, but
was instead shaped by the short term aim of safeguarding the
bank's loan.
An important structural characteristic of an industry which
has aroused much historical debate is the ownership and
management of firms. A number of historians such as Chandler,
Payne and Lazonick have argued that the family firm was a
major causal factor behind Britain's continued reliance on small
units of production and ultimately its economic decline between
1870-1939. The family business is characterised as a
conservative institution which inhibited the growth of a firm
through a reluctance to relinquish any managerial control.
Furthermore, the elementary education and
	
engineering
apprenticeship, which many founder-owner businessmen
experienced, has often been cited as instilling conservative
characteristics in its recipients.
Research on the nature of ownership and management in the
Coventry car component industry demonstrated that the majority
of firms were small family based enterprises. The evidence
indicated that the relatively few mergers or publicly floated
companies could not be simply attributed to the continuation of
family control, but to the highly competitive nature of the
industry itself. Indeed, in the few cases where firms did
expand, the 'conservative' characteristics of the proprietor were
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second to the appeal of greater market shares and larger profits.
However, the structure of the component industry, with its low
entry and exit barriers generally encouraged the establishment
of a myriad of small engineering firms which lacked the
resources to merge or issue shares to the public. Thus the
structure of the industry gave component firms little opportunity
to merge or expand. The thesis also investigated another
accusation levelled at the British family businesses, namely that
firms lagged behind their American counterparts since they
lacked the professionally trained managers. Analysis of the
small scale Coventry firms showed that the vast majority relied
on family, friends or links with the Coventry business
community to both appoint works managers and sales staff.
However, given the small scale of the Coventry car component
industry, the family firms were not held back by the absence of
formally trained management. Of greater importance to firms
involved in a supply industry, was the ability of management to
integrate fully in the Coventry business community. Even large
American subsidiaries adopted this informal and flexible
approach by employing large numbers of managers that were
based locally. Thus, the manager of BTH, often bypassed the
sales staff and official management structures and instead
sought personal contacts within the Coventry car component and
car assembling industries.
The evidence drawn from the Coventry car component industry
indicated that the family firm was more of a symptom of the
structure of an industry, rather than the dynamic force shaping
it. Consequently, the small scale family firms selected the
optimum managerial strategy of utilising the close-knit Coventry
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business community given the small scale structure of the
industry. Historians who have criticised British firms for not
creating centralised management structures, de-contextualise
their analysis by attempting to impose American managerial
models on small scale industrial structures in the belief that
larger corporate structures would have followed strategy. By
contrast, the thesis has argued that three important structures in
the Coventry car component industry were shaped by a highly
competitive product market. Moreover, research has analysed
the factors which determined why the market was so competitive
by investigating the demands placed on component makers by
the car assemblers between 1895-1939.
Historians such as Maxcy and Silberston, and Turner have
claimed that the car component industry was inherently
inefficient in three areas relating to the productive process viz.
output, technological implementation and the extent of product
standardization. This sweeping presupposition has led them to
conclude that the component industry was a major constraint on
the growth of the motor industry to 1914. The examination of
output, technology and standardization within the component
industry certainly showed that many firms were deficient in
these areas. Short term factors, such as the origin of a firm and
the First World War did have a bearing on a firm's ability to
engage in repetitive production and implement the latest
technology. Coventry firms which had diversified into the
component industry from a traditional trade experienced the
greatest difficulties in emulating former cycle and munition
firms which were conversant in producing long runs of
components.
	 The First World War, while enhancing the
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productive techniques of firms which continued to manufacture
its pre-war product, severely disrupted car component firms
which were forced into munition work. Post war conversion
proved difficult for many firms since the war-time plant and
remaining stock was of little use for the domestic market.
However, the chapter identified an institutional rigidity which
had a long term affect on the productive efficiency of the car
component industry, namely the demands made by the car
assemblers. The car assemblers demanded that component
makers supplied relatively short runs of non-standardized
components throughout the period under study. This ensured
that both large and small supply firms were required to hold
large quantities of non-standardized stock of which there was no
guarantee of sale. This had both a serious drain on component
firms' reserve capital and their ability to implement new
technology and engage in adequate research and development.
Consequently, such demands helped ensure that many component
firms were unable to expand through investing reserve capital or_
attracting external finance. Thus, inefficient productive
practices such as short runs of non-standardized components and
high stock levels were a characteristic of the Coventry car
component industry. However, Maxey and Silberston, and
Tuner's assertion that the car component industry held back the
motor industry through a refusal to adopt American mass
production techniques is misleading. The car component
industry was responding to demands made by the assemblers,
demands which focused on small runs of non-standardized
components which the American model of mass production
would have found impossible to meet. Therefore, since these
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demands actually played a role in shaping the industry, it was
necessary to investigate why car assemblers required the
supplies they ordered. Consequently, the thesis has traced the
origins and development of the relationship between the car
assemblers and component industry to establish how the
assemblers were able to take such a powerful negotiating
position between 1896-1939.
American historians, such as Chandler, Lazonick and
Lewchu k, have been critical of the British motor industry for
not integrating production along the lines of the American
model. They have argued that backward integration would have
encouraged mass production and created an efficient productive
process which would have been devoid of bottle-necks and
related problems with suppliers.
The analysis of the component firm's interaction with the car
assemblers demonstrated that it was more complex than the
conventional buyer and seller relationship. Car assemblers were
able to transfer production costs such as re-tooling, research and
development, and stock levels to a financially weak car
component industry. The financial weakness of many component
firms which had stemmed from diversifying from a traditional
declining industry, ensured that, by 1914, car assemblers were
able to take up a powerful bargaining position. Moreover, the
financial weakness of the component industry enabled car
assemblers to extract substantial credit from their suppliers, an
advantage which saved many car makers from almost certain
bankruptcy. Thus far from retarding the growth of the motor
industry, the component industry was instrumental in reducing
production costs and providing broad financial support to car
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The analysis on a broader level challenges Chandler's thesis
which asserted that structure followed strategy. This study has
adopted a holistic analysis of the motor industry which showed
that Britain's imperfect domestic car market created a highly
competitive car component industry that was shaped by
assemblers' demands. Thus the small scale of the Coventry car
component industry merely reflected Britain's domestic car
market rather than deficiencies in strategy at managerial level.
Appendix I
Car component Firms in Coven 1902
Firm Date Est Origins Product
Allard Coach Bodies
Baker Coach Bodies
City Carriage 1849 Coach Bodies
Hawkins Coach Bodies
Hollick Coach Bodies
Mills Fullford Coach Bodies
Pass. Thomas 1850 Coach Bodies
Kalker 1901 Est as a Car
Component Co
Electrical
Rotherhams Watches Electrical
Van Raden 1898 Est as a Car
Component Co
Electrical
Bayliss Cycles Engine/Comp
Engine/CompForman 1901 Est as a Car
Component Co
Simplex Est as a Car
Component Co
Engine/Comp
White and Poppe 1899 Military Engine/Comp
Other (Steel Balls)Automachinery 1896 Cycle
Coventry Chain 1896 Cycles Other (Chains)
Crawford Gear Cycles Other (Gears)
Dover 1893 Cycles Other (Steering
Wheels)
Coventry Motor
Fittings
1902 Est as a Car
Component Co
Radiators
Coventry Radiator 1883 Cycles Radiators
Doherty 1902 Est as a Car
Component Co
Radiators
Albion Drop
Forging
1900 Est as a Car
Component Co
Casting/stamp
Brett's Stamping 1896 Cycles Casting/stamp
Coventry
Malleable
1884 Cycles Casting/stamp
Smith's Stamping 1896 Cycles Casting/stamp
Coventry Swaging 1896 Cycles Unspecified
Clipper Tyres 1898 Cycles Wheels/Tyres
, Dunlop 1893 Cycles WheelsiTyres
Sources: Kelly's Directory of Warwickshire 1900, Ryland's Directory of Iron, Steel & Allied Trades 1902,
Motor Manufacturers of Coventry (Museum ofBritish Road Transport), Autocar, The Motor, Lloyds Bank
Coventry branch Archive, Midland Bank Coventry branch Archive_
Car Com ponent Firms in Coventry 1912
_
Albert Mason 1911 Unknown Bodies
Awson	 Motor
Carriage
Unknown Bodies
Baker Coach Bodies
Charlesworth Coach Bodies
City	 Carriage
Co
1849 Coach Bodies
Coventry
Motor Bodies
Unknown Bodies
Foleshill
Motor
	
&
Carriage Wks
Unknown Bodies
Hawkins 1895 Coach (1900) Bodies
Hewers	 Car
Bodies
Unknown Bodies
Hobley,
Thomas
Coach Bodies
Holley Unknown Bodies
Hollick	 &
Pratt
Coach Bodies
Mills Fulford 1899 Unknown Bodies
Parkside
Motor Bodies
1912 Unknown Bodies
Pass. T 1850 Coach (1900) Bodies
Viking	 Car
Carriage
Unknown Bodies
Albion Drop
Forging
1900 Est as Car
Comp Co
Casting/Stamp
ing
Brett's
Stamping
1896 Cycles Casting/Stamp
ing
Coventry
Malleable
1884 (1900) General
Castings
Casting/Stamp
ing
Pheonix
Motor
Castings
1908 Est as a Car
Component Co
Casting/Stamp
ing
Smith's
Stamping
1896 Cycles (1900) Casting/Stamp
ing
Coventry
Electrical
Company
Unknown Electrical
Coventry
Watch
Movement Co
1889 Cycles (1903) Electrical
Eagle 1912-1913 Est as a Car
Component Co
Electrical
Kalker 1901 Est as a Car
Component Co
Electrical
ML Magneto 1908 General
Electrical
Electrical
Rothehams Cycles Electrical
United	 Motor
Industries
Unknown Electrical
Van Raden 1898 Est as a Car
Component Co
Electrical
Barnett Co Unknown Engines/Comp
Engines/compBayliss Cycles (1902)
British	 Piston
Ring
1911 Machine Tool
(1911)
Engine/comp
Condor Motor
Co
Unknown Engines/Comp
Cromwell
Engineering
Unknown Engines/Comp
E.J. Hardy 1890s Cycles (1903) Engine/comp
Forman 1901-1912 Est as a Car
Component Co
Engines/comp
Johnston,
Hurley &
Martin
1904 Est as a Car
Component Co
Engines/comp
Motor
Accessories
Company
1911 Est as a Car
Component Co
Engines/comp
Payne & Co Cars/Gas
Engines
Engines/comp
Pistons 1911 Est as Car
Comp
Engines/comp
Remmington
Motor Co
Unknown Engines/Comp
Simplex . Est as as Car
Component Co
Engines/comp
White	 &
Poppe
1899 Military
(1901)
Engines/comp
Automachiner
y
Cycle Other	 (Steel
Balls)
Coventry
Chain
1896 Cycles (1900)
•
Other
(Chains)
Dover 1893 Cycles Other
(Steering
Wheels)
RadiatorsCoventry
Motor Fittings
1902 Est as a Car
Component Co
Coventry
Radiator
1883 Cycles Radiators
Doherty 1901 Est as a Car
Component Co
Radiators
Motor Raditor Est as a Car
Component Co
Radiator
Randle
Radiator
1909 Est as a Car
Component Co
Radiators
Bluemels 1891 1907 Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Bramco Cycles
Coventry
Motor
Accessories
Est as Car
Component Co
Coventry
Ordnance
Works
1905 Military
(1907)
Unspecified
Coventry
Swaging
1896 Cycles (1900) Unspecified
Mascot Unknown Unspecified
UnspecifiedPriory	 Motor
Accesories
1910 Est as Car
Compoents
Captain Ring Unknown Wheels/Tyres
Coventry
Wheel
Corn pany
Cycles Wheels/Tyres
Dunlop 1893 Cycles (1900) Wheels/Tyres
Sources: Ryland's Directory of Coventry, Kelly's Directory of Warwickshire,
The Motor, Autocar, Lloyds Bank Coventry District Archive, Midland Bank
Coventry District Archive.
Car Component Firms in Coventry 1919
Atkinson. S.F. 1913-1919 Unknown Bodies
Awson Unknown Bodies
Baker Coach Bodies
Charlesworth Coach Bodies
City	 Carriage
Co
Coach Bodies
Coventry
Motor	 &
Sundries
Est as a Car
Comp Co
Bodies
Earlsdon
Motor	 Body
Co
Est as a Car
Comp Co
Bodies
Foleshill
Motor	 &
Carriage Wks
Unknown Bodies
Hollick	 and
Pratt
Coach Bodies
Midland Light
Bodies
1913-1919 Est as Car
Component Co
Bodies
Midland
Motor	 Body
Co
1913-1919 Unknown Bodies
Mills Fulford 1899 Unknown Bodies
Parkside
Motor Bodies
1912 Unknown Bodies
Pass. T 1850 Coach (1900) Bodies
Albion Drop
Forging
1900 Est as Car
Comp Co
Casting/Stamp
ing
Brett's
Stamping
1896 Cycles Casting/Stamp
ing
Britannia
_
General
Casting
Casting/Stamp
ing
Clarke	 &
More
Unknown Casting/Stamp
ing
Co y	Motor
Foundry
Est as Car
Component Co
Casting/Stamp
Coventry
Malleable
1884 (1900) General
Castings
Casting/Stamp
ing
Coventry
Plating	 &
Press Wks
1913-1919 Est as a Car
Comp Co
Casting/Stamp
ing
Holbrook
Foundry
1919 Est as a Car
Comp Co
Casting/Stamp
ing
Middlemores Leather
accessories
Casting/Stamp
ing
Pheonix
Motor
Castings
1908 Est as a Car
Component Co
Casting/Stamp
;Jig
Reliance
Sheet Metal
1913-1919 Est as a Car
Component Co
Castings'Stam
pings
Rowland	 Hill
& Sons
1859 (1901) General
Castings
Casting/Stamp
ing
Smith's
Stamping
1896 Cycles (1900) Casting/Stamp
ing
Star Foundry Unknown Casting/Stamp
ing
Sterling
Metals
Unknown Casting/Stamp
ing
Bonniksen, B. 1913-1919 Est as Car
Comp Co
Electrical
British
Thompson
Houston
1912 Est as a Car
Component Co
Electrical
Coventry
Electrical
Company
Unknown Electrical
Coventry
Magneto
1914 Est as a Car
Component Co
Electrical
Coventry
Watch
Movement Co
1889
.
Cycles (1903) Electrical
Kalker 1901 Est as a Car
Component Co
Electrical
ML Magneto 1908 General
Electrical
Electrical
Rothehams Cycles Electrical
Van Raden 1898 Est as a Car
Component Co
Electrical
Bayliss Cycles (1902) Engines/comp
British	 Piston
Ring
1909 Machine Tool
(1911)
Engine/comp
Condor Motor
Co
Unknown Engines/Comp
Cromwell Est as Car
Component Co
Engines/Comp
E.J. Hardy 1890s Cycles (1903) Engine/comp
Holkey Bros 1913-1919 Est as a Car
Comp Co
Engines/Comp
Hotchkiss 1915 Est as Car
Component Co
Engines/Comp
Johnston,
Hurley &
Martin
1904 Est as a Car
Component Co
Engines/comp
Motor
Accessories
Company
1911 Est as a Car
Component Co
Engines/comp
Nero Engine
Co
1915 Est as a Car
Comp Co
Engines/Comp
Payne & Co Cars/Gas
Engines
Engines/comp
Pistons 1911 Est as Car
Comp
Engines/comp
Remington
Motor Co
Unknown Engines/Comp
Riley Engine
Co
Est as a Car
Comp Co
Engines/Comp
Simplex Est as as Car
Component Co
Engines/comp
Valves Ltd 1915 Est as a Car
Component Co
Engines/Comp
White	 &
Poppe
1899 Military
(1901)
Engines/comp
Auto'ionery . Cycle Other	 (Steel
Balls)
Coventry
Chain
1896 Cycles (1900) Other
(Chains)
Other
(Steering
Wheels)
Radiators	 .
Dover 1893 Cycles
Coventry
Motor Fittings
1902 Est as a Car
Component Co
Coventry
Radiator
1883 Cycles Radiators
Doherty 1901 Est as a Car
Component Co
Radiators
Eclipse	 Motor
Fittings
1913-1919 Est as a Car
Comp Co
Radiators
Excel'
Radiator	 and
Sheet	 Metal
Co
1913-1919 Est as a Car
Comp Co
Radiators
Randle
Radiator
1909 Est as a Car
Component Co
Radiators
Bluemels 1891 1907 Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Bramco Cycles
Coventry
Swaging
1896 Cycles (1900)
General
Accessories
Supply Co
1913-1919 Est as a Car
Component Co
Unspecified
Gilford	 Motor
Accessories
1913-1919 Est as a Car
Component Co
Unspecified
Holf	 Motor
Accessories
1913-1919 Est as a Car
Component Co
Unspecified
Lake & Elliot 1913-1919 Est as a Car
Component Co
Unspecified
Page & Key 1913-1919 Est as a Car
Component Co
Unspecified
Spencer Bros 1913-1919 Est as a Car
Component Co
Unspecified
White & Co 1913-1919 Est as a Car
Component Co
Unspecified
Wolf & Co 1913-1919 Est as a Car
Component Co
Unspecified
Captain Ring Unknown Wheels/Tyres
Dunlop 1893 Cycles (1900) Wheels/Tyres
Coventry
Wheel
Company
Cycles Wheels/Tyres
Sources: Ryland's Directory of Coventry, Spennell's Directory of the City of
Coventry, Kelly's Directory of Warwickshire, Lloyds Bank Coventry district
archive, Midland Bank Coventry district archive.
Car Com ponent Firms 1926
Firm Location HO Product
Awson Motor Coventry Bodies
Carbodies Coventry Bodies
Caton Co
,
Coventry Bodies
Charlesworth Coventry Bodies
Cheylesmore
Sheet Metal
Coventry Bodies
City Carriage
Wks
Coventry Bodies
Commercial
Dome Wing
Coventry Bodies
Cross & Ellis Coventry Bodies
Eaves &
Barratt
Coventry Bodies
Midland Light
Bodies
Coventry Bodies
Midland
Motor Bodies
Coventry Bodies
Mills Fulford Coventry Bodies
Morris Motor
Bodies
Oxford	 * Bodies
Motor Panels Coventry Bodies
Pass Thomas Coventry Bodies
Bryant. E Coventry Bodies
Hanock &
Warman
Coventry Bodies
Foleshill
Carriage
Coventry Bodies
Ward. W.E. Coventry Bodies
Coventry
Motor Wings
Coventry Bodies
.
Midland
Motor Bodies
Coventry Bodies
Albion Drop
Forging
Coventry Casting/Stamp
Brett's London Casting/Stamp
Britannia
Foundry
Coventry Casting/stamp
Clarendon
Pressings
Coventry Casting/Stamp
Co y Motor
Foundry
Coventry Casting/Stamp
Coventry
Malleable
Coventry Casting/Stamp
Fozel Castings Coventry Casting stamp
Holbrook
Foundry
Coventry Casting Stamp
Middlemores Coventry Casting Stamp
Pheonix
Castings
Coventry Casting/Stamp
Reliance
Sheet Metal
Coventry Casting/stamp
Smiths Coventry Casting Stamp
Sterling
Metals
Coventry Casting/Stamp
Bryce
(Formerly
Highfield Rd
Elec Co)
Coventry Electrical
BTH London * Electical
Coventry
Magneto
Coventry Electrical
ML Magneto Coventry Electrical
Saunders
Electrical
Coventry Electrical
Van Raden Coventry Electrical
British Piston
Ring
Coventry Engines/Comp
Condor Motor
& Fittings
Coventry Engines/Comp
Co y Movement
Co
Coventry Engines/Comp
Cromwell
Engineering
Coventry Engines/Comp
Johnston
Hurley and
Martin
Coventry Engines/Comp
Morris Motors Oxford	 * Engines/Comp
Page & Hardy Coventry
Coventry
Coventry
Engines/Comp
Engines/Comp
Engine/Comp
Payne & Co
Pistons
Riley Engine Coventry Engines/Comp
Rotherams Coventry Engines/Comp
Valves Ltd Coventry Engines/Comp
Autohoods Coventry Other (Hoods)
Automach Coventry Other (Steel
balls)
Bramble Sheet
Metal
Coventry Other
(bonnets)
Other
(Trimmings)
Other (Hoods)
Other (Discs)
Other (Chains)
Brooke Coventry
Calso Hoods Coventry
Coventry
Manchester
Cornercroft
Coventry
Chain
Fry & Co Coventry
Coventry
Other (Hoods)
Other
(Bolts/pins)
Harnell
Engineering
Co y Motor &
Sundries
Coventry Radiators
Co y Motor
Fittings
Coventry Radiators
Co y Radiator Coventry Radiators
Eclipse Motor
Fittings
Coventry Radiators
Randle Rad Coventry Radiators
Barnes Acess Coventry
Coventry
Coventry
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Blumel Bros
Coventry
Equipment
Earl
Engineering
Coventry Unspecified
General
Accessory
Supply
Coventry Unspecified
Godiva
Engineering &
Motor Works
Coventry Unspecified
H.O.M
Cabinet
Coventry Unspecified
Holt Motor
Accessory
Coventry Unspecified
Lake & Elliot Coventry
London
Unspecified
UnspecifiedTorrington Co
Wal Car
Equipment
Coventry Unspecified
Wantnaby &
Son
Coventry Unspecified
White & Co Coventry Unspecified
Dunlop Rim &
.Wheel
London * Wheels/Tyres
Warland Rim Coventry Wheels/Tyres
Sources: Ryland's Directory of Coventry, Spennell's Directory of the City of
Coventry, Kelly's Directory of Warwickshire, Lloyds Bank Coventry district
archive, Midland Bank Coventry district archive.
Car Com onent Firms in Coventr y 1936
Firm Location of
HO
Product
Awson Motor Coventry Bodies
Butlins Coach Coventry Bodies
Carbodies Coventry Bodies
Caton Co Coventry Bodies
Charlesworth Coventry Bodies
Cheylesmore
Sheet metal
Coventry Bodies
City Carriage
Wks
Coventry Bodies
Commercial
Dome Wing
Coventry Bodies
Co y Hood &
Sidescreen
Coventry Bodies
Co y
 Motor &
Sundries
Coventry	 • Bodies
Coventry
General
Welding
Coventry Bodies
Cross & Ellis Coventry Bodies
Eaves & Son Coventry Bodies
Fisher &
Ludlow
Birmingham Bodies
Keight Coventry Bodies
Letchford
Swift
- Coventry Bodies
Midland Light
Bodies
Coventry Bodies
Midland
Motor Bodies
Coventry Bodies
Mills Fulford Coventry Bodies
Morris Motor
Bodies
Oxford	 * Bodies	 .
Motor Panels Coventry Bodies
Swallow
Coach
Coventry Bodies
Universal
Panels
0 Coventry Bodies
Willis Panel Coventry Bodies
Albion Drop
Forging
Coventry Casting/Stamp
Brett's London Casting/Stamp
Clarendon
Pressings
Coventry Casting/Stamp
Co y
Chrominum
Plating Co
Coventry Casting/Stamp
Co y Motor
Foundry
Coventry Casting/Stamp
Holbrook
Foundry
Coventry Casting/Stamp
Middlemores Coventry Casting/Stamp
Pheonix
Castings
Coventry Casting/Stamp
Reliance
Sheet Metal
Coventry Casting/stamp
Smiths Coventry
Coventry
Casting/Stamp
Casting/StampSterling
Metals
Bryce
(Formerly
Highfield Rd
Elec Co)
Coventry Electrical
Coventry
Magneto
Coventry Electrical
Midland
Components
Coventry Electrical
Van Raden Coventry Electrical
Alpha Eng Coventry Engines/Comp
British Ring Coventry Engines/Comp
Co y Movement
Co
Coventry Engines/Comp
Morris Motors Oxford	 * Engines/Comp
Pistons Coventry Engine/Comp
Riley Engine Coventry Engines/Comp
Rotherams Coventry Engines/Comp
Valves Ltd Coventry Engines/Comp
Automach Coventry Other (Steel
balls)
Brooke Coventry Other
(Trimmings)
Other (Discs)
Other (Gears)
Cornercroft London	 *
Gears &
Components
Coventry
Harnell
Engineering
Coventry Other
(Bolts/pins)
Iso Speedic Coventry Other
(Speedo/guage
s)
RenoId Chain Manchester Other (Chains)
Other (Gears)Self Changing
Gears
Coventry
Co y Motor
Fittings
Coventry Radiators
Co y Radiator Coventry Radiators
Randle Rad Coventry Radiators
Barnes Acess Coventry
Coventry
Coventry
Unspecified
Unspecified
Unspecified
Blumel Bros
Torrington Co
Dunlop Rim &
Wheel
London * Wheels/Tyres
Sources: Ryland's Directory of Coventry, Spennell's Directory of the City of
Coventry, Kelly's Directory of Warwickshire, Lloyds Bank Coventry district
archive, Midland Bank Coventry district archive.
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